Agricultural Sector Analysis on Greenhouse Gas Emission Mitigation in the United States by Schneider, Uwe A.
INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films 
the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and 
dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of 
computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations 
and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized 
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing 
from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6s x 9” black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing 
in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.
Bell & Howell Information and Learning 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 
800-521-0600
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ANALYSIS ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION 
MITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A Dissertation 
by
UWE ANDREAS SCHNEIDER
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
December 2000
Major Subject: Agricultural Economics
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number 9994329
UMI*
UMI Microform9994329 
Copyright 2001 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company. 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ANALYSIS ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION
MITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A Dissertation 
by
UWE ANDREAS SCHNEIDER
Submitted to Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Approved as to style and content by:
Bruce A.McCarl 
(Chair of Committee)
'/Cu'fryJh.
r. Mielde/^^James W j  
(Member)
A. Gene Nelson 
(Head of Department)
December 2000
Thomas W. Boutton 
(Member)
Paul D. Mitchell 
(Member)
Major Subject: Agricultural Economics
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ABSTRACT
Agricultural Sector Analysis on Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Mitigation in the United States. (December 2000)
Uwe Schneider, M.Ag., Humboldt University, Berlin;
M.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Bruce A. McCarl
This dissertation analyzes the economic potential of agriculture to participate in 
greenhouse gas emission mitigation efforts. Major agricultural mitigation strategies are 
included simultaneously to capture interactions. Results indicate that agriculture's 
contribution to emission reduction may be substantial, but not sufficient to fulfill the 
requirements of the Kyoto Protocol, which are estimated to be in the neighborhood of 
700 million metric tons (MMT) of carbon equivalents by the year 2010. Even under 
extreme economic incentives, the annual emission reduction potential from U.S. 
agriculture does not exceed 300 MMT if including all carbon dioxide related strategies, 
or 400 MMT if also including carbon equivalent emission reductions of methane and 
nitrous oxide related strategies.
Production of biomass feedstock for power plants, i.e. switch grass, becomes the 
dominating mitigation strategy for carbon saving incentives o f S80 per ton of carbon 
equivalent and above. Lower incentives between S5 and S80 per metric ton o f carbon 
equivalent lead to a complex mixture of various mitigation strategies involving reduced
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
fertilization, tillage, and irrigation; increased afforestation; and improved liquid manure 
management. In addition to net emission reductions between 25 and 70 MMT of carbon 
equivalents, low carbon incentives involve substantial environmental gains through less 
erosion and less nitrogen pollution.
Cryyr>ir*o 1 rocnlte from cKo'V tViA imnArtnno® of* oo^O>^^mrri w u i  i w O c f c i c d  L i  W i l l  h i i i O  u t j O v L L u i i U i i  d & i v J * *  v i i w  t  L i i p U i  i u i i w  v  « J i  u C w O u i i k i i i ^  l U l
interdependencies among mitigation strategies. The savings potential of mitigation 
strategies examined individually may be considerably higher than it is under a joint 
analysis. The findings also provide support for a new breed of combined environmental 
and farm policy, which would replace costly individual programs aimed at various 
environmental goals or to provide for fair farm incomes.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT...........................................................................................................................iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................................................................................... v
LIST OF FIGURES.............................................................................................................. xii
LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................... xvi
LIST OF EQUATIONS.....................................................................................................xviii
1 INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................I
1.1 Background............................................................................................................. 1
1.2 Objectives...............................................................................................................2
2 U.S. AGRICULTURE’S ROLE IN A GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION 
MITIGATION WORLD: AN ECONOMIC REVIEW AND PERSPECTIVE............. 5
2.1 What Is the Reason Society Might Be Involved in GHGE Reduction?..............5
2.1.1 The Kyoto Protocol..................................................................................... 6
2.2 How Might Agriculture Participate in or Be Influenced by GHGE 
Reduction Efforts?...................................................................................................7
2.2.1 Agriculture - A Source of Greenhouse Gases........................................... 8
2.2.1.1 Methane..............................................................................................9
2.2.1.2 Nitrous Oxide...................................................................................14
2.2.1.3 Carbon Dioxide................................................................................14
2.2.2 Agriculture - A GHG Sequestering Sink................................................. 15
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
vi
Page
2.2.2.1 Soil Sequestration.............................................................................15
2.2.2.2 Forest Sequestration.........................................................................16
2.2.3 Agriculture - A Way of Offsetting Net Greenhouse Gas
Emissions...................................................................................................—0
2.2.3.1 Biomass for Power Plants................................................................20
2.2.3.2 Liquid Fuel Production - Ethanol................................................... 21
2.2.3.3 Building Products Substitution....................................................... 25
2.2.4 Agriculture - Operating in a Mitigating World......................................... 25
2.3 How Might a Country Implement GHGE Reduction?........................................ 26
2.3.1 Markets for Emissions Trading.................................................................27
2.3.2 Taxation or Subsidization......................................................................... 28
2.3.3 Trading Across Gases............................................................................... 29
2.3.4 Trading Across Countries......................................................................... 29
2.3.5 Monitoring and Verification..................................................................... 31
2.4 What Characteristics of Agriculture Might Be Relevant in Formulating 
GHGE Mitigation Policy?..................................................................................... 33
2.4.1 Positive and Negative Externalities..........................................................33
2.4.1.1 Potential Positive Externalities........................................................33
2.4.1.2 Potential Negative Externalities......................................................35
2.4.2 Political Will for Public Intervention and Farm Support.:........................ 35
2.4.3 Demand Characteristics.............................................................................36
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
vii
Page
2.4.4 Practical Sectoral Economics.................................................................... 36
2.4.4.1 Axe the Comparative Costs of Agricultural Net GHGE 
Reductions Low Enough?.............................................................. 37
2.4.4.2 Will a Carbon Program Disrupt the Traditional Agricultural 
Sector?............................................................................................. 37
2.4.5 Will the Farmer Participate?..................................................................... 38
2.4.6 Incentive Program Design..........................................................................39
2.4.6.1 Preservation of Gains Over Time...................................................40
2.4.6.2 Countervailing Actions....................................................................40
2.4.6.3 Hitting More Than the Target......................................................... 41
2.4.6.4 Uncertainty of Non-Point Sinks..................................................... 41
2.4.7 Property Rights..........................................................................................42
2.4.8 Trade and Program Participation by Trade Competitors........................ 43
2.4.9 Eligibility of Agricultural Sinks................................................................ 43
2.5 Concluding Comments -- Agriculture as a Bridge to the Future...................... 43
3 GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
METHODOLOGY USED IN THIS DISSERTATION................................................45
3.1 Input Market Interdependencies...........................................................................45
3.2 Output Market Effects..........................................................................................49
3.3 Effects o f Mitigation Policies on Other Agricultural Externalities................... 54
3.4 Efficiency of Mitigation Policies.........................................................................58
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
viii
Page
3.5 Transaction Costs................................................................................................. 59
4 METHODOLOGY..........................................................................................................61
4.1 Developing Farm Level GHGE Data - Use of the Erosion Productivity 
Impact Calculator (EPIC)...................................................................................... 63
4.1.1 Description................................................................................................63
4.1.2 Running EPIC for Alternative Fertilization Options............................. 64
4.2 The Agricultural Sector Model (ASM)............................................................... 65
4.3 The Agricultural Sector and Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Model 
(ASMGHG)............................................................................................................ 72
4.3.1 New Crop Management Dimensions in ASMGHG............................... 72
4.3.2 Linking Farm Level Emissions Data to ASMGHG............................... 74
4.3.3 ASMGHG Validation.............................................................................. 78
4.3.4 Methane Emissions...................................................................................81
4.3.4.1 Livestock Emissions.......................................................................81
4.3.4.2 Emission Reductions From Livestock Production.......................83
4.3.4.2.1 Manure Handling...................................................................83
4.3.4.2.2 Emission Reductions From Altered Enteric 
Fermentation..........................................................................89
4.3.4.3 Rice Production.............................................................................. 94
4.3.5 Carbon Dioxide Emissions......................................................................96
4.3.5.1 Source Emissions...........................................................................96
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ix
Page
4.3.5.1.1 Direct Carbon Emissions Through Fossil Fuel Use........... 97
4.3.5.1.2 Indirect Carbon Emissions Through Irrigation.................. 98
4.3.5.1.3 Indirect Carbon Emissions Through Fertilizer Use......... 100
4.3.5.2 Sink Enhancements......................................................................101
4.3.5.2.1 Soil Carbon Emission Sink/Source....................................102
4.3.5.2.2 Production of Fossil Fuel Substitutes................................109
4.3.5.2.3 Conversion of Agricultural Land Into Forestry................113
4.3.6 Nitrous Oxide Emissions........................................................................ 116
4.3.7 Emissions Accounting in ASMGHG......................................................118
4.3.7.1 Individual Emission Sources and Sinks...................................... 118
4.3.7.2 Aggregated Emissions..................................................................121
4.3.8 Mitigation Policies...................................................................................122
4.3.8.1 Dual Emission Accounting...........................................................122
4.3.8.2 Policy Equations........................................................................... 125
4.3.8.2.1 Emission Standards............................................................ 125
4.3.8.2.2 Emissions Trading..............................................................126
4.3.8.2.3 Emission Taxes and Sequestration Subsidies................... 128
4.3.8.2.4 Special Greenhouse Gas Emission Related Tax or
Subsidy Policies...................................................................128
4.3.9 Scenario Analysis in ASMGHG............................................................. 129
4.3.10 ASMGHG Tableau.................................................................................. 130
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Page
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM JOINT GHGE MITIGATION ANALYSIS.......... 133
5.1 Overall Contribution of Agriculture to Greenhouse Gas Abatement.............. 134
5.2 Mitigation Contribution of Individual Strategies..............................................138
3.3 Welfare Implications of Mitigation to Agricultural Sector Participants......... 14j
5.4 Mitigation Impacts on Traditional Agricultural Markets................................. 146
5.4.1 Management Changes.............................................................................146
5.4.2 Market Indicators.................................................................................... 154
5.5 Diversion of Agricultural Land to Different Uses............................................158
5.6 Mitigation Impacts on Other Agricultural Externalities.................................. 165
6 EXAMINATION OF ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS.......................................... 168
6.1 Joint Versus Independent Analysis of Agricultural Mitigation Options..........169
6.2 Trade Between Greenhouse Gases.................................................................... 176
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis............................................................................................ 178
6.3.1 Soil Organic Matter Coefficients........................................................... 181
6.3.2 Nitrous Oxide Emission Coefficients....................................................184
6.4 Efficiency Losses and Transaction Costs From Upstream Policies...................187
6.5 External Effects of Specific Mitigation Policies on Unregulated Emission 
Sources................................................................................................................. 188
7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.......................................................................... 194
NOTES................................................................................................................................199
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
XI
Page
REFERENCES................................................................................................................... 201
NOMENCLATURE........................................................................................................... 217
APPENDIX A COPYRIGHT STATEMENT.................................................................218
APPENDIX B EPIC PARAMETERS FOR CORN PRODUCTION IN IOWA 220
VITA................................................................................................................................... 224
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 2-1 Costs of GHGE reductions through enteric fermentation, based on
Gerbens (1999a)...........................................................................................12
Figure 2-2 Costs of GHGE reductions through livestock manure
management, based on Gibbs......................................................................13
Figure 2-3 Costs of GHGE reductions through tree planting........................................ 19
Figure 2-4 Costs of carbon reductions through biofuel for power plants, based
on McCarl, Adams, and Alig...................................................................... 23
Figure 2-5 Costs of GHGE reductions through ethanol use, based on Jerko.............. 24
Figure 3-1 Illustrative graphical analysis of potential shifts of demand for
farmland after a mitigation policy under joint (upper panel) and
independent (lower panel) analysis............................................................ 46
Figure 3-2 Possible responses in agricultural output markets after greenhouse
gas emission regulation...............................................................................50
Figure 3-3 Impacts of greenhouse gas emission (G) mitigation efforts on
erosion (E) and nitrogen pollution (N).......................................................55
Figure 4-1 Agricultural Sector Model economic structure...........................................73
Figure 4-2 Simplified ASMGHG tableau....................................................................132
Figure 5-1 Effect o f low carbon prices on joint emission reduction of
greenhouse gases and contribution of individual gas categories.............135
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
xiii
Page
Figure 5-2 Effect o f high carbon prices on joint emission reduction of
greenhouse gases and contribution of individual gas categories.............136
Figure 5-3 Effect of extremely high carbon prices on joint emission reduction
of greenhouse gases and contribution of individual gas categories...........137
Figure 5-4 Effects o f carbon prices on agricultural carbon source reductions.......... 139
Figure 5-5 Effects of carbon prices on agricultural carbon sinks...............................140
Figure 5-6 Effects o f carbon prices on nitrous oxide emission reductions and
nitrogen use............................................................................................... 141
Figure 5-7 Effects o f carbon prices on methane emission reduction
components.................................................................................................142
Figure 5-8 Effects o f high carbon prices on welfare in the agricultural sector......... 144
Figure 5-9 Effects o f low carbon prices on welfare in the agricultural sector.......... 145
Figure 5-10 Effect of high carbon prices on tillage system use................................... 148
Figure 5-11 Effect of low carbon prices on tillage system use.................................... 149
Figure 5-12 Effects of high carbon prices on irrigation of conventional crops
and related emissions................................................................................. 150
Figure 5-13 Effects o f high carbon prices on dairy management and output............. 152
Figure 5-14 Effects o f high carbon prices on methane emission reduction
components from dairy cows.................................................................... 153
Figure 5-15 Effect o f high carbon prices on land values..............................................155
Figure 5-16 Effects of high carbon prices on conventional crop production.............. 156
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
xiv
Page
Figure 5-17 Effects of low carbon prices on conventional crop production...............157
Figure 5-18 Effects of high carbon prices on overall livestock production................ 159
Figure 5-19 Effects of low carbon prices on livestock production.............................. 160
Figure 5-20 Effect of high carbon prices on land use................................................... 161
Figure 5-21 Effect of high carbon prices on production of biofuel............................. 163
Figure 5-22 Effect of high carbon prices on regional biofuel production....................164
Figure 5-23 Effects of high carbon prices on other agricultural externalities.............166
Figure 5-24 Effects of low carbon prices on other agricultural externalities..............167
Figure 6-1 Total GHGE reduction potential under different assumptions
about implementation of available mitigation strategies.........................170
Figure 6-2 Carbon emission offsets from ethanol use under different
assumptions about implementation of available mitigation
strategies (ethanol price = S1.20/gallon)..................................................172
Figure 6-3 Total GHGE reduction potential obtained through joint mitigation
analysis and through summation of individual strategies’ potential 175
Figure 6-4 Land value changes under different assumptions about
implementation of available mitigation strategies................................... 177
Figure 6-5 Efficiency gain of joint emission reduction versus individual
GHGE reduction.........................................................................................179
Figure 6-6 Social costs of GHGE mitigation under different assumptions
about GHG involvement and substitutability.......................................... 180
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
XV
Page
Figure 6-7 Total GHGE reductions in the agricultural sector for different
levels o f soil organic matter coefficients (SOMC)...................................182
Figure 6-8 Soil carbon emission reductions for different SOMC levels and
different carbon values...............................................................................183
Figure 6-9 Total GHGE reductions in the agricultural sector for different
adjustments of N^O emission coefficients and different carbon
values........................................................................................................... 185
Figure 6-10 Nitrous oxide emissions reductions for different adjustments of
N:0 emission coefficients and different carbon values.......................... 186
Figure 6-11 Carbon sequestration efficiency for different types o f policy
implementation........................................................................................... 190
Figure 6-12 Effects o f hypothetical soil carbon policy on regulated (SOM
carbon) and unregulated GHGE sources and sinks..................................192
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
xvi
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 2-1 Cost Estimates for Methane Emission Reductions....................................10
Table 2-2 Cost Estimates for Nitrous Oxide Emission Reductions............................11
Table 2-3 Cost Estimates for Carbon Sink Enhancements......................................... 17
Table 2-4 Cost Estimates of Carbon Emission Reductions Through Fossil
Fuel Offsets................................................................................................. 22
Table 2-5 Uncertainty Discount Factors for CE Emissions Trading Based on
Proposition by Canada.................................................................................32
Table 4-1 Description of Program to Link EPIC to ASMGHG................................. 66
Table 4-2 Annual EPIC Parameters From Comparative Runs.................................. 69
Table 4-3 Nitrogen Fertilizer Choices......................................................................... 75
Table 4-4 EPA Data Used for Manure Management Improvement.......................... 85
Table 4-5 Parameters for Modeling BST-Treatment of Dairy Cows......................... 95
Table 4-6 Calibration of Soil Carbon Net Emission Coefficients............................107
Table 4-7 Regional Assumptions on Biomass Productivity and Resulting Net
Emission Values.........................................................................................110
Table 4-8 Data and Assumptions for Calculating Emission Offsets From
Biomass Power Plants............................................................................... 111
Table 4-9 Data on Potential, Costs, and Carbon Sequestration From Planting
Trees on Agricultural Lands (After Stavins)............................................114
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
xvii
Page
Table 4-10 Assumptions for Nitrous Oxide Emission Coefficient Calculation
and Validation............................................................................................119
Table 6-1 Percentage Overstatement o f Ethanol Mitigation From not
Including All Other Mitigation Options..................................................174
Table 6-2 Tillage System Specific Tax Levels of Hypothetical Soil Carbon
Policy in Dollars per Acre......................................................................... 189
Table 6-3 Relative Contribution of Unregulated Emission Sources and Sinks
to GHGE Reduction Under Hypothetical Soil Carbon Policy................193
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF EQUATIONS
Page
Equation 1 Percentage Change Calculation of EPIC Parameters................................. 77
Equation 2 Augmenting of ASMGHG Budget Items Through Relative
Changes of EPIC Parameters.......................................................................77
Equation 3 Total Regional Crop Acreage Constraint During Baseline Budget
Validation.....................................................................................................78
Equation 4 Total Regional Irrigated Crop Acreage Constraint During Baseline
Budget Validation........................................................................................78
Equation 5 Total Region, Crop, and Tillage Specific Acreage Constraint
During Baseline Budget Validation............................................................ 79
Equation 6 Zero Upper Limit on Alternative Fertilization Practices During
Baseline Budget Validation.........................................................................79
Equation 7 Calculation of ASMGHG Baseline Production.......................................... 79
Equation 8 Simple Production Level Identity................................................................ 79
Equation 9 Production Level Identity After Substitution of Equation 7 Into
Equation 8 ....................................................................................................79
Equation 10 Yield Adjustment in ASMGHG...................................................................79
Equation 11 Animal Population Constraint......................................................................81
Equation 12 Emission Reduction Identity for Livestock Manure Management............ 86
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
xix
Page
Equation 13 Calculation of Animal Population Fraction Under Improved
Manure Management for Each Level of Carbon Equivalent
Subsidy..........................................................................................................86
Equation 14 Total Cost Approximation of Manure Management Improvement........... 87
Equation 15 Deduction of Cost per Animal Head for Improved Manure
Management................................................................................................. 87
Equation 16 Total Methane Emission Reduction Accounting From Improved
Livestock Manure Management in ASMGHG...........................................88
Equation 17 Total Cost Accounting From Improved Livestock Manure
Management in ASMGHG.......................................................................... 88
Equation 18 Limit on National Population Under Improved Manure
Management................................................................................................. 89
Equation 19 Proportionality Constraint on Improved Manure Management.................89
Equation 20 Calculation of Milk Yields From EPA Data...............................................91
Equation 21 Prediction of Year 2000 Levels of Milk Production.................................. 91
Equation 22 Calculation of Emission Coefficients From Enteric Fermentation
for Dairy Cows From EPA D ata.................................................................91
Equation 23 Prediction of Emission Coefficients From Enteric Fermentation
for Dairy Cows Beyond EPA Data..............................................................91
Equation 24 Estimation of Year 2000 Emission Coefficients From Enteric
Fermentation of Dairy Cows....................................................................... 92
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
XX
Page
Equation 25 Calculation of Emission Coefficients for Enteric Fermentation
From BST Treated Dairy Cows.................................................................. 92
Equation 26 Calculation of Enteric Fermentation Coefficient Adjustments for
BST Treated Dairy Cows........................................................................... 92
Equation 27 Methane Emission Coefficient From Enteric Fermentation in
ASMGHG.................................................................................................... 93
Equation 28 True Emission Reduction From BST Use...................................................94
Equation 29 Methane Emission Coefficients From Rice Cultivation............................ 96
Equation 30 Calculation of Emission Coefficients From Fossil Fuel Use.................... 97
Equation 31 Calculation of Average Fuel Expenditure for Irrigation........................... 98
Equation 32 Calculation of Average Fuel Quantities for Irrigation............................... 98
Equation 33 Calculation of Average Carbon Emissions From Irrigation......................99
Equation 34 Calculation of Indirect Carbon Emissions From Fertilizer
Manufacturing........................................................................................... 100
Equation 35 Total SOM Account Using EPIC Factors and USDA Tillage
System Data................................................................................................103
Equation 36 Theoretical SOM Level of Each Tillage System Assuming 100
Percent Adoption....................................................................................... 103
Equation 37 Total SOM Change of Each Tillage System Assuming 100 Percent
Adoption.....................................................................................................103
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
xxi
Page
Equation 38 Specification o f Maximum SOM Change Under Complete Switch
to Conservative Tillage............................................................................. 104
Equation 39 Zero SOM Change for Base Scenario........................................................105
Equation 40 Calculation of SOM Change at 100 Percent Conventional Tillage
System Adoption........................................................................................105
Equation 41 SOM Change Identity..................................................................................105
Equation 42 Augmented SOM Change Identity............................................................. 106
Equation 43 Identity After Substituting Equation 37 Into Equation 41......................... 106
Equation 44 Identity After Substituting Equation 42 Into Equation 43.........................106
Equation 45 SOM Difference Between New Management Equilibrium and
Average Current SOM Level..................................................................... 106
Equation 46 Annual Soil Carbon Emission Coefficients in ASMGHG........................108
Equation 47 Net GHG Emission Coefficients of Biomass Production in
ASMGHG................................................................................................... 112
Equation 48 Carbon Emission Coefficients From Ethanol Production.........................113
Equation 49 National Annual Emission Reduction From Afforestation of
Cropland......................................................................................................115
Equation 50 Total Costs o f Afforestation....................................................................... 115
Equation 51 Convexity Constraint for Afforestation Variable in ASMGHG............... 115
Equation 52 Calculation of Nitrous Oxide Emission Coefficients From Crop
Production.................................................................................................. 117
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
xxii
Page
Equation 53 Calibration of Nitrous Oxide Emission Coefficients................................118
Equation 54 All Emission Sources Accounting Constraint in ASMGHG.................... 120
Equation 55 All Emission Sinks Accounting Constraint in ASMGHG....................... 121
Equation 56 Summation of Individual Emission Sources............................................. 122
Equation 57 Summation of Individual Emission Sinks................................................. 122
Equation 58 Active Emission Sources Accounting Constraint in ASMGHG.............. 123
Equation 59 Fixation o f Ignored Emission Sources at Baseline Level..........................123
Equation 60 Active Emission Sinks Accounting Constraint in ASMGHG.................. 124
Equation 61 Fixation of Ignored Emission Sinks at Baseline Level..............................124
Equation 62 Calculation o f Total Emission Sources......................................................124
Equation 63 Calculation of Total Emission Sinks..........................................................124
Equation 64 Implementation of Emission Standards in ASMGHG..............................125
Equation 65 Costs of Excess Emissions Above Specified Standard.............................125
Equation 66 Implementation of Emissions Trading in ASMGHG................................127
Equation 67 Total Cost From Emissions Trading to Agricultural Sector in
ASMGHG................................................................................................... 127
Equation 68 Total Benefits From Emissions Trading to Agricultural Sector in
ASMGHG................................................................................................... 127
Equation 69 Emission Taxation in ASMGHG............................................................... 128
Equation 70 Total Tax Value in the Agricultural Sector............................................... 129
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Greenhouse gas emissions (GHGE) have increased for centuries due to industrial, 
agricultural, and household activities, especially those activities that involve fossil fuel 
use. The first scientific recognition of GHGE and their possible environmental impacts 
occurred in 1896 by the Swedish chemist Arrhenius. He advanced the theory that carbon 
dioxide emissions from combustion of coal would enhance earth's greenhouse effect and 
lead to global warming. About 90 years later in 1987, an ice core from Antarctica 
analyzed by French and Russian scientists revealed an extremely close correlation 
between CO: concentration and temperature going back more than 100,000 years (Jouzel 
et al., Bamola et al.). In 1997, the first international agreement to limit emissions was 
established in Kyoto, Japan.
Since recognition of the GHGE problem, the number of related studies has 
increased exponentially. This argument may be illustrated through a small experiment 
using the agricultural database library AGRICOLA. Searching for the keyword "global 
warming" returns 1 citation between 1970 and 1978, 2 citations between 1979 and 1984, 
113 citations between 1985 and 1991, and 629 citations between 1992 and 1997. The
This dissertation follows the reference style of the American Journal o f  Agricultural 
Economics.
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scientific work on GHGE crosses disciplinary boundaries, involving, among others, 
biochemical, physical, economic, and ethical studies. One reason for the continued 
scientific interest is the difficulty of solving the GHGE problem. Difficulties arise 
because of high cost estimates of emission reductions, the need for international 
cooperation, and the scientific uncertainty about cause-effect relationships involved with 
GHGE.
Solving the GHGE problem implies reducing net emissions of GHG and 
stabilizing atmospheric concentrations at acceptable levels. Substantial changes in 
human technologies are necessary to accomplish such a goal. However, currently 
available alternative technologies are expensive and have motivated many economic 
studies. This dissertation adds yet another study to the economic section of GHGE 
science.
1.2 Objectives
The main objective of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive economic 
assessment of GHGE mitigation through the agricultural sector of the U.S. Agriculture 
has been discovered as a perhaps cheap alternative for overall emission reduction in the 
next decades. Potential agricultural strategies are manifold and have been subject to 
economic analysis (McCarl and Schneider, 1999). However, many important questions 
have been omitted from previous assessments.
Previous studies have examined specific agricultural mitigation strategies 
(McCarl. Adams, and Alig; Stavins; Babcock and Pautsch). To estimate the economic
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3implications of a strategy, prior work has assumed independence from some, or all 
additional mitigation opportunities. The assumption of independence, however, is not 
very plausible. Most of the crop-management-related mitigation strategies are 
competitive with one another, because they compete for the common land base. The 
more cropland converted to grassland, the less cropland available for tree planting, 
ethanol production, or no-till-management of food crops. Thus, as various U.S. 
mitigation strategies are implemented simultaneously, the costs for each individual 
strategy will increase. The analysis in this dissertation will augment previous analyses 
by accounting for the interactions between GHGE mitigation strategies.
The economic assessment will involve estimation of mitigation costs in 
agriculture, welfare implications for the agricultural market segments including welfare 
effects on foreign countries, and agricultural market responses such as price changes and 
acreage shifts. This study will provide an estimate of the aggregate supply curve for 
GHGE reductions from the agricultural sector. Knowledge of the aggregate supply curve 
is an important step toward internalizing the GHGE externality. In addition, the study 
will estimate the effect of agricultural emission reductions on the level of other 
externalities such as erosion and fertilizer runoff.
In section 2, U.S. agriculture’s potential to participate in GHGE mitigation efforts 
will be discussed. Available mitigation strategies and existing cost estimates for 
adoption will be reviewed based on the recent literature. Graphical analysis is used in 
section 3 to theoretically justify the objective of this dissertation. Emphasis is given to 
the importance of mitigation-induced interdependencies within the agricultural sector.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4Methodology will be outlined in section 4. In section 5, empirical results of the GHGE 
analysis are summarized. Agricultural impacts from mitigation are estimated using the 
best possible assessment method, where all possible mitigation strategies are available 
simultaneously and substitution between gas offsets is possible. Alternative assumptions 
and assessment methodologies arc examined in section 6. Summary and conclusions arc 
presented in section 7.
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52 U.S. AGRICULTURE'S ROLE IN A GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION 
MITIGATION WORLD: AN ECONOMIC REVIEW AND PERSPECTIVE1
Greenhouse gas emissions (GHGE) constitute a global production externality, 
which is likely to adversely affect climate. The United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established to negotiate net GHGE reduction. 
Actions under that convention yielded the Kyoto Protocol, which represents the first 
major international agreement towards GHGE reduction. This paper addresses how 
agriculture may be affected by dealing with four questions.
• What is the reason society might be involved in GHGE reduction?
• How might agriculture participate in or be influenced by GHGE reduction 
efforts?
• How might an agricultural GHGE reduction role be implemented?
• What characteristics of agriculture might be relevant in formulating GHGE 
reduction policy?
2.1 What Is the Reason Society Might Be Involved in GHGE Reduction?
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions pose a global environmental problem. Their 
atmospheric concentrations have increased considerably and are projected to continue to 
do so. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (DPCC), increasing 
GHG concentrations will cause global mean temperatures to rise by about 0.3 degree 
Celsius per decade (Houghton, Jenkins, and Ephramus). Global warming in turn is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6predicted to increase the sea level, change habitat boundaries for many plants and 
animals, and induce other changes within the complex climate system (Cole et al.).
Major agricultural impacts of increased GHGE may include changes of the species 
composition in a given area, changes in crop yields, changes in irrigation water 
requirements and supply, and changes in cost of production. Many scientists believe the 
risks of negative impacts across society outweigh potential benefits (Bruce, Lee, and 
Haites) and suggest that society reduce net GHGE to insure that future problems do not 
arise. Currently, many countries are considering policy actions regarding net GHGE 
emission reductions.
2.1.1 The Kyoto Protocol
In 1992, the UNFCCC was established with the "ultimate objective ... to achieve 
... stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" (p.9). As of 
October 1998, 176 countries had signed the convention. However, the convention does 
not specify either GHG concentration targets or emission reduction levels. The Geneva 
conference in 1996, the Kyoto conference in 1997, the Buenos Aires conference in 1998, 
and the Bonn conference in 1999 were intended to create more specific targets.
In Kyoto, a first agreement was reached (Bolin). Thirty-eight countries, mainly 
developed nations in North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia, agreed to reduce 
emissions of six greenhouse gases [carbon dioxide (COi), methane (CH4 ). nitrous oxide 
(N2O), hydro-fluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7(SF6)] to five to eight percent below 1990 levels. U.S. negotiators agreed to reduce 
emissions by seven percent. The resultant Kyoto protocol requires each participating 
party to "have made demonstrable progress in its commitments" (p.9) by 2005 and to 
achieve the emission reductions within the period 2008 to 2012. In addition to emission 
reductions, the treaty approves offsets through enhancement of sinks, which absorb 
greenhouse gases.
Agriculture (using a broad definition including rangelands and forestry) is 
mentioned as both an emitter and a sink in the protocol. Annex A of the Protocol 
identifies agricultural emission sources such as enteric fermentation2, manure 
management, rice cultivation, soil management, field burning, and deforestation. The 
protocol also lists agriculturally related sinks of afforestation and reforestation. 
Additional sources and sinks are under consideration.
2.2 How Might Agriculture Participate in or Be Influenced by GHGE Reduction 
Efforts?
There are at least four ways agriculture may participate in or be influenced by 
greenhouse gas mitigation efforts.
• Agriculture may need to reduce emissions because it releases substantial amounts 
of methane, nitrous oxide, and carbon dioxide.
• Agriculture may enhance its absorption of GHGE by creating or expanding sinks 
through management practices.
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s• Agriculture may provide products, which substitute for GHGE intensive products 
displacing emissions.
• Agriculture may find itself operating in a world where commodity and input 
prices have been altered by GHGE related policies.
We deal with each of these ways by providing cost estimates and literature 
citations where available. Our treatment of the literature is as global as possible but is 
undoubtedly biased toward U.S. sources.
2.2.1 Agriculture - A Source of Greenhouse Gases
Agriculture's global share of anthropogenic emissions has been estimated to be 
about fifty percent of methane, seventy percent of nitrous oxide, and twenty percent of 
carbon dioxide (see Cole et al., Isermann). Contributions across countries vary with 
large differences existing between developing and developed countries. Agriculturally 
based emissions in developing countries largely arise from deforestation and land 
degradation. Agriculturally based emissions in developed countries are largely caused by 
fossil fuel based emissions through energy use: reductions in soil carbon through 
intensive tillage; nitrous oxide emissions through fertilizer applications, livestock 
feeding, residue management, and tillage (Watson et al.); methane emissions from 
livestock raising and rice production (Hayhoe). Within livestock production about two 
thirds of methane emissions emerge from enteric fermentation of ruminant animals, 
mainly catde. with the rest from animal waste. Costs of agricultural GHGE reduction
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9strategies have been examined by a number of authors (see Table 2-1 and Table 2-2 for a 
summary).
2.2.1.1 Methane
Gerbens (1999a, 1999b) reviewed manure management alternatives and dietary 
changes for enteric fermentation management. The combined additive effect of all 
enteric fermentation strategies is shown in Figure 2-1. Gibbs estimated the costs of 
liquid manure management improvements (Figure 2-2) and Adams et al. (1992) 
examined the effect of reduced high-energy feed rations, and tax induced demand shifts 
for beef. Gerbens (1999a) asserts that almost all treatments aimed to reduce methane 
from enteric fermentation would be more profitable than currently used technologies. 
The studies also indicate that the total reduction potential from enteric fermentation 
strategies is considerably lower than for livestock manure management.
Seven percent of current methane emissions (the U.S. target level under Kyoto) 
amounts to 1.5 million metric tons of methane. Both Gerbens ( 1999b) and Gibbs 
estimated that liquid manure treatment has the potential to reduce methane emissions by 
that amount at costs ranging between S 100 and S200 per ton carbon equivalent. Adams 
et al. (1992), at a one million ton reduction level, calculated average costs for methane 
emission reductions ranging from about S 100 (rice) to S700 (beef tax) per ton carbon 
equivalent.
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Table 2-1 Cost Estimates for Methane Emission Reductions
Author Strategy Cost in $ per TCE
Reduction in 
MMT CH4
Comments
-3,700 0.3 Improved feed intake
Gerbens (1999a) Enteric fermentation
273 0.6 BST treatment
Gerbens (1999b) Liquid manure management
51
94
0.3
1.6
Complete manure removal from 
liquid/slurry systems
Large-scale on-farm complete mix 
digesters
Gibbs Liquid manure management
0
200
0.4
2.2
See Figure 2-2
103 0.5 50 % fertilization reduction
Rice cultivation
116 1.1 100% fertilization reduction
Adams et.al (1992)
Altered rations 204 1.1 5% yield decrease (supply shift)
Herd reduction 730 1.1 5% demand increase (beef tax)
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Table 2-2 Cost Estimates for Nitrous Oxide Emission Reductions
Authors Strategy
Improved crop nutrient 
management
Cost in $ per 
TCE
Reduction in 
MMT N20 Comments
-158 0.16
Nitrification inhibitors
Ballye, Werner,
and Hallberg . . .. .°  Low protein swine teed
164
1,400
0.13
0.17
Nitrogen reduced poultry feed 1,300 0.67
Nitrogen fertilizer tax
Harnisch
No anhydrous nitrogen fertilizer
370
46
0.02
0.06
Trachtenberg and 
°gg
Improved nutrient management
Total benefits of 473 -624 
Mill. $, Estimated excess N- 
application of 24-32%
Adams et al. 
(1992) Nitrogen fertilizer use reduction 56 0.14
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2.2.1.2 Nitrous Oxide
Cost estimates for reducing nitrous oxide emissions have been developed 
assuming relevant strategies are: a) reduced nitrogen fertilizer applications, b) use of 
nitrification inhibitors, c) improved nitrogen nutrient management, and d) reduced 
nitrogen content of animal feeds. The cost estimates vary widely in part due to the 
uncertainty in the magnitudes of emission levels. Battye. Wemer, and Hallberg found 
reduced nitrogen content poultry feed to cost SI,300 per ton carbon equivalent while 
potential low protein amino acid supplements to swine feed could reduce feeding costs 
by $1,400 per ton carbon equivalent saved. In addition, Battye, Wemer, and Hallberg 
argue improved nitrogen nutrient management can reduce emissions at cost savings. 
Average costs for nitrous oxide emissions from reducing anhydrous and total nitrogen 
fertilizer use were estimated in the neighborhood of S50 per ton carbon (Adams et al. 
1992, Hamisch). To meet the Kyoto requirements3, about 0.13 million metric tons of 
NiO emissions need to be reduced.
2.2.1.3 Carbon Dioxide
The volume of CO2 emission reductions from agriculture is relatively low and 
thus will receive only brief mention here. Agricultural sources of carbon dioxide 
emissions from fuel use are minor relative to total societal emissions. U.S. EPA 
estimated agricultural emissions in 1996 from fossil fuel use to be less than one percent 
of the U.S. total emissions o f4,900 million metric tons of CCK.
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Soil carbon dioxide emissions have been larger in the past. In the first half of this 
century, Donigian et al. argue that for the central U.S. land conversion to agriculture 
decreased soil organic matter (SOM) to about fifty percent of its native level but the land 
base is not now expanding. While SOM remained relatively stable through 1970 
(Allison), it then increased reflecting increased rates of reduced tillage systems (Flach, 
Barnwell, and Crosson). Similarly, total forestland in the U.S. has been slightly 
increasing during the last decade (U.S. Forest Service). In countries with large rates of 
deforestation emissions are important. Houghton estimates that between twenty-five and 
thirty-one percent of global carbon emissions come from tropical deforestation and 
subsequent land degradation.
2.2.2 Agriculture - A GHG Sequestering Sink
Another way to reduce net emissions is to increase storage of GHG in ecosystem 
compartments such as biomass or soil. This strategy is also commonly called carbon or 
GHG sequestration.
2.2.2.1 Soil Sequestration
Soil organic matter is the largest global terrestrial carbon pool (Post et al.) and 
exceeds the amount of carbon in living vegetation by a factor of two or three 
(Schlesinger). Currently, U.S. agricultural soils hold about seven billion metric tons of 
carbon (Kem). Management practices such as land retirement (conversion to native 
vegetation), residue management, less disruptive tillage systems, increased use of winter 
cover crops and perennials, altered forest harvest practices, land use conversion to
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pasture or forest, and restoration of degraded soils can increase carbon retention. Kem 
argues that an increase in SOM could absorb 1 to 1.7 billion metric tons. Lai et al. 
estimate the fifty-year potential at about five billion metric tons. Babcock and Pautsch 
analyzed the costs of carbon sequestration on cropland through reduced tillage 
generating estimates ranging from SO to about $400 per ton of carbon depending on level 
sequestered (Table 2-3).
Soils also provide sinks for other gases, but much less is known. Estimates 
indicate that soils take up between ten and twenty percent of methane emissions annually 
(Reeburgh, Whalen, and Alperin). The soil sink of nitrous oxide is not well understood 
at the present time (Watson et al.). Studies (Mosier et al.) on grasslands indicate that 
conversion of grasslands to croplands tends to increase net emissions of nitrous oxide 
and methane. The net increase of methane emissions is due to a reduction in the capacity 
of cultivated soils to absorb methane.
2.1.2.2 Forest Sequestration
One management alternative that has been repeatedly examined involves 
conversion of agricultural lands to tree plantations (Table 2-3). Carbon is subsequently 
stored in the forest soil, the growing tree and any product, which takes up long-term 
residence in buildings etc. Adams et al. (1999) recently developed estimates of the 
average costs of carbon sequestration by tree plantations. Four selected carbon-fixing 
goals yielded undiscounted average annual costs between S13 and S26 per ton carbon.
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Table 2-3 Cost Estimates for Carbon Sink Enhancements
Authors Strategy Cost in $ per Reduction inTCE MMTCE Comments
Winjum et al. Tree planting
Moulton and Richards Tree planting
Adams et al. (1992) Tree planting
Adams et al. (1999) Tree planting
5
2
12 127
16 255
18 382
16 127
23 255
30 382
62 636
21 43 (annually)
23 53 (annually)
25 63 (annually)
26 73 (annually)
Reforestation, only vegetation carbon 
Afforestation, only vegetation carbon
Soil, litter, and vegetation carbon (see 
Figure 2-3)
Soil, litter, and vegetation carbon and also 
include land rental costs and forgone costs 
of less agricultural production (see Figure 
2-3)
analyzed annual carbon flux increase, cost 
estimates are undiscouuted, (see Figure
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Tabic 2-3 Continued
Authors Strategy Cost in $ per TCE
Reduction in 
MMTCE Comments
Dudek and Leblanc Tree planting 3 to 12 35
McCarl Tree planting Wide range Wide range Supply curve up to 40 billion metric tons (see Figure 2-3)
Parks and Hardie Tree planting 9 to 10 42 (annually)
Sedjo and Solomon Tree planting 13 to 21 2600
Sedjo Tree planting 3.5 2900 Temperate forests
Stavins Tree planting < 66 9 37 U.S. counties in the South
Newell and Stavins Tree planting Oto 145 0 to 14 annually 36 counties, econometric model (see Figure 2-3)
Oto 110 Oto 5 Maine
Plantinga, Mauldin, and 
Miller Tree planting
Oto 45 Oto 16 South Carolina
Oto 75 0 to 60 Wisconsin
Van Kooten et al. Tree planting
0 to 50
Oto 70 
o
Oto 30
Oto 30
11
19
22
Western Canada, hybrid poplar used for 
wood products, infinite time horizon, zero 
percent (upper row) and four percent 
(lower row) discounting
Babcock and Pautsch Reduced tillage 200
400
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Figure 2-3 Costs of GHGE reductions through tree planting
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Their results were consistent with those of a number of previous studies (Winjum et al.; 
Dudek and Leblanc; Moulton and Richards; Adams et al., 1992; McCarl). Tweeten, 
Sohngen, and Hopkins list further studies on carbon sequestration in forest ecosystems 
and tree plantations. Estimates have not been done for the costs via such possible 
strategies as Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) expansion4, zero tillage, and forest 
harvest practice alterations.
2.2.3 Agriculture - A Way of Offsetting Net Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Agriculture could also be involved in providing substitutes for products whose 
use causes substantial greenhouse gas emissions. In particular, this could occur through 
use of agricultural commodities as biofuel replacing fossil fuels or through substitution 
of wood products for more GHGE intensive building materials.
2.2.3.1 Biomass for Power Plants
Substitution for fossil fuels generally involves using agricultural products as 
feedstock for electrical power plants or inputs to liquid fuel production. The power plant 
alternative involves burning agricultural biomass in the form of switch grass or short 
rotation woody crops to offset fossil fuel use for electricity generation. Burning biomass 
instead of fossil fuel would reduce net CO2 concentration into the atmosphere because 
the photosynthetic process involved with biomass growth removes about ninety-five 
percent of CO2  emitted when burning the biomass (Kline, Hargrove and Vanderlan) 
causing a recycling of the emissions. Fossil fuel combustion, however, releases fossil 
carbon that was fixed as organic matter hundreds of millions of years ago.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
21
A number of studies have examined the costs of biomass fuel substitution (recent 
ones are summarized in Table 2-4). The cost of CCK offsets with biomass-fiieled 
electrical power plants can be computed from the results in McCarl, Adams, and Alig. 
Dividing their estimates of the extra costs of using biomass as opposed to coal by the 
difference in carbon dioxide emissions3 yields an estimate of average abatement costs. 
McCarl, Adams, and Alig estimates indicate that a million BTUs from biomass will cost 
S1.45 to S2.16 as opposed to a coal cost of $0.80 (U.S. DOE, 1998a). The corresponding 
average costs of reducing carbon emissions by one metric ton are between S25 and S55 
(Figure 2-4).
2.2.3.2 Liquid Fuel Production - Ethanol
Converting cornstarch or cellulose-laden products into ethanol substituting for 
petroleum can also offset carbon emissions (Wang, Saricks, and Santini). Again this 
would recycle the majority of the GHGE from fuel use. The economics of ethanol has 
been investigated for more than 20 years with almost all results indicating a substantial 
subsidy is required to make it competitive with petroleum. Tyner et al. investigated the 
question in the late 70s.
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Table 2-4 Cost Estimates of Carbon Emission Reductions Through Fossil Fuel Offsets
Reduction in
Authors Category Cost in $ per TCE MMTCE Comments
11(26) 26
See Figure 2-4, numbers in
McCarl, Adams, and Alig Bio-fuel for power plants 24(42) 
53 (73)
137
560
parentheses are cost 
estimates if no research 
progress is assumed
Graham et al. Bio-fuel for power plants 29 to 52 0 to 520
58 23
Walsh et al. Bio-fuel for power plants
96
290
110 
110
Jerko Ethanol
324 800
See Figure 2-5
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Figure 2-4 Costs of carbon reductions through biofuei for power plants, based
on McCarl, Adams, and Alig
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Figure 2-5 Costs of GHGE reductions through ethanol use, based on Jerko
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More recently Jerko derived ethanol production costs between $1.20 and $1.35 per 
gallon. Production of fossil fuel based gasoline costs only about $0.60 per gallon. Using 
the difference between Jerko’s price and the gasoline price and an average carbon 
content of 0.616 kg carbon per gallon of gasoline (U.S. DOE, 1998b), average abatement 
costs range between $250 and $330 per ton carbon. Figure 2-5 shows ethanol based 
carbon emission reduction costs derived using the data in Jerko.
2.2.3.3 Building Products Substitution
Marland and Schlamadinger argue that increased use of wood in construction, 
while increasing carbon emissions from the forest products industry, reduces net 
emissions since it creates larger savings through reduced use of fossil fuels in the 
concrete block or steel industries. The authors, however, do not provide estimates of 
carbon equivalent costs.
2.2.4 Agriculture - Operating in a Mitigating World
Agriculture could be affected by greenhouse gas reduction policies, which are 
largely directed toward other sectors. In particular, efforts to reduce emissions are likely 
to increase fossil fuel prices. For example, sellers of diesel fuel might have to purchase 
an emissions permit, which would increase fuel prices. Similarly, fuel taxes might be 
imposed. Such increases would not only influence the cost of petrol-based agricultural 
chemicals and fuel inputs but also alter off-farm commodity prices.
There have been a few economic examinations6. McCarl, Gowen, and Yeats 
report an analysis where they show that, for example, a $100 per ton carbon tax would
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result in a 0.5 percent reduction in agricultural induced welfare. Collins and USDA 
Global Change Program Office studied the same magnitude of tax and reached the same 
conclusions. Antle et al. simulated economic effects of energy prices on Northern Plain 
grain producers. For a $110 carbon tax they estimate variable costs to rise between three 
and thirteen percent. Farm Bureau also did an analysis (Francl; Francl, Nadler, and Bast) 
in which they concluded that a $ 110 carbon tax would cause at least a twenty-three 
percent loss in net farm income for Midwest com farms. As the estimated effects on 
farm income differ, so does the scope of the analyses. While McCarl, Gowen, and Yeats 
treat both agricultural' prices and crop acres endogenously, Antle et al. only allow for 
acreage substitution, holding prices constant. Farm Bureau did not use a complete cost 
benefit analysis, but based their analysis on simple budgeting, holding both prices and 
acreage constant. Generally, the results of the more complete studies reveal energy taxes 
are likely to have little agricultural sector impact.
23  How Might a Country Implement GHGE Reduction?
A system of incentives or regulations will be needed to secure participation in 
GHGE mitigation. The Kyoto Protocol establishes country-specific GHGE reduction 
targets, but provides flexibility in meeting these targets. It emphasizes "application of 
market instruments” to achieve the "quantified emission limitations" on a national level. 
Limits are not placed on individual emitters but rather on the whole country, and it is 
anticipated that domestic trading systems will be established. However, individual 
emitters are obligated to account, report, and verify their emissions annually. No
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provisions have been made yet for emissions trading between time periods, commonly 
called banking.
2.3.1 Markets for Emissions Trading
Markets for emissions trading should be at the top list of policy options to cost- 
effectively manage emissions (Sandor and Skees). Several emissions trading programs 
have been implemented. Examples in the U.S. are the Emissions Credit Trading (1977). 
the U.S. Lead Phase down (1982), and the Acid Rain Program (1995). Current policy 
debate on GHGE reduction implementation suggests that an emissions trading system 
much like the one used for the U.S. acid deposition program will be put in place. This 
system uses a cap and trade approach and has been successful in bringing down SO2 
emissions (Tietenberg et al.). It permits emitters who bear high costs from emission 
reductions to buy emission rights from lower cost emitters. The sum of all tradable 
emission rights equals the emission volume targeted. High penalties for violations and 
monitoring ensure compliance.
Fischer. Kerr, and Toman highlight features of potential GHGE trading systems. 
First, they assert that unlike SO2 emissions, GHGE will have to be controlled upstream 
because control of GHGE at the point of billions of emission sources is too expensive. 
Fortunately, fossil fuel use is almost perfectly related to CO2 emissions and much 
cheaper to account for. Also, Post et al. argue that keeping track of land management 
can provide reasonable estimates of agricultural sinks, as well as, methane and nitrous 
oxide emissions.
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Second, Fischer. Kerr, and Toman assert that permits should be auctioned 
arguing that auctioning would substantially raise governmental revenue compared to 
gratis allocations such as grandfathering. The revenue then could be used to alleviate 
adverse effects. Finance technological research and adaptation to climate change, and 
benefit taxpayers through reductions in other taxes. With grandfathering, permits are 
allocated to emission sources according to their relative historical share on total. Thus, 
two additional weaknesses of grandfathering are that the system may be biased against 
new sources and that the beneficiaries of the initial allocation may not be the same who 
face the most adverse economic effects from emission control policies.
Third, credits for early emission reductions (commonly called emissions banking) 
would considerably lower compliance cost to the Kyoto Protocol. Burtraw, Palmer, and 
Paul estimate mitigation costs in the U.S. electricity sector to achieve reductions 
equivalent to a full year’s obligation during the commitment period from 2008 to 2012. 
Their study shows average costs in the neighborhood of S25 per metric ton of carbon if 
emission credits were applicable over the next decade, i.e. from 2000 to 2009.
According to a similar EIA study (US DOE, 1998b), the same emission reduction 
volume enforced in 2010 alone would cost on average S350 per metric ton of carbon.
2.3.2 Taxation or Subsidization
In addition to emissions trading, the Kyoto Protocol leaves open the possibility of 
taxes and subsidies. The non-point source nature of greenhouse gas emissions would 
again likely make it necessary to tax or subsidize inputs rather than emissions. Fossil
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fuel taxes may be employed because they have low transaction costs and yield revenues 
that can be used to finance other mitigation policies. Increased fossil fuel prices can also 
create a considerable economic incentive for emission saving technologies.
2.33  Trading Across Gases
Trading may be allowed across the spectrum of greenhouse gases. To place the 
gases on an equal footing, the IPCC developed the concept of global warming potential 
(GWP) which compares greenhouse gas ability to trap heat in the atmosphere (Cole et 
al.). The EPCC uses carbon dioxide as a reference gas and calculates GWPs for three 
reference time horizons: 20, 100, and 500 years. For example, over a 100-year time 
horizon, one metric ton of methane and 2 1 metric tons of carbon dioxide trap an equal 
amount of heat in the atmosphere so the GWP of methane is 2 1. Similarly, the GWP of 
nitrous oxide is 310. The other gases (HFCs. PFCs, and SF6) each have GWPs of several 
thousand.
2.3.4 Trading Across Countries
Four international implementation mechanisms are authorized. These include 
bubbles, emission trades, joint implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). The bubble approach permits groups of Annex B7 countries of the Kyoto 
Protocol to merge their emissions compliance, setting few restrictions on trading within 
those country groups. The U.S. has reached a conceptual agreement with Australia, 
Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Russia and Ukraine to pursue a bubble group (U.S. 
Department of State). Bubbles reduce the incentive for non-compliance through the joint
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responsibility of both the individual members and the regional organization. However, 
bubbles may result in efficiency losses compared to emissions trading for they restrict 
permit trading within the bubble member countries.
Emissions trading would allow Annex B countries to purchase or sell emission 
rights to any other such country. Each international transaction must be reported to and 
approved by the UNFCCC secretariat. The relevant modalities, rules and guidelines for 
these transactions still need to be defined. In principle, emissions trading could be 
authorized at the governmental level or at a sub-national entity level. The latter would 
increase trade efficiency.
Joint implementation (JI) refers to multi-national projects within Annex B 
countries, where involved parties can receive emission reduction units (ERU). JI can be 
viewed as supplemental option to emissions trading. Instead of buying emissions 
allowances from another eligible party, a country can also directly finance and supervise 
emission reduction projects in that country. This can be more efficient than emissions 
trading, particularly, when substantial technological differences exist between countries. 
The importance of JI, however, may be small with respect to the agricultural sector.
Through the Clean Development Mechanism, Annex B countries can secure 
certified emission reductions (CER) in non-Annex B developing countries, which are not 
subjected to emission reduction targets. Countries like the U.S. are likely to buy 
additional emission allowances from outside to meet their national commitment 
especially favor the Clean Development Mechanism. By integrating low cost emission
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reduction options in developing countries, this mechanism would result in a lower 
market price for emission permits.
2.3.5 Monitoring and Verification
A recurring theme in the Kyoto Protocol is the monitoring and verification of 
carbon emissions and sinks. To have a viable market in credits there needs to be a 
commodity that can be clearly identified and reliably and consistently measured. 
Marland, McCarl and Schneider note the possibility that GHG credits could depend on 
the uncertainty in their measurement.
Implementation of trading systems across gases is likely to involve some type of 
uncertainty discounting. As argued above emission reductions will have to be estimated 
upstream, hence uncertainties arise. The degree of these uncertainties, however, seems 
to differ widely between different GHG mitigation strategies. Nitrous oxide emissions 
savings from improved fertilizer management, for example, vary to a much higher 
degree, than do carbon dioxide emissions savings from reduced fossil fuel use. Thus, in 
a risk adverse society, the value of emission credits from fairly uncertain nitrous oxide 
reductions should be discounted relative to the value of emission credits from almost 
perfectly predictable carbon dioxide emission reductions.
Canada has proposed carbon credit adjustments based on confidence intervals of 
the amount of CE emission reductions (Table 2-5). The resulting adjustment factors can 
be interpreted as uncertainty discount factors. Two pieces of information would be 
necessary to make these adjustments.
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Table 2-5 Uncertainty Discount Factors for CE Emissions Trading Based on 
Proposition by Canada
Uncertainty in Emission Maximum Allowable Deviation of Actual Emissions
Estimate (Assuming 95% from Emission Target (Excess Emission Tolerance) 
Confidence and Normal
Distribution)«
1% 3% 5% 10%
10% 0.93 0.95 0.97 1
20% 0.86 0.88 0.90 0.94
30% 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.88
40% 0.76 0.77 0.79 0.82
50% 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.77
80% 0.60 0.62 0.63 0.66
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First, probability distributions for the uncertainty of CE emission reductions from 
all involved mitigation strategies must be known with 95 percent confidence. Second, a 
maximum allowed quantity of excess emissions (due to uncertainty) over an emission 
target must be specified. In Table 2-5, adjustment factors are shown for different levels 
of uncertainty and different levels of excess emission tolerance.
2.4 What Characteristics of Agriculture Might Be Relevant in Formulating 
GHGE Mitigation Policy?
Agricultural policies have always been subject to controversial debates. Features 
of recent U.S. farm programs have been shown to induce changes in agricultural 
management and resource use. For example, the deficiency payment scheme motivated 
farmers to produce more. In this section, we will discuss characteristics of agriculture 
that should be considered in formulating GHGE mitigation policies.
2.4.1 Positive and Negative Externalities
Pursuit of agriculturally based policies limited to carbon sequestration can have 
both beneficial and detrimental external effects that are unintended. A total weighing of 
the externalities may be key to policy formation.
2.4.1.1 Potential Positive Externalities
When McCarl, Gowen, and Yeats examined the effects of carbon permit prices, 
they found that the policy stimulated widespread expansion of conservation tillage and a 
large reduction in soil erosion. A country bears a number of costs due to erosion in
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terms of water quality, ecology, sedimentation, etc. that would be reduced by increased 
use of conservation tillage. Thus, a policy based on carbon emissions or sequestration 
might benefit a number of erosion-related areas not originally the target of the policy. 
Other types of positive externalities could occur including:
• Reduced tillage could increase soil organic matter, enlarging soil water-holding 
capacity and reducing the need for irrigation water:
• Increased soil organic matter could also improve natural soil fertility, thereby 
decreasing the need for inorganic fertilizers:
• Expanded conversion of agricultural lands to grasslands or forests could provide 
increased wildlife habitat and protect biodiversity:
• Diminished use of fertilizer could reduce the nutrient content of runoff from 
agricultural lands, thereby improving water quality and reducing hypoxia of 
streams, rivers, lakes and aquifers. Such alterations would improve the 
characteristics of the waters in these regions for use by non-agricultural water 
consumers;
• Diversion of agricultural lands into energy production to reduce CO; emissions 
might induce technological improvement in agricultural crops, permitting 
expanded electricity generation at lower cost.
Many other benefits could be cited, but the basic point has been made. The 
potential clearly exists for positive environmental and economic benefits (externalities) 
to arise from policies intended to reduce CO; accumulation in the atmosphere.
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2.4.1.2 Potential Negative Externalities
Along with the possibility of unintended benefits, there is the possibility of 
unintended costs. Here is a short list of possible negative externalities:
• Adams et al. (1992), and more recently McCarl, show that programs designed to 
move agricultural lands into forestry could have deleterious effects on the 
traditional forest sector, leading to either deforestation of traditional parcels or 
reduced incomes.
• Reduction in intensity of tillage has been found in some cases to require 
additional use of pesticides for weed, fungus, and insect management. In 
addition to requiring energy for synthesis, production, and application, these may 
have deleterious effects on ecological systems, runoff, and water quality.
• Expanded use of agricultural lands for carbon sequestration increases the 
competition with traditional food and fiber production. The result might well be 
decreased food and fiber production: increased consumer prices for crops, meat 
and fiber; and decreased export earnings from agriculture.
Again, many other cases could be cited, but the basic point has been made. There 
could be negative environmental externalities arising out of policies intended to reduce 
emissions or increase carbon sequestration.
2.4.2 Political Will for Public Intervention and Farm Support
Historically, the agricultural sector in many countries has received substantial 
public subsidies in the form of price and income supports. Today, U.S. farm subsidies
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have been reduced. However, there is also increasing pressure from farm interests to get 
back into the farm program business, particularly given low current prices for 
agricultural commodities. GHGE reductions under the Kyoto Protocol raise new 
possibilities for income supports. Perhaps a new breed of farm programs could be 
justified with funding based on energy and GHGE savings.
Also the emergence of a carbon-offset market could reduce the government role. 
Private agricultural and non-agricultural interests contracting for carbon would provide a 
new source of private income to farmers.
2.4.3 Demand Characteristics
Most agricultural production is up against an inelastic demand curve. People do 
not eat a great deal more even if food costs less; so increased production is often 
matched by declining prices. However, producing biofuel for the energy market would 
probably place agriculture as a fairly small player producing against an elastic demand 
curve. The carbon market may have similar characteristics. Such a market would not 
yield such large price reductions when agricultural carbon credits are included and would 
yield producer benefits, as opposed to consumer gains as has been the prevalent recent 
case. Adding such a market would have income distribution implications.
2.4.4 Practical Sectoral Economics
From a practical standpoint when considering both how to gamer agricultural 
participation and how such participation might influence the economics of the 
agricultural sector, there are a number of important economic questions.
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2.4.4.1 Are the Comparative Costs of Agricultural Net GHGE Reductions Low 
Enough?
Are comparatively cheap emission reductions or sink enhancements available? 
Will non-agricultural interests buy carbon credits from agricultural interests? Anecdotal 
evidence seems to suggest that this is the case, but the demand by non-agricuiturai 
interests for carbon credits is not clear. The evidence above shows the cost of several 
agricultural opportunities to be well below S 100 per ton of carbon. Recent studies by the 
President’s Council of Economic Advisors (1998), the Energy Information 
Administration (U.S. Department of Energy), and by economists such as Manne and 
Richels have produced a wide range of numbers for the cost of carbon emission 
reductions in other sectors. The range of costs depends very much on program timing 
and trading regime permitted, i.e. the extent to which emissions credits will be traded 
internationally and which countries will participate, and when the program is 
implemented. Many cost estimates exceed $ 100 per ton of carbon.
2.4.4.2 Will a Carbon Program Disrupt the Traditional Agricultural Sector?
The economic impacts on the traditional agricultural sector participants depend 
on the intensity of mitigation efforts. The more agriculture enters the GHGE business 
the less there will be conventional agricultural production. Some mitigation strategies 
may be competitive (biofuel, ethanol, forestation) and some may be complementary 
(management alterations) to existing land uses. Competitive strategies will decrease 
conventional agricultural production and cause prices for food commodities to rise.
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However, such rises may induce further innovation and resources into the sector. With 
inelastic demand curves as often encountered for food commodities, producers are likely 
to gain but consumers will probably lose. Land prices would likely rise as a consequence 
of the competition between crops used for food and crops (including trees) used directly 
for mitigation strategics, such emission sequestration and biofucl generation. The total 
issue portends shifts in the distribution of income between agricultural producers and 
consumers. We also need to consider the costs and benefits of the negative and positive 
program externalities, including, ideally, the costs and benefits of a changing climate.
2.4.5 Will the Farmer Participate?
Many physical scientists have evaluated farmer mitigation strategies and 
concluded there are "win-win" possibilities available, asserting that the farmer would 
make money, emissions would be lowered, and there would be positive environmental 
externalities. However, the adoption of such strategies by farmers is not granted.
Farmers do not choose a "winning" strategy from a social or scientific point of view; 
they choose the "best" winning strategy available to them. Thus the strategy chosen must 
dominate the other strategies available from farmers' viewpoint. Farmers may not 
choose a profitable reduced tillage method if a more profitable intensive tillage method 
is available. In addition, a number of other factors will enter into their decisions. In 
particular
• Risk is a consideration. Farmers who switch practices may experience not only a
change in net returns but also changes in operational risk. Studies on tillage
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intensity show that slightly increased net returns under reduced or no-tillage are 
offset by higher variation in net returns, thus increased risk (Klemme; Mikesell, 
Williams, and Long; Williams, Llewelyn, and Bamaby: Epplin and Al-Sakkaf). 
This may imply that the development of insurance programs partially alleviating 
risk may be desirable to stimulate adoption.
• Management requirements can be more demanding for mitigation related 
strategies, particularly less tillage-intensive practices. Farmers may be unwilling 
to adopt practices that require substantially more critical management activities 
and a long learning time. This may be particularly true of older farmers nearing 
retirement. Extension efforts and insurance may be needed to facilitate adoption.
• Many farmers are motivated by a stewardship role in terms of the soil and the 
environment. In that context, one may find that farmers would more easily adopt 
soil-conserving techniques than would otherwise be the case.
• A number of the mitigation practices, once adopted, must remain in use for a 
long time if GHGE gains are to be realized. Farmers may be unwilling to assume 
such long-term commitments, and it may be difficult to pass on the commitment 
and monitor continued performance when farm ownership changes. Leasing 
arrangements may also create obstacles.
2.4.6 Incentive Program Design
Incentive programs which capture gains through emission reductions need to be 
carefully designed with respect to four big issues: I) preservation of gains over time, 2)
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discouragement of countervailing actions, 3) avoidance of unintended program expenses 
(hitting more than the target), and 4) diminution of non-point sink uncertainties.
2.4.6.1 Preservation of Gains Over Time
Many mitigative strategies regarding sinks result in increased absorption of 
GHGs until a new equilibrium state is reached. Growth rates of both trees and soil 
carbon accelerate over the first few decades, but decline as trees reach maturity or soils 
approach new carbon equilibrium (Sprugel). Tillage experiments have shown that the 
carbon content of agricultural soils increases for up to 30-40 years after tillage alteration 
(Hendrix). Many sink strategies have three important features. First, they cannot be 
counted as a recurring annual sink for GHG. Initially, they offset emissions, but later 
their net emission reduction falls close to zero as the new equilibrium is approached. 
Second, if after some time the management of the sink changes to a less "friendly" basis 
such as plowing the land, harvesting the trees, or adopting conventional tillage, then the 
stored GHGs volatize rapidly. Thus, management alterations must be retained once they 
are initiated. Third, the ability of soils to sequester carbon in soils may diminish as the 
climate warms, as there is a negative relationship between higher temperatures and the 
organic matter content of soils (Kutsch and Kappen).
2.4.6.2 Countervailing Actions
The adoption of certain emission reduction strategies in one economy segment 
may lead to a substantial offset by countervailing actions in other parts of the economy. 
For example, McCarl recently found that land converted to forest under a carbon-based
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subsidy program would revert back to agriculture after one forest rotation unless the 
program was somehow designed to not let the land be harvested or to make it stay within 
the forest sector. In addition, he discovered a substantial countervailing movement of 
land from the traditional forest sector back into the agricultural sector when a carbon 
subsidy caused large amounts of land to be afforested. A program with a semi 
permanent ban on harvesting and a non-reversion to agriculture clause might be required 
to maintain the gain over the long term. This will raise program cost.
2A6.3 Hitting More Than the Target
The design of an incentive scheme may pose challenging policy targeting 
questions and could encounter unintended expenses. Our history of targeting non-point 
source pollution phenomena in agriculture has been checkered (Malik, Larson, and 
Ribaudo). The Conservation Reserve Program, for example, helped reduce soil erosion 
considerably. However, the program most likely incurred unwanted expenses by paying 
farmers for enrollment of land that was not intended to be cultivated anyway. In the 
carbon arena, incentives designed to keep land in forestry might end up paying 
landowners who had no real intention of ever moving land out of forestry.
2.4.6.4 Uncertainty of Non-Point Sinks
Acceptance of agricultural sink strategies implies the establishment of a trading 
scheme involving land in many diverse areas of the country. Unfortunately, emission 
savings from some sink enhancements are not perfectly correlated to land management, 
thus uncertainty results. The widespread nature of possible participants coupled with the
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uncertainties may dampen the enthusiasm for including such sinks in a national or 
international emissions trading scheme, and may discourage nonagricultural interests 
from approaching agriculture for permit trades. Taff and Senjem find that trading 
schemes’ success depends on the non-point sinks’ ability to offer remedial practices that
o«> of  onrl M’KnCO affftotivonocc ka nr‘r»a»>fok!rt ^arrraaocue Ui Uiicu MJiulu oitu »v liUow wiic^u woii uw pi *V tciiiti aCcwplauiw uwgiwvj Ui
certainty.
2.4.7 Property Rights
Programs, which tax or regulate alterations of land-use, will cause private 
property rights issues to arise. Public discussion of such issues has been observed, for 
example, when land-use changes have been restricted to preserve endangered species 
whose habitat is dependent on private property. Consider the following questions
• Will we allow existing forest owners, who are not being compensated in the 
program, to choose to deforest their lands and move them into agriculture?
• Will harvested forests be taxed in proportion to any carbon released?
• Will farmers who are currently using some form of reduced tillage be allowed to 
later reverse that decision and use more intensive tillage systems?
• Will landowners who now have land in some form of grass or forested lands and
develop that land into tilled agricultural lands have to pay for emissions?
• Will land that is currently rather minimally disturbed in the agriculture or forest 
sectors but moves into subdivisions or other uses that diminish the carbon storage 
potential be requiring emission permits?
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Ail of these appear to be major property rights issues.
2.4.8 Trade and Program Participation by Trade Competitors
The concept that not all countries will be treated equally, largely because of their 
development status, is prominent in the Kyoto protocol with the Annex B etc. country 
discussion. The Farm Bureau has stated opposition to adoption of the protocol because 
certain key competitive agricultural countries such as Brazil and Argentina are not 
covered (Francl). The Bureau’s analysts feel U.S. farmers will lose their comparative 
advantage if they need to obey GHGE regulations while key competitive agricultural 
producing countries do not. Such an issue may well have to be resolved before countries 
like the United States ratify the protocol.
2.4.9 Eligibility of Agricultural Sinks
There are a variety of agricultural land-management practices that might enhance 
sinks or limit emissions. However, only the forestry activities involving afforestation, 
reforestation and deforestation appear eligible under the current phrasing of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Article 3.4 leaves the way open to add other items to the list at some future 
time, but this has not occurred as of yet.
2.5 Concluding Comments -  Agriculture as a Bridge to the Future
Agriculture with the near-term possibilities for changes in tillage and/or forest 
incidence offers a near-term way of reducing GHGE, which may or may not persist at a 
future date. The essential question is whether agriculture provides a way of reducing
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current compliance costs before major nonagricultural technological breakthroughs are 
available which reduce dependency on fossil fuels and lower future GHGE, such as the 
long awaited fusion development. Many of the above cost estimates seem low enough 
that agricultural strategies may have a role at least as a bridge to future nonagricultural 
technological fixes. In meeting such agreements as the Kyoto Protocol, agricultural 
participation may be highly desirable, as there are cheap GHGE reductions or offsets. 
However, the 10 years until the commitment period are short. GHGE offset strategies 
will be cheapest when trees and soil carbon reach their maximum growth rates, which in 
the case of trees will not uniformly happen by the critical Kyoto dates. Agriculture 
certainly will respond if proper incentives or markets are provided as the historic 
participation in such programs as the U.S. Conservation Reserve Program, farm program 
and payment in kind programs indicate.
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3 GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE 
METHODOLOGY USED IN THIS DISSERTATION
This study analyzes simultaneously the multiple mitigation options available to 
the agricultural sector and captures interdependencies between these options. It treats 
crop acreage allocation and prices for agricultural products endogenously and assesses 
the effects of mitigation policies on various agricultural externalities. This section 
illustrates under which circumstances the use of such a modeling framework is important 
as opposed to using a more simplistic approach. Note that many assumptions used for 
the graphical analysis were not applied for the empirical analysis in sections 5 and 6.
3.1 Input Market Interdependencies
Agricultural mitigation strategies are linked because they use a common farm 
resource, land. In Figure 3-1, the effects of interdependencies in the land market are 
illustrated graphically. To simplify the graphical analysis, several assumptions are made. 
First, agricultural production is constrained to involve only three hypothetical choices o f 
crop management practices. These practices include two alternative types of wheat 
management: no-till wheat production (Strategy A) and conventional-till wheat 
production (Strategy B), and one type of com management (Strategy C). The produced 
com is processed into ethanol.
Second, introduction of a carbon emission mitigation policy is assumed to affect 
the profitability of considered cropping alternatives.
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Figure 3-1 Illustrative graphical analysis of potential shifts of demand for 
farmland after a mitigation policy under joint (upper panel) and 
independent (lower panel) analysis
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The supposed policy is a tax on net emissions of carbon equivalents. If net carbon 
emissions from a cropping alternative are negative, then the tax becomes a subsidy and 
net profits increase.
For this qualitative analysis, zero-till wheat and com-ethanol production are 
assumed to become more profitable after policy implementation because net carbon 
emissions are assumed to be negative. The mitigative effect of com-ethanol relates to its 
potential to substitute for conventional gasoline. Zero-till wheat production offsets 
carbon emissions through increases in soil organic matter. In contrast, conventional-till 
wheat management is assumed to yield positive net carbon emissions, hence, net profits 
decrease. If net profits from agricultural practices change, demand for farmland will 
change as well. For demonstrative purpose, it is assumed that farmland demand will 
increase substantially for zero-till wheat production (DA0 to DAI), less substantially for 
com-ethanol (Dco to DC1), and decrease for conventional-till wheat production (DB0 to 
DB1).
With no mitigation policy in place, the equilibrium land use occurs at the 
intersection of aggregate land demand curve (D°) and land supply curve (S). Demand for 
land is aggregated over the individual demand curves of all hypothetical cropping 
activities a farmer may choose from (DA0, DB0, Dco). Farmland is primarily used for 
conventional wheat production (qB0) and com-ethanol production (qco). Demand for 
zero-till wheat management (DA0) is fairly low and relatively little acreage is allocated to 
this type of wheat management. At equilibrium, total land amounts to q° with the land 
rental cost equaling p°.
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To illustrate the interdependency between mitigation strategies, two alternative 
methods for assessing the mitigative potential of cropping practices are compared in 
Figure 3-1. The first approach involves a joint assessment (upper panel in Figure 3-1), 
where the supposed mitigation policy simultaneously affects all three hypothetical 
cropping practices. A second more partial approach involves an independent analysis, 
where the policy impacts on only one of the available cropping activities (lower panel of 
Figure 3-1). In particular, this approach considers mitigative effects from com-ethanol 
production, but ignores emissions and emission reductions from soil organic matter 
changes and fossil fuel use of the two hypothetical wheat management practices.
Under a joint assessment, introduction of the mitigation policy will increase 
equilibrium farmland usage from q° to q1, raising the land rental rate from p° to pl. Zero- 
till wheat acreage increases (qA0 to qAI) while conventional-till wheat acreage decreases 
(qB0 to qBI). Despite increased farmland demand for com-ethanol production, the actual 
acreage allocated to com-ethanol decreases (qco to qci). This occurs because the 
increased marginal revenue from com-ethanol production does not offset the increased 
costs, which are rental cost and opportunity cost of land.
Assessing ethanol’s mitigation potential independently leads to different results. 
Such an assessment would not look at demand shifts for farmland from wheat 
management strategies. The new equilibrium land rental rate (p1 ) would be higher than 
originally (p°) but lower than under the assumption of joint mitigation (pl. upper panel). 
Com-ethanol acreage would increase from qco to qCI. The relatively high prediction of
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com-ethanol acreage (qci > qGI) would in turn yield a relatively high prediction of the 
mitigation potential from ethanol-based carbon emission reductions.
The graphical results lead to several implications for the methodology employed 
in this study. First, independent analysis of individual mitigation strategies can overstate 
the mitigation potential of that strategy if a) more mitigation strategies are 
simultaneously available, and b) some of the alternative mitigation strategies have a 
comparative advantage over the strategy examined. In Figure 3 -1. this argument is 
confirmed through the case of ethanol-based emission reductions.
Second, interdependencies do not only exist among different mitigative strategies 
but also between mitigative and non-mitigative strategies. As shown in Figure 3-1, non- 
mitigative strategies such as conventional-till wheat management experience a 
comparative disadvantage, thus, the equilibrium usage of these activities decreases.
3.2 Output Market Effects
Mitigation policy induced changes of the land market equilibrium will also affect 
the equilibrium in output markets. A hypothetical example of the aggregate output 
markets for cropping activities is shown in Figure 3-2. For illustrative purpose, Figure 
3-2 is subdivided into three graphs each symbolizing a particular level of market 
integration. Traditional agricultural markets are represented in the upper diagram. 
Supply and demand curves are aggregated over all food commodities and other 
established agricultural products. A potential mitigation market is represented in the 
lower diagram of Figure 3-2.
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Figure 3-2 Possible responses in agricultural output markets after greenhouse 
gas emission regulation
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C* 1Demand for GHGE abatement is positive (D ) if a mitigation policy has been 
implemented or zero (D00) if not. In the middle diagram, food and mitigation market are 
combined by use of marginal economic surplus (MES) curves. These curves correspond 
to the difference of demand and supply in the two individual markets.
Some specific assumptions should be noted. First, GHGE abatement is assumed 
to be negatively correlated with food production. For example, land that is used for tree 
planting or ethanol production cannot be used to produce food. Similarly, reduced 
nitrogen fertilizer use abates NiO emissions but on the expense of lower crop yields. To 
incorporate the inverse relationship between food production and GHGE abatement into 
the joint market, the axis indicating GHGE abatement is directed oppositely (right to left) 
to the axis representing aggregate food production (left to right). The more emissions are 
abated, the less food can be produced. Thus, at a particular point of production (GHGE 
abatement), the area underneath the MES curve for food production to the left of that 
point measures the total economic surplus in the food market. The area underneath the 
MES for GHGE abatement to the right of the point in question measures the total 
economic surplus in the mitigation market.
Second, realization of a mitigation policy is assumed to move the aggregated 
supply curve for food from Sro to SFl. This shift symbolizes additional production cost 
to farmers because of increased rental rates for farmland (see previous section) and 
higher expenses on fossil fuel based inputs. On the other hand, implementation of a 
mitigation policy is assumed to create additional revenue to farmers in the mitigation 
market. This revenue corresponds to positive demand (DCI) for GHGE abatement8
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established directly through the government via a subsidy or indirectly via emissions 
trading.
Figure 3-2 can be used to analyze effects of a mitigation policy on the level of 
food production, prices, GHGE abatement, and on welfare of different market segments. 
In absence of mitigation regulations, aggregated food demand (DF) and supply (S™) 
determine the autarkic equilibrium level of food production (q°) and price (p^). The 
marginal economic surplus to the agricultural sector as a whole from producing food 
(MES™) equals zero at equilibrium (q°). Since no demand exists for GHGE reductions 
(D00 = 0), GHGE abatement remains at its lowest level (q°). Total welfare in the 
agricultural sector equals the sum of producers' surplus (areas R + L + N + P) and 
consumers’ surplus (areas S + M + 0  + Q + T + U + V + W). The sum of these areas in 
the food market is exactly identical to the sum of areas A through J in the joint market.
Introduction of GHGE abatement incentives establishes a second market for 
agricultural enterprises: the mitigation market. The simultaneous equilibrium can be 
found in the joint market by maximizing total economic surplus from both markets. The 
maximization condition is met where MESF1 and MESCI intersect and results in qEQ. By 
moving to either side of the equilibrium point (qEQ). additional benefits in one market 
would be more than offset through losses in the other market. At equilibrium, the sum of 
consumers’ and producers’ surplus corresponds to areas A + B + C realized in the food 
market, and areas D + H + J + K realized in the mitigation market. Note that the level of 
food production is lower than before implementation of the mitigation policy.
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Mitigation policy based welfare losses in the food market total the sum of areas D 
-t-E + F + G + H + I + J (joint market). Using the food market diagram, these losses can 
be decomposed into producers’ (areas L + N + P) and consumers’ losses (area M + O +
Q + V + T). In addition to overall welfare reductions in the food market, welfare will be
FOshifted from consumers to producers faccnusc pnccs in the food mnrlcct merense (p to 
pEQ). These welfare shifts are represented by the sum of areas S + U. Because producers 
both gain and lose from mitigation policies, the net effect on producers’ welfare is 
ambiguous and depends on the elasticities of supply and demand curves, and the 
magnitude of supply shifts as well. Consumers are likely to experience substantial 
welfare losses in the food market.
While farmers may or may not experience income losses in the food market, they 
are subject to gains in the mitigation market. In particular, these gains amount to the 
sum of areas Y + Z, or equivalently, to areas D + H + J + K (joint market). Note that the 
autarkic equilibrium in the mitigation market would occur at qG1, where marginal cost of 
emission reductions equals marginal revenue, and MES from GHGE abatement equals 
zero. However, such equilibrium is purely hypothetical because it assumes no 
interactions with the food market. If these interactions were taken into account, abating 
at qGI would reduce total welfare in the food market by the sum of areas C + B + F (joint 
market) subject to relatively small gains in the mitigation market (area C in joint market 
representation or area X in mitigation market representation). Such behavior would be 
inconsistent with profit maximization.
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Figure 3-2 can also be used to assess the qualitative impacts of a mitigation 
policy that does not establish direct revenues from emission reductions. For example, 
implementation of emission standards with no emissions trading provisions increases 
cost of food production subject to no monetary gains from complying with the imposed 
standard. The resulting market equilibrium can be found in the joint market at the 
intersection of MESFI and MESC0. Effects in the food market are similar as observed 
before. Production decreases from q° to qF1 causing substantial welfare losses in the 
food sector. Increasing prices for food (pF0 to pFI) lead to welfare shifts from consumers 
to producers (areas S + T). Again, while consumers loose, the net effect on farmers’ 
income is ambiguous.
3.3 Effects of Mitigation Policies on Other Agricultural Externalities
The relationship between food production, emissions of greenhouse gases (G). 
and two other environmental externalities, erosion (E) and nitrogen pollution (N) is 
shown in Figure 3-3. Two assumptions are made for this hypothetical analysis. First, 
the marginal social costs of erosion increase as more food is produced. This occurs 
because highly erodible land is usually more costly to manage. Fanners use the most 
suitable and less erodible land first, but bring more erodible land into production as 
demand for food commodities increases.
Second, the marginal social costs of nitrogen pollution are also increasing with 
respect to food production. High demand for food increases farmers’ incentive to 
maximize yields; hence nitrogen fertilization increases.
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Figure 3-3 Impacts of greenhouse gas emission (G) mitigation efforts on erosion 
(E) and nitrogen pollution (N)
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As nitrogen use increases, so does the probability of causing excess nitrogen, the 
nitrogen residual left in the soluble portion of the soil after plant uptake. Excess levels 
of nitrogen increase the amount of nitrogen leaching into the ground water.
Social costs of the described externalities are shown in the lower panel of Figure 
3-3, where MSC^ represents marginal social cost of GHGE, MSC^ marginal social cost 
of nitrogen water pollution, and MSCE marginal cost of erosion. As argued above and in 
section 3.2, all externalities are positively correlated with food production, thus the 
marginal social damage increases as more food is produced.
The food market representation in Figure 3-3 contains one aggregate demand 
curve (Df) and three supply curves symbolizing three different levels of social cost 
accountancy. The supply curve labeled Sro embodies all currently incurred marginal 
costs of food production in absence of any environmental policy. Internalizing only the 
GHGE externality generates supply curve SFI. To emphasize the linkage to section 3.2, 
the two supply curves (S150, SFl) were named identically to those used in this previous 
section. Finally, internalizing all marginal social costs of considered externalities and 
adding these costs to the marginal cost of food production (SF0) yields the total marginal 
social cost curve (S™ + MSC° +• MSCN + MSCE).
In absence of any environmental policy, the free market equilibrium would be 
determined at the intersection of DF and S^, corresponding to a relatively high level of 
food production (q^). As concluded in section 3.2, the aggregate food price would settle 
relatively low, at p™. Unaccounted social costs from above described externalities
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a  p  r  a  d
would be relatively high and equivalent to the sum of areas G + G +G  +N  +N  + 
Nc -f Ea + Eb + Ec.
If all externalities were internalized, the market would move from the free market 
equilibrium (qro, p™) to a new equilibrium (qSE, pSE). Production of food would notably 
decline and pnccs for food wrould go up. Social cost from environmental damages 
would not be eliminated but considerably reduced. The remaining environmental 
damage would equal the sum of areas GA + NA + EA (lower diagram of Figure 3-3). The 
associated social benefits from internalizing the identified externalities can also be 
recognized in the food market diagram (sum of areas LI + L2 + L3).
In the previous section, impacts of a GHGE mitigation policy on food markets 
were analyzed. Particularly, it was argued that internalizing emissions of GHG would 
shift the aggregate supply curve for food to the left (SF0 to SF1). As a result production of 
food would decrease from qro to qFl and the price of food would increase from pro to pFI. 
The effects of such policy on environmental externalities can be seen in Figure 3-3. As 
intended, GHGE would be lower (xFl) than without policy (x™). However, given the 
above-discussed assumptions are valid, nitrogen pollution and erosion would also be 
diminished at xF1. Areas N° + Ec represent those unintended environmental gains.
The unintended environmental side effects are unaccounted for in previous 
GHGE mitigation studies (see section 2). Although this dissertation will not provide 
estimates of the marginal social damage from erosion or nitrogen leaching, it can provide 
a quantitative record of changes in levels of erosion and nitrogen pollution as various 
mitigation policies are put in place. This represents a major improvement over existing
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analyses. It will be left to further studies to place monetary values on erosion and 
nitrogen pollution reductions, and to incorporate likely effects of GHGE reduction 
policies on additional externalities, for example, on the quality of wild life habitats.
3.4 Efficiency of Mitigation Policies
Summarizing the above arguments, mitigation policies are likely to cause the 
following main impacts on the agricultural sector. First, limited availability of farmland 
will force a competition between land used for traditional agricultural production and 
land used to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Second, farmers will select a 
combination of traditional management and mitigation strategies that maximizes their 
profit. Third, prices for food commodities are likely to rise. Fourth, farm income may 
increase due to gains in the mitigation arena. Also, farm income arising from food 
production may increase because the inelastic demand for food commodities may 
increase food prices considerably. Fifth, mitigation is likely to reduce the extent of other 
negative environmental externalities.
Policy makers want to know whether agriculture’s mitigation potential justifies 
implementation of specific farm management related mitigation policies and if so, what 
specific policies would be efficient. In general, a mitigation policy is efficient if the time 
stream of net social benefits from this policy is preferred over that from any feasible 
alternative. Benefits from GHGE mitigation efforts may include reduced levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions, reduced costs of emission reductions in non-agricultural 
markets, reduced levels of other agricultural externalities, more governmental revenues,
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and fairer income distribution in the agricultural sector. Dynamic efficiency gains of, for 
example, decreased future abatement costs through technological change are important 
(Jaffe and Stavins). Losses from GHGE mitigation policies involve welfare reductions 
in the traditional agricultural sector and transaction costs.
The analytical approach of this dissertation enables a more accurate estimation of 
net benefits from mitigation policies, which in turn enables policy makers to choose 
efficient policies.
3.5 Transaction Costs
Transaction costs represent a key characteristic of environmental policies. Most 
environmental externalities exist because the magnitude of these costs outweighs 
potential gains from creating a market for the external good or bad. Transaction costs 
include costs of implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of environmental policies. 
Because of very limited experience with GHGE policies, the magnitude of transaction 
costs in the mitigation arena is highly uncertain and may differ substantially among 
emission sources (Crandall).
Taxes on fuel, fertilizer, and energy certainly belong to the low cost category of 
mitigation policies. They are already used in many countries (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development survey) even though the actual tax rates are 
disconnected from GHGE reduction objectives. Adjusting the level of an already 
implemented policy, therefore, should not considerably increase the costs of monitoring 
and enforcing this policy. Given that lobbying costs for tax level changes are tolerable,
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societies would incur relatively little additional expenses from adjusting these tax rates 
to incorporate emission reduction objectives.
While implementation of fuel taxes may be relatively cheap, some other 
agricultural mitigation policies are likely to yield higher transaction costs. For example, 
nitrous oxide emissions from agricultural Fields can only be mitigated by upstream 
policies on certain management practices. The linkage of these practices to actual levels 
of emissions, however, is not yet well established (see section 2.2.1.2). Hence, 
inefficiencies result. Similarly, soil carbon emission mitigation policies may relate to 
high costs from verifying net emission reductions over time.
Costs pertaining to inefficiencies from upstream versus downstream emission 
regulations will be the only transaction cost item examined in this dissertation. Other 
items pertaining to costs of implementation, verification, and monitoring of GHGE 
mitigation policies will be ignored throughout the empirical analysis. The main reason 
for this rigorous approach is the lack of reliable data. However, not accounting for 
transaction costs does not entirely reduce the usefulness of empirical results. Since 
transaction costs are likely to be governmental expenses, their absence or presence does 
not affect the market equilibrium. Thus, if transaction cost data become available at 
some future date, the empirical results from this dissertation may be augmented, perhaps 
without the need for extensive recomputations.
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4 METHODOLOGY
The overall objective of this dissertation is to analyze the potential of U.S. 
agriculture to mitigate GHGE. The Agricultural Sector Model (ASM) hosted at Texas 
A&M (McCarl et al.) presented a good starting point for meeting this objective. ASM 
computes the market equilibrium for major agricultural markets in the U.S. Foreign 
markets for relevant trading partners are also included. Maximization of producer profits 
and consumer utility yields the equilibrium solution in ASM. The solution provides a 
detailed picture o f the U.S. agricultural sector including information on prices, levels of 
production, and net exports as well as resource usage, technology adoption, and welfare 
distribution. However, the original ASM model does not involve a complete GHGE 
related component.
The fundamental task and method of this dissertation was to augment the ASM 
model for the analysis o f GHGE mitigation. Several basic steps were taken to 
accomplish this goal. First, a list of potential mitigation strategies was defined. These 
strategies included available options for all agriculturally relevant GHGs with respect to 
crop or livestock production, and basic processing.
Second, data were needed on GHGE levels for all feasible mitigation strategies. 
Emissions data for livestock technologies were based on EPA and IPCC estimates, or 
derived according to IPCC guidelines. The EPCC and EPA, however, do not provide 
emissions data on crop production activities. Emissions from crop production are very 
sensitive to many specific technology parameters and regionally specific weather patterns
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(Granli and B0 ckman). As a result, comprehensive observational data are very costly to 
obtain and, as of yet, few such data exist. The only way to overcome this lack of data is 
to use crop growth simulation models. Examples are the EPIC model (Williams et al.) 
and the CENTURY model (Parton et al.). All of these models are continuously 
developed to improve estimation of the complex relationship between agricultural crop 
management and associated levels of emissions. For the purpose of this dissertation, we 
used the EPIC model to simulate the relative effects of agricultural management on 
carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide emissions, and on a variety of other environmental 
parameters.
Third, agricultural activities in ASM needed to be made compatible to mitigation 
strategies. For example, nitrous oxide emission mitigation can be achieved through 
reduced fertilization. The original ASM model, however, has no fertilization 
alternatives. Given the virtually infinite number of possible management options, this 
step required choosing a sufficient number of representative alternatives. The limiting 
factor for the number of examined alternatives is computing time.
Fourth, the mathematical structure of the ASM model needed to be modified.
This involved setting up GHG emission and sink accounting equations, validation of 
baseline emissions and baseline cropping practices, and building a GHG policy module 
that allows for analysis of various policy scenarios involving payment levels and eligible 
strategies.
The following sections document and describe the methodological components of 
this analysis in more detail.
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4.1 Developing Farm Level GHGE Data - Use of the Erosion Productivity Impact 
Calculator (EPIC)
4.1.1 Description
The EPIC model was originally developed to assess the impact of cropping 
practices on crop productivity of various soils (Williams et al.). In later years, the scope 
of EPIC has been expanded to cover the effect of a variety of land use management 
decisions on soil, water, nutrient, and pesticide movements and their combined impact 
on soil loss, water quality, and crop yields. Recent efforts involve greenhouse gas 
emission related processes such as estimation of denitrification rates and soil carbon 
accounting. EPIC has been used in more than fifty countries.
The basic geographical scale of EPIC is a field site with homogeneous soil, 
landscape, weather, and cropping characteristics. Water and associated chemicals, soil, 
and organic matter move from the edge of the field and from the bottom of root zone.
An internal weather generator, based on local weather patterns, generates random 
probabilistic weather events, which combined with user specified crop management 
events results in plant growth and all the above-mentioned nutrient, weather, and soil 
component changes. EPIC is a daily time step model and produces summary output 
daily, monthly, annually, or by aggregates of these time periods.
In this dissertation. EPIC will be used to simulate the effects of alternative crop 
management strategies on soil organic matter content, nitrous oxide emissions through 
denitrification or air volatilization, and several other important environmental parameters
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such as soil erosion, nitrogen, and phosphorous movements. The simulated values will 
then be integrated in an economic optimization model for the U.S. agricultural sector. A 
description of this optimization model follows in sections 4.2 and 4.3.
4.1.2 Running EPIC for Alternative Fertilization Options
EPIC was originally built as a site-specific simulation model, which can provide 
output on hundreds of soil and crop related parameters on a daily basis. Consequently, 
most previous EPIC studies are site, crop and technology specific. The task of this 
dissertation was to use EPIC to develop annual, representative parameter values for all 
major U.S. crops, in all major U.S. production regions, and for many alternative 
technology specifications. For example, the number of EPIC runs covering one 
fertilization option with all feasible irrigation and tillage system combinations, for all 
major crops on all relevant soil types, in all major production regions amounted to about 
5,000 individual runs. Thus, the total number of runs equaled the number of individual 
runs per fertilization option times the number of different fertilization option to be 
examined.
An individual EPIC run requires three input files. These three files contain local 
weather and climate data (file extension DATO, soil parameters (file extension 'SOL'), 
and crop management related parameters (file extension ’OPS’). In an effort to use the 
EPIC model for large-scale assessments of agricultural practices, a complete set of EPIC 
input files consistent with 5,000 individual crop management combinations was 
compiled at the B lackland Research Center and made available for this study.
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The EPIC program also contains several parameter files, which allow users to 
modify specific options. For this study, the following options were modified: a) 
fertilizer applied through nitrogen stress parameter (contained in file PARM8120.DAT),
b) fertilizer type at application time (contained in file ASMFERT1.DAT), and c) 
dcnitnfication soil-watcr threshold (contained in file PARM8120.DAT). The nitrogen 
stress level determines the fraction of growing season days with nitrogen stress. High 
levels of nitrogen stress imply low levels of nitrogen fertilizer. Possible types of mineral 
nitrogen fertilizers in EPIC include nitrate, ammonia, and any convex combination 
between the two. The denitrification soil-water threshold determines the water 
saturation level, which initiates denitrification of nitrate to atmospheric nitrogen and 
nitrous oxide. For this study, it was uniformly set to 99 percent.
Table 4-1 summarizes the basic steps of the program developed to run EPIC and 
to automatically format the output values. Annual EPIC output parameters, which were 
saved, are listed in Table 4-2. The final EPIC output is directly compatible to the 
economic optimization model described in sections 4.2 and 4.3.
4.2 The Agricultural Sector Model (ASM)
The economic impacts of greenhouse gas mitigation will be assessed using a 
mathematical programming model, which is based on the agricultural sector model 
(ASM). The ASM maximizes the sum of producers’ and consumers' surplus subject to 
resource limitations, government policy, and market supply-demand balances as 
described in McCarl and Spreen; and Chang, et al.
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Table 4-1 Description of Program to Link EPIC to ASMGHG
Step Description
Step 1 Define fertilizer alternatives for EPIC runs
(GAMS) a) Values of nitrogen stress parameter {20...100}
b) Values of denitrification parameter {95.99}
c) Values of N H 4 / N O 3  ratio {100% N H 4 , 0% NK,}
d) Values of simulation period {100 years}
Step 2 Create parameter files for alternative fertilizer options
(DOS-UTIL) a) PARM8120.DAT (nitrogen stress and denitrification options)
b) ASMFERT1.DAT (nitrogen fertilizer type)
c) Copy parameter file into subdirectory
d) Change file name to identify fertilizer alternative 
Example:
After setting nitrogen stress equal to "85" and denitrification equal 
to "99". save PARM8120.DAT as N8599.PAR in subdirectory 
"\EPIC8120\FERTALT\".
Similarly, after setting NH4  equal to 100% save ASMFERT1.DAT 
as N1N0.PAR in subdirectory "\EPIC8120\FERTALT\".
e) Repeat Step 2a) - d) until all alternative fertilizer settings have 
been processed
Scan existing EPIC records 
If results are complete.
Exit program 
If records are incomplete,
Write missing runs in each region to EPICRUN.DAT file,
Copy EPICRUN.DAT into respective EPIC regional directory, 
Go to Step 4
Step 4 Write executable batch files for missing EPIC runs
(GAMS) 9 Go to Step 5
Step 3 
(GAMS) 9
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Table 4-1 Continued
Step Description
Step 5 
(DOS) 9
Execute EPIC using batch files from Step 4
Step 5a Overwrite fertiiizer parameter files in EPICS 120 directory:
(DOS) 9 i) PARM8120.DAT
ii) ASMFERT1.DAT 
Go to Step 5b
Step 5b Copy regional EPIC input files into EPIC8120 directory
(DOS) 9 i) *.NEW (weather data)
ii) *.SOL (soil property data)
iii) *.OP2 (management data)
iv) OPSFILE2.DAT, S0LFILE1.DAT, EPICRUN.DAT
Step 5c Execute EPIC8120
(DOS) 9 (This executes all EPIC runs which are specified in EPICRUN.DAT 
for the current region and the current fertilizer setting)
Go to Step 5d
Step 5d Copy EPIC output file into data storage directory
(DOS) 9 Change the file name of EPIC output file (EPICS 120.SUM) to 
identify region and fertilizer settings.
Example:
Change EPIC8120.sum to TXHI9599.113 (This file would then 
contain results for Texas High Plains, nitrogen stress 95, 
denitrification option 99. 100% NHt-nitrogen, nitrification 
inhibitor, and 1 0 0  years simulation
Go to Step 5e
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Table 4-1 Continued
Step Description
Step 5e Delete the following files for each completed regions:
(DOS) 9 i) *.NEW (weather data)
ii) *.SOL (soil property data)
iii) *.OP2 (management data)
iv) OPSFILE2.DAT, SOLFILEl.DAT, EPICRUN.DAT 
Go to Step 5f
Step 5f If more regions to be processed,
(GAMS) 9 Continue with Step 5b for next region 
If all regions processed,
Go to Step 5g
Step 5g If more fertilizer options to be processed.
(GAMS) 9 Continue with Step 5a for next fertilizer alternative 
If all fertilizer settings processed,
Go to Step 6
Step 6 Create aggregated, GAMS compatible EPIC output file
(FORTRAN) 9 a) Copy all regional output files into one file, use GAMS table 
format
b) Add dimension for fertilizer option in each row of new file
Step 7 
(GAMS) 9
Go to Step 3
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Table 4-2 Annual EPIC Parameters From Comparative Runs
EPIC-Variable Description and Unit
Weather data
PRCP Precipitation (mm)
PET Potential evapo-transpiration (mm)
ET Actual evapo-transpiration (mm)
Crop technology data
YIELD Crop yield (t/ha)
HI Harvest index (crop yield/aboveground biomass)
BIOM Crop biomass (shoot + root) (t/ha)
RSD Crop residue (t/ha)
COST Total production cost (S)
Soil data
PH Soil pH
ORG C Organic carbon content (%)
YOC Carbon in sediment yield (t/ha)
HUM Stable organic matter (humus) in profile (t/ha)
TOCI Initial carbon content in soil in (t/ha)
TOCF Final carbon content in soil (t/ha)
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Table 4-2 Continued
EPIC-Variable Description and Unit
Nitrogen data
NS Nitrogen stress factor in days of vegetation period
FN Average annual nitrogen fertilizer rate (kg/ha)
FN03 Average annual NO3 fertilizer rate (kg/ha)
FNO Organic nitrogen fertilizer
FNH3 NH3-N fertilizer (kg/ha)
NFLX Nitrogen fixation by legumes (kg/ha)
AVOL Nitrogen volatilization NH3-N (kg/ha)
DN Nitrogen loss by denitrification (kg/ha)
PRKN Mineral nitrogen loss in percolation (kg/ha)
IMN Nitrogen immobilized by decaying residue (kg/ha)
NITR Nitrification NH3-N conversion to NO3-N (kg/ha)
HMN Nitrogen mineralized from stable organic matter (kg/ha)
MNN Nitrogen mineralized (kg/ha)
YON Organic nitrogen loss with sediment (kg/ha)
YN03 NO3-N loss in surface runoff (kgdia)
SSFN Mineral nitrogen loss in subsurface flow (kg/ha)
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Table 4-2 Continued
EPIC-Variable Description and Unit
Phosphorous data
FP Average annual phosphorous fertilizer rate (kg/ha)
PS Phosphorus stress in days of vegetation period
YAP Soluble phosphorous loss in runoff (g/ha)
YP Phosphorous loss with sediment (kg/ha)
MNP Phosphorous mineralized
PRKP Mineral phosphorous loss in percolation
Erosion data
MUST Soil loss from water erosion using MUST equation (t/ha)
MUSS Soil loss from water erosion using MUSS equation (t/ha)
USLE Soil loss from water erosion using USLE (t/ha)
YW Soil loss from wind erosion (t/ha)
Water flow data
IRGA Irrigation water applied (mm)
Q Surface runoff (mm)
SSF Sub-surface flow (mm)
PRK Percolation below soil profile (mm)
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ASM solutions yield estimates of equilibrium prices, quantities, resource usage, 
and social welfare levels. There are 48 primary and 54 secondary commodities included. 
Land, labor, and water resources are allocated among ten major production regions and 
further disaggregated into 63 smaller regions. Production budgets are specified for each 
region while national level processing budgets are used. Constant elasticity functional 
forms are defined for domestic consumption and export demand as well as input and 
import supply. A basic representation of the economic structure in ASM is given in 
Figure 4 -1.
ASM has been used previously in Baumes: Burton: Burton and Martin; Tyner et 
al.; Adams, Hamilton, and McCarl; and Adams et al. among others. ASM solution 
values should be interpreted as intermediate-run equilibrium results. Adjustment costs 
incurred in the short-run, i.e. for implementing new technologies are not accounted for in 
ASM.
4.3 The Agricultural Sector and Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Model (ASMGHG)
The modeling effort in this dissertation involved modifying and expanding the 
ASM to analyze opportunities of greenhouse gas emission mitigation through the 
agricultural sector. Hereafter, the modified ASM shall be referred to as ASMGHG.
4.3.1 New Crop Management Dimensions in ASMGHG
To examine greenhouse gas mitigation options through agricultural management, 
sufficient choices with respect to agricultural management had to be made available in 
ASM.
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Tillage intensity, soil type, and the amount and type of nitrogen fertilizer applications 
impact both soil organic matter buildup and denitrification rates, and thus, net carbon 
dioxide and nitrous oxide emissions (Granli and Bdckman). The original ASM for crop 
enterprises included neither alternative tillage systems, nor different soil types, nor 
alternative fertilization options.
In this dissertation, the complete set of crop enterprise budgets was replaced by a 
new data set compiled by USDA NRCS (Benson). The new data set includes 
information on input requirements, input expenditures, and yields for conventional and 
alternative tillage systems as classified by the National Conservation and Resource 
Service (NRCS). In particular, the three tillage categories introduced are conventional 
tillage, conservation tillage, and zero tillage.
4.3.2 Linking Farm Level Emissions Data to ASMGHG
EPIC results were used to augment ASMGHG enterprise budgets by two 
additional dimensions: a fertilization dimension and a land type dimension. Each 
element of the fertilizer dimension represents a specific type and amount of fertilizer 
applied (Table 4-3). In addition, the fertilizer dimension identifies whether nitrification 
inhibitors were used. Soils in each region were subdivided into four classes.
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Table 4-3 Nitrogen Fertilizer Choices
N-Scenario N-Stress Value N-Type N-Inhibitor
N50TII0 50% 100% NH4 No
N75T1I0 25% 100% NH4 No
NS5T1I0 1i . _ / /  c - 100% NH4 No
N92TII0 8 % 100% NH4 No
N95T1I0 5% 100% NH4 No
N98T1I0 2 % 100% NH4 No
NOOTIIO 0 % 100% NH4 No
N50T5I0 50% 50% NH4, 50% N03 No
N75T5I0 25% 50% NH4, 50% N03 No
N85T5I0 15% 50% NH4, 50% N03 No
N92T5I0 8 % 50% NH4, 50% N03 No
N95T5I0 5% 50% NH4,50% N03 No
N98T5I0 2 % 50% NH4,50% N03 No
NOOT5IO 0 % 50% NH4. 50% N03 No
N50T0L0 50% 100% N03 No
N75T0I0 25% 100% N03 No
N85TOIO 15% 100% N03 No
N92T0I0 8 % 100% N03 No
N95TOIO 5% 100% N03 No
N98T0I0 2 % 100% N03 No
NOOTOIO 0 % 100% N03 No
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Crop budget data for alternative fertilization options and different soil types were 
developed through adjustment of base technology data. While some of the crop budget 
data, for example input use, could be assumed to stay at the base level, others needed to 
be updated. In particular, crop yield, fertilizer use, water use, and associated costs were 
adjusted for different soil types and fertilization management. The adjustment process 
required three basic steps and is summarized below.
First, a base level for EPIC parameters was established which had the same 
dimensions as equivalent parameters in the ASMGHG crop production budgets. The 
base level for the average land type was calculated for each region using a weighted 
average of soil types from that region. The base nitrogen level was set equal to the 
highest fertilization scenario in EPIC. Second, the proportionate change of all EPIC data 
from the base level was calculated (Equation 1). EPIC data, which are not impacted by 
nitrogen management and soil type, thus, would have a value of 1 0 0  percent.
Third, the adjusted ASMGHG budget item value was calculated as the product of 
original budget item value times the adjustment for a particular land type and 
fertilization management (Equation 2). By using a relative adjustment instead of 
absolute levels, deviations of the base scenarios of the new ASMGHG model from the 
original were minimized. Environmental parameters such as soil organic matter, 
erosion, nitrogen and phosphorus percolation were not contained in ASM budgets.
There, the absolute EPIC value was assigned to ASM crop budget data.
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Equation 1 Percentage Change Calculation of EPIC Parameters
; EPIC*
■•R.C.W.L.T.F.E
P^
-R.C.W .L.T.F.E
x p
Y  t  R.C.W.L.T.'NBASE'.E
Lt L L.R 
V L
Equation 2 Augmenting of ASMGHG Budget Items Through Relative Changes 
of EPIC Parameters
Where:
L r . l
p
R.CAV.L. r.F .E
p  F.PtCr
C R.C.W L. r.F .E
or rpjASM 
d u l / r . c . w . t . e
p i  T T N  ASMGHG _  p r  rpjA SM  y  pEPICT- 
D U L ^R.C.W .L.T.F.E -  D U L , R.C.W.T.E '  ‘-•R.C.W.L.T.F.E
= Available cropland of land type L in region R,
= Simulated value of epic item E. for crop C, in region R, water
technology W, land type L. tillage system T, and fertilization 
alternative F,
= Multiplier for adjusting basic ASM budget items to land type 
L and alternative fertilization alternative F.
= Original ASM budget item E in region R, for crop C, water
technology W, tillage system T, and
B U D ^ ' w T . t . f . e  = Augmented ASMGHG budget item E in region R, for crop C,
water technology W. land type L. tillage system T, and 
fertilization alternative F.
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4.3.3 ASMGHG Validation
The ASMGHG is specified with 1997 prices and production levels. In addition, 
cost and yields were calibrated to match the observed use of conservation tillage and 
irrigation according to 1997 NRI levels. The adjustment of yields is shown below.
First, the acreage allocated to a specific crop, irrigation technology and tillage 
practice was constrained to match nationally observed levels (Equation 3 through 
Equation 5). In addition, the acreage allocated to alternative fertilizer options was 
constrained to be zero (Equation 6 ). Second. levels of domestic production were 
determined through ASMGHG (Equation 7). Substituting Equation 7 in Equation 8  
yields Equation 9. The final adjustment to yields in ASMGHG is shown in Equation 10.
Equation 3 Total Regional Crop Acreage Constraint During Baseline Budget 
Validation
V ’ 7  ASMGHG _  » USDA 
Z* r t R.C.W.T.L.F ~  r t R.C 
W.T.L.F
Equation 4 Total Regional Irrigated Crop Acreage Constraint During Baseline 
Budget Validation
V  a- ASMGHG _  a USDA
Ld R .C /Irre" T L.F "  r t R.C.-IrrE- 
T.L.F
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Equation 5
Equation 6
Equation 7
Equation 8
Equation 9
Equation 10
Total Region, Crop, and Tillage Specific Acreage Constraint During 
Baseline Budget Validation
Z7T ASMGHG _  a USDA R .C ,W .T .L .F  -  R .C .TW .L.F
Zero Upper Limit on Alternative Fertilization Practices During 
Baseline Budget Validation
"T" ASMGHG ___ /%
A R .C .\V .T .L .F*"\B A SE " ”  U
Calculation of ASMGHG Baseline Production
Q ASMGHG _  V  / y  ASMGHG T  ASMGHG \R.C “  L* \  1 R.C. W .T .L .F A R .C .W .T .L .F / 
W .T.L.F
Simple Production Level Identity
Q Q L’SDA
_______ R-C ASMGHG
R.C "  ASMGHG X X R .C  
X R .C
Production Level Identity After Substitution of Equation 7 Into 
Equation 8
( ( ~  USDA N
/-vUSDA _  y  y  ASMGHG Q r .C J  ASMGHG
V r . C  L , ‘ R .C .W .T .L .F  X ASMGHG X A R,C,W .T,L.
:Vv V r .c  /W .T.L.F
Yield Adjustment in ASMGHG
Qu s d a_  R.C
1 R .C .W .T.L.F -  ^  R .C .W .T .L .F  X fyASM GHG
^< R .C
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Where:
r  .ASMGHG 
A  R .C . W .T .L .F
a USDA
a r.c
a  USDA 
R .C .T
A USDA 
R .C .'Irrg"
■y-ASMGHG 
1 R .C . W .T .L .F
Q ASMGHG 
R.C
Qu s d a  R.C
yA S M C H G  
R.C.W .T. L.F
= Constrained acreage in ASMGHG allocated to crop C in
region R using water technology W, tillage system T, 
fertilization alternative F on land type L,
= Observed total acreage of crop C in region R,
= Observed total acreage of crop C in region R with tillage 
system T,
= Observed total irrigated acreage of crop C in region R.
= Original ASMGHG yields for crop C in region R using water
technology W, tillage system T. fertilization alternative F on 
land type L,
= Computed level of domestic production of crop C in region R.
= Level of domestic production of crop C in region R. and
= Adjusted yields in ASMGHG for crop C in region R using
water technology W, tillage system T, fertilization alternative 
F on land type L.
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4.3.4 Methane Emissions
4.3.4.1  Livestock Emissions
The first step in modeling greenhouse gas emission mitigation was to specify 
emission coefficients for currently used technologies. Emission coefficients specifically 
estimated for the U.S. were available from the EPA web site (U.S. EPA). In addition, 
the IPCC provides default coefficients, which were used whenever no U.S. specific 
estimates were available. In applying EPA or IPCC emission coefficients to ASM, 
several adjustments had to be made. First, the classification of livestock activities in 
ASMGHG often differed from EPA and IPCC classifications. Annual livestock 
production values from the ASMGHG model had to be translated into livestock 
population estimates (Equation 11). This conversion was necessary because emissions 
do not arise from livestock products (animal flux) but rather from standing animals 
(animal pool).
Equation 11 Animal Population Constraint
\
X  N r .A .B  =  P R s  x  (1 -  5 R s )  x  L a  r  s  x  W V R  S
B S > R .A
Where:
N r.a.b = Average annual total population of animal A, in region R,
under enteric fermentation regime B,
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P r.s = Annual livestock production in region R for ASMGHG
livestock activity S,
8  r,s = Average death loss in region R for ASMGHG livestock
activity S,
W a.k.s — Average live weight or production for animal A m region R
under ASMGHG livestock activity S. and 
L a.r.s = Average live span of animal A in region R in ASMGHG
livestock activity S.
EPA calculates emission coefficients for cattle depending on age. Emissions 
from beef cattle, for example, are categorized in three stages: stage one covers the first 
twelve month and has the lowest emission factors, stage two covers the second twelve 
month, and stage three covers emissions from mature animals beyond an age of two 
years. Whenever ASMGHG livestock production activities overlap these emission 
categories, the activity was divided into sub-classes
Anaerobic decomposition of livestock manure leads to production of methane. 
Emissions are driven by the amount of manure produced, its composition and 
temperature, and the way the manure is managed (U.S. EPA). Liquid and slurry systems 
not only generate more methane emissions than dry systems, but their usage in the U.S. 
is increasing as the trend toward fewer but larger dairy and swine farms continues.
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4.3.4.2 Emission Reductions From Livestock Production
There are three principal ways to mitigate methane emissions from livestock. 
First, decreasing the numbers of ruminant animals can reduce emissions. Second, 
improving manure handling can reduce methane emissions. A third way to decrease 
methane emissions from livestock is to improve the enteric fermentation process m 
ruminant animals.
4.3.4.2.1 Manure Handling
Manure management system improvements include covered anaerobic digesters, 
complete-mix digesters, and plug flow digesters (U.S. EPA), which are all applicable to 
liquid manure systems for large dairy and hog farms. Dry manure system improvements 
are not included in this analysis for several reasons. First, large hog farms in the U.S. 
manage manure almost exclusively with liquid systems (U.S. EPA). Second, methane 
production is highest in an anaerobic, water-based environment, with a high level of 
nutrients, warm temperatures, and in a moist climate (U.S. EPA). As a result, dry 
manure systems produce much less methane than liquid manure systems. Third, data for 
manure system improvements from dry manure systems were only available from 
European farms on a very aggregated level.
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For both swine and dairy farms, EPA published the break-even herd size for an 
improvement technology to be economically feasible, the incremental emission reduction 
contribution in million metric tons of carbon equivalent, and the average value of 
methane emission reductions in dollars per metric ton of carbon (Table 4-4). Manure 
management emission reduction involves the following main characteristics. First, costs 
of emission reduction technologies consist of installation and operating and opportunity 
costs for all system components. Revenues consist of the value of the electricity 
produced, the value of emission reductions, and the value of heat recovery. The value of 
emission reductions equals the product of assumed carbon equivalent value and global 
warming potential of methane. As the value of carbon equivalent emission reductions 
increases, so does the price of electricity.
Second, emission reduction costs per animal depend on herd size (U.S. EPA).
The larger a herd, the lower are these costs of using methane emission reduction 
technologies per animal head. Third, it is assumed that operating manure digesters 
completely eliminates manure emissions from associated swine or dairy herds.
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Table 4-4 EPA Data Used for Manure Management Improvement
Value of 
Emission 
Reduction in 
Dollars per 
TCE
Dairy Hogs
Cumulative 
Methane 
Emission 
Reduction in 
Percent
Incremental 
Methane 
Emission 
Reduction in 
MMTCE
Cumulative Incremental 
Methane Methane 
Emission Emission 
Reduction in Reduction in 
Percent MMTCE
-30 4 0.23 1 0 1.23
- 2 0 14 0.52 1 0 0 . 0 0
- 1 0 2 0 0.33 1 0 0 . 0 0
0 36 0 . 8 8 1 0 0 . 0 0
1 0 41 0.29 1 0 0 . 0 0
2 0 46 0.27 16 0.79
30 49 0.19 35 2.25
40 52 0.17 46 1.36
50 55 0.14 55 1 . 1 0
75 62 0.37 83 3.52
1 0 0 6 8 0.38 8 8 0.51
125 74 0.31 90 0.25
150 79 0.26 90 0 . 0 1
175 83 0.24 90 0 . 0 0
2 0 0 87 0 . 2 1 90 0 . 0 0
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For modeling manure management in ASMGHG, aggregated EPA data needed to 
be decomposed to find necessary coefficients on a per animal head basis. First, a share 
factor was calculated which represents the fraction of animals for which manure 
management would be profitable (Equation 12 and Equation 13). The value of this
f r o r * f r | p T % * » r > r l c  K o ^ h  O H  o n i m o l  M r r v *  n r > ^  I o v a I r%F r * o r K f > n  d n n j i m U n r  c t t K c » H * rliUwuUil uUui t/ii uiw uiuillui wj uiiu uiw> iw • vi oi u^ w wui uOii w^ jui * Uiviik .iuu Ji J *
Equation 12 Emission Reduction Identity for Livestock Manure Management
s x ^  y iA.i A L l '•c R .A /C H 4- a  1 n R.A >
C D  E P A ------------------ R-----------------------------------------
g w p .CH4.
Equation 13 Calculation of Animal Population Fraction Under Improved Manure 
Management for Each Level of Carbon Equivalent Subsidy
ER^-ct- X OWP.CTJ-
S a " ~
R
= Total emission reductions in carbon equivalents from animal
A at the i* level of a supposed carbon equivalent subsidy (U.S. 
EPA estimate),
= Total population of animal A in region R.
= Fraction of national animal population for which liquid 
manure management to save methane emissions is profitable,
Where:
CD EPA
NT EPA
tN R.A
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Manr
c R.A.*CH4“ Annual methane emissions from manure of animal A in region
R, and
GWP-CH4- Global warming potential of methane.
The calculation of system costs for manure management is shown below. It is 
assumed that system costs are the same for the equally sized animal herds across all U.S. 
regions. As the value of methane emission reductions increases, improved manure 
management crosses the breakeven point for smaller herd sizes. All emission reduction 
increments in Table 4-4 represent methane savings from animal herds for which 
improved manure management has just become profitable. Given small profit margins 
for those animal herds, total additional abatement costs at each CE price must 
approximately equal total additional revenues (Equation 14). Thus, dividing total costs 
by the number of animals added at each incentive level yields an estimate of system costs 
per animal head (Equation 15).
Equation 14 Total Cost Approximation of Manure Management Improvement
Equation 15 Deduction of Cost per Animal Head for Improved Manure
Management
c
R.B
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Where:
Total system costs at carbon equivalent value i for animal A,
ith value of carbon equivalent emission reductions, and
System cost coefficient at carbon equivalent value i per head
of animal A.
As mentioned above, manure management improvements are more cost efficient 
for larger animal herds. In ASMGHG, animals are not distinguished by herd size. To 
model increasing system costs as the number of involved animals increases, an 
additional constraint was introduced (Equation 18). This constraint limits at each value 
of carbon equivalent emission reduction the number of animals for which manure 
management improvements is feasible. In addition, the percentage of animals deployed 
for better manure management in each region is also proportional to the fraction of liquid 
manure management usage in each region (Equation 19).
Equation 16 Total Methane Emission Reduction Accounting From Improved
Livestock Manure Management in ASMGHG
R.A.i
Equation 17 Total Cost Accounting From Improved Livestock Manure
Management in ASMGHG
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Equation 18 Limit on National Population Under Improved Manure Management
X  M r.a., * s A>1 x £  N R.A.E• B
R.B
Equation 19 Proportionality Constraint on Improved Manure Management
S y SR.A X X  ^R.A.B 
M r .a ., -  r  r *  I  M ,.a,
X I ^ySR.A x X ^R.A.B
R '  B '
Where:
MR A, = The number of animals A in region R added to improved
manure management regime, and 
SvsR A = The percentage of animals A in region R, which is kept under
liquid manure management and is hence eligible for methane 
reduction measures through improved manure management.
4.3.4.2.2 Emission Reductions From Altered Enteric Fermentation
Increasing the amount of absorbed energy per unit of foodstuff to reduce 
rumination per unit of product can reduce methane emissions from enteric fermentation. 
Potential strategies include genetic improvement (Gerbens, 1999a) or use o f feed 
supplements to increase feed intake (U.S. EPA), dietary changes resulting in a higher 
energy concentration per unit o f foodstuff (Gerbens, 1999a), pasture improvements 
(Johnson et al.), and vaccination. Results from enteric fermentation related mitigation 
studies are summarized in section 2 .2 .1 . 1 o f the dissertation.
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In the U.S., not all of the suggested strategies are practical. Intensively managed 
dairy cattle already receive a high-quality diet, which has a high proportion of 
concentrates. In addition, a large number of U.S. beef cattle are raised on pasture. For 
these animals substitution of roughage by concentrates is impractical. Improving the 
quality of the pasture could reduce methane emissions, however, comprehensive data to 
quantify both the economic and mitigative effects of such a strategy are not available as 
of yet.
For above reasons. Bovine somatrophine (bST) use for dairy cows is the only 
enteric fermentation option currently implemented in ASMGHG. Use of BST impacts 
livestock production in four ways. First, the milk production of dairy cows increases. 
Second, feeding intake per cow increases. Third, enteric fermentation per dairy cow also 
increases. As a result, methane emissions per dairy cow increase as well. Fourth. BST 
treatment imposes additional cost on dairy farmers. While BST treatment increases the 
milk production per cow. fewer cows are necessary to produce the same amount of milk. 
Thus, BST treatment has the potential to mitigate GHGE by decreasing the amount of 
methane emissions per unit of product.
EPA aggregated data on regional total milk production and dairy populations 
were used to obtain average regional milk production per dairy cow and to project milk 
production without BST use for the year 2000 (Equation 20 and Equation 21). The 
relationship between enteric fermentation per dairy cow and milk production was 
estimated through ordinary least squares (Equation 23).
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Equation 20 Calculation of Milk Yields From EPA Data
0 EpA 
EP.\ _  V R ."M ilk " .t
^ R .'M ilk ’ .t “  x jE P A
R."Dairy".t
Equation 21 Prediction of Year 2000 Levels of Milk Production
A EPA A n  i f
H R."\iiik".-:ooo" =  a  r  T  P r  x *-:ooo"
Equation 22 Calculation of Emission Coefficients From Enteric Fermentation for 
Dairv Cows From EPA Data
e EPA
p  EPA
C R."DalrvV E fIUt', .i
n epa^  R."Dairy ",t
Equation 23 Prediction of Emission Coefficients From Enteric Fermentation for 
Dairv Cows Bevond EPA Data
,EPA EPA
e R."Dairy"."EfBjie".c ~  '( R T  *P R X ^R .- .M ilk '.t +  £
Where:
a  R*P R’7 R ’?  I = Regional OLS regression parameters.
EPA
*lR."M ilk",t = Computed average regional milk production per dairy cow,
0 EPAVR/Milk-.t = Annual total regional milk production,
M^ pa 
‘ R.*Dairy\t = Annual total regional dairy cow population,
n  EP A4  R."MiIk"."2000" = Projected regional milk production without BST in 2000, 
= Time parameter,
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eRP-DairyVEflu-".t = Regional methane emission coefficient from enteric
fermentation per dairy cow, and 
= Regional methane emissions from enteric fermentation of all 
dairy cows.
Subsequently, a relative adjustment factor for regional enteric fermentation 
coefficients of dairy cows was calculated (Equation 24 to Equation 26). This factor is an 
estimate of the percentage increase in methane emissions from enteric fermentation after 
BST treatment.
Equation 24 Estimation of Year 2000 Emission Coefficients From Enteric 
Fermentation of Dairv Cows
EPA -  -  A EPA
C R.''Dair>”."EfBu,*.":000" ~  I R T  *P R X 4R ."M ilk”.-2000"
Equation 25 Calculation of Emission Coefficients for Enteric Fermentation From 
BST Treated Dairv Cows
EPA * *
e  R." Dairy". B." 2000" =  7 R + *P R X
bSTC'o) \
j  +  4"Milk
100
x a EPA
Equation 26 Calculation of Enteric Fermentation Coefficient Adjustments for 
BST Treated Dairv Cows
( e ^  -  eEPA )(  R."Dairy".B.”2000" c R."Dairy" " E f ^ ', '2 0 0 0 "  ]ef** —R,"Dairv".B „EPA
e R."Dairv"."Effc„ '. '2 0 0 0 "
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Where:
e R ^ W  b .-:ooo- = Percentage increase in milk production after BST treatment,
eRP':Dairy-.-EfBac".":ooo- = Adjustment factor for enteric fermentation coefficient of BST
treated dairy cows,
eR/kuy\B.-:ooo- = Projected enteric fermentation coefficient of dairy cows
without BST treatment in the year 2000, and 
eR^-Dair>".-Efa41c".":ooo- = Projected enteric fermentation coefficient of BST treated dairy
cows in the year 2 0 0 0 .
The enteric fermentation coefficients of BST treated dairy cows in ASMGHG 
were then computed as the product of base enteric fermentation coefficients times the 
adjustment due to BST treatment (Equation 27). Note that BST treatment only then 
mitigates methane emissions from enteric fermentation if the number of dairy cows 
decreases as a result of higher milk production per cow. In ASMGHG this could be 
examined by solving the model twice for a wide range of methane emission reduction 
values, with and without the opportunity to use BST treatments (Equation 28).
Equation 27 Methane Emission Coefficient From Enteric Fermentation in 
ASMGHG
EntF EmF x f l  +  e f * 1
R .A ."C H 4".B  c R .A .'C H 4 \" B a se "  *  f l T c i R . A . B f
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Equation 28 True Emission Reduction From BST Use
E R r  4  I  * N„._v
\  bST
B
- R .A .B  ,
\  nobST
y  eEBtF X NL* c R.A."CH-r."Base” A 1 R.A.B 
^ R.A.B > ,
Where:
e“ TH4- b = ASMGHG enteric fermentation coefficient for animal A with
enteric fermentation regime B in region R,
^"a.-ch-jvbuc- = ASMGHG enteric fermentation base coefficient for animal A
in region R, and
E R ^ = True emission reduction from BST treatment.
The feed intake of BST treated dairy cows was increased proportional for all feed 
categories according to estimates from Kaestle, Williams, and Gibbs. The treatment 
costs of BST were entered according to an estimate from Gerbens (1999a). Table 4-5 
summarizes the assumptions made for BST treatment.
4.3.4.3 Rice Production
Besides livestock production, rice agriculture also constitutes a source of 
methane emissions. In ASMGHG, emission coefficients for rice production were 
calculated through average emission coefficients (Equation 29) as provided by (U.S. 
EPA).
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Table 4-5 Parameters for Modeling bST-Treatment of Dairy Cows
Parameter Value
Milk production increase 1,800 lbs./cow/year
Overall feed intake increase 15%
Roughage 15%
Concentrates 15%
Treatment cost 122 S/year/cow
BST Base adoption in ASMGHG 1 0  % (endogenously computed)
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The only way in the model to decrease methane emissions from rice is through 
acreage reduction. Alternative practices may also reduce methane emissions in the 
future. However, current scientific knowledge about potential savings is limited, and 
hence, no data were available to quantify the effects of alternative practices on methane 
emissions.
Equation 29 Methane Emission Coefficients From Rice Cultivation
f.R ice _  —EPA T h ; °
C R .L .X H 4- — c -R i«-.-C H 4- "RiceVR
Where:
eRx.-cH4- = Methane emission coefficient for production of one acre of
rice in region R on land type L. 
s-a* - -CH4- = Average methane emission coefficient per day on flooded rice
fields, and
T.1^ .  R = Average flooding time of rice fields in region R in days per
year.
4.3.5 Carbon Dioxide Emissions
4.3.5.1 Source Emissions
Agricultural carbon emissions are based on direct and indirect use of fossil fuels 
and on changes in soil organic matter or aboveground biomass. The following section 
documents the calculations used to retrieve greenhouse gas emission coefficients for a
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wide range of agricultural practices including specific mitigation strategies. Data 
sources are provided as well.
4.3.5.1.1 Direct Carbon Emissions Through Fossil Fuel Use
Fossil fuels, which are directly used in agricultural operations, include diesel, 
gasoline, electricity, natural gas, and liquefied petroleum gas (LP gas). The new crop 
enterprise budgets used in ASMGHG contain both quantity and expenditure on above 
fuel items based on USDA farm surveys. Carbon emission coefficients from direct fossil 
fuel use were derived as shown in Equation 30.
Equation 30 Calculation of Emission Coefficients From Fossil Fuel Use
DirFF
R.C.W.T
FF
Where:
DirFF
R.C.W.T Direct carbon emissions from producing one acre of crop C in
region R, using water technology W, and tillage system T,
4 f f .c .w , t Direct quantity of fossil fuel FF from producing one acre of
crop C in region R, using water technology W, and tillage
system T,
Average energy content of fossil fuels, and
Carbon emission of fossil fuels per unit o f energy.
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4.3.5.1.2 Indirect Carbon Emissions Through Irrigation
Irrigation of agricultural fields can be an energy intensive process. Particularly, 
in places where water is a scarce resource, pumping and transportation of irrigation water 
may consume considerable amounts of energy. Since energy sources usually involve 
fossil fuels, carbon dioxide emissions result and should be accounted for as indirect 
agricultural carbon emissions.
Ag census data were available on fuel expenditure for irrigation at state level 
(Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey). Specification of carbon emission coefficients from 
irrigation in ASMGHG required three steps. First, the average expenditure on each fuel 
type for one acre-foot of irrigation water was computed (Equation 31). Second, the 
average fuel type quantity for an acre-foot of water was calculated dividing average 
expenditure by national prices for each fuel type (Equation 32). Third, carbon emission 
coefficients for an acre-foot were estimated using DOE carbon emission coefficients for 
each fuel type (Equation 33).
Equation 31 Calculation of Average Fuel Expenditure for Irrigation
trrg _  P Q r J T
P 9 r .F F  ~  . I r r g  trrg 
“  R *  R
Equation 32 Calculation of Average Fuel Quantities for Irrigation
Ittg _  P ^ R J T
qRFF f t .
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Equation 33 Calculation of Average Carbon Emissions From Irrigation
Irr* Irrg „
R,"CE" 4R .FF  * FF.'CE"
Where:
pq1^  = Average expenditure on fossil fuel type FF from irrigation of
one acre by one foot of water in region R,
PQr?ff = Total expenditure on fossil fuel type FF for irrigation in region
R,
Aj,”* = Total irrigated acreage in region R,
K ' = Total annual amount of irrigation water used in region R,
q^FF = Average quantity of fossil fuel type FF needed from irrigation
of one acre by one foot of water in region R, 
pFF = Average national price of fossil fuel type FF at farm gate,
e‘£!CE. = Regional carbon emission coefficient for irrigation of one acre
with one foot of water, and 
5 ff .ce- = The average carbon emission coefficient for fossil fuel type
FF.
Currently, the only option to reduce carbon emissions from irrigation in 
ASMGHG is to reduce the amount of irrigated acreage. In the real world, Farmers also 
have the option to reduce the amount of water applied on irrigated fields. However,
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modeling this option in ASMGHG would require additional data that were not available 
at this point.
4.3.5.1.3 Indirect Carbon Emissions Through Fertilizer Use
Fertilizer manufacturing is also an energy intensive process in which a large 
amount o f fossil fuel is combusted. Thus, the more fertilizer is applied, the more carbon 
is indirectly emitted through agriculture. In ASMGHG, emission coefficients per acre 
and per mass unit of fertilizer were established through use of input-output direct 
multipliers, total energy equivalents of fertilizer, emission coefficients o f fossil fuels as 
reported by DOE, and EPIC results (Equation 34). Note that using input-output direct 
multipliers implies fixed proportions of various fuel types in manufacturing fertilizers. 
However, as the value of emission reductions increases, substitution of emission 
intensive fossil fuel types by less emission intensive fossil fuel types or other energy 
sources is likely. For the purpose of this study, the expected marginal improvement in 
assessment accuracy did not justify the marginal cost o f gathering relevant information to 
relax this assumption. Emission coefficients were also adjusted for the four soil types 
and various nitrogen fertilizer management options.
Equation 34 Calculation of Indirect Carbon Emissions From Fertilizer 
Manufacturing
g Fen -  n Fert v Y  ( cb t u % b t u  „ b t u \  pE P ic%
R.C.W .T.L.F.N U  4R .C .W .T .N U  X Z - i (^F F .N U  X C n NU X FF / X E R.C.W .T.L.F.NU
FF
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 0 1
Where:
e Rx.w.T.L.F.Nu = Indirect nutrient fertilizer emissions of COt from producing
one acre of crop C in region R, using water technology W, and 
tillage system T, fertilization alternative F on land type L, 
Q r x .w .t .nu  = Quantity of nutrient fertilizer NU applied to one acre of crop
C. using water technology W, tillage system T in region R, 
s™* = Relative energy share of fossil fuel type FF in manufacturing
nutrient fertilizer NU, 
enljjy = Total energy input to produce one mass unit of nutrient
fertilizer NU, and
e rPcCw .t .l . f .nu  = Emission coefficient adjustment factor from EPIC for nitrogen
fertilizer for soil types and fertilizer management.
4.3.5.2 Sink Enhancements
As argued in sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, agriculture could offset fossil fuel based 
emissions through production of alternative energy sources and through carbon 
sequestration. Sequestration involves the buildup of soil organic matter through reduced 
tillage intensity or increased soil cover, and buildup of aboveground organic matter by 
planting trees on agricultural land.
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4.3.5.2.1 Soil Carbon Emission Sink/Source
EPIC simulations provided the absolute Soil Organic Matter (SOM) equilibrium 
levels for each region, soil, and crop management. In converting the EPIC-based SOM 
equilibrium levels to ASMGHG coefficients, caution was necessary. SOM level 
calculations are new features in EPIC, which have not been verified or compared 
extensively to observed SOM behavior in natural soils. Thus, absolute EPIC-based 
SOM values were likely to over- or understate the true carbon sequestration potential.
To minimize EPIC bias, it was desirable that the total potential to sequester 
carbon through reduced tillage of agricultural soils in ASMGHG concurs to existing 
estimates from the literature (Lai, Kern). To meet this objective, EPIC-based SOM 
values were calibrated. Through this calibration, absolute SOM levels between different 
tillage intensities were adjusted but management specific differences within a tillage 
category were proportionally preserved. Below this process is described in detail.
As a first step in calibrating EPIC-based SOM estimates, total changes in SOM 
were calculated for each tillage system. Throughout the entire calculation, crop and 
irrigation acreage for each crop in each region were held constant at 1997 levels. The 
SOM base level was computed using the 1997 tillage mix and EPIC-based total SOM 
values (Equation 35). In Equation 36, EPIC-based total SOM levels for each tillage 
system are computed assuming that the respective tillage is used on all U.S. cropland. 
The net effect of exclusively using a particular tillage system throughout the U.S. on the 
change in total SOM is the difference between the total SOM levels using only the 
particular tillage system minus the 1997 total SOM level (Equation 37)
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Equation 35 Total SOM Account Using EPIC Factors and USDA Tillage System 
Data
SOMm' = L “ * x  £  K sS x . - X S O M ^ , , ,^ - )
R.C.W.L T
Equation 36 Theoretical SOM Level of Each Tillage System Assuming 100 
Percent Adoption
SOM ?IC = Lusda x
R.C.W.L
f f  \
y  „ NRCS
VA f
R.C.W.T.L x SOMepicR.C.W.T.L.'Nbase'
Equation 37 Total SOM Change of Each Tillage System Assuming 100 Percent 
Adoption
ASOMf = SOM f -  SOM
f  r
EPIC
= lusda x £
R.C.W.L
"\ \  
xSOM ^ 10R.C.W.T.L. Nbasc'X NRCS S R.C.W.T.L
T
- Y ( s NRCS xSOMEPIC )R.C.W.T.L R.C.W.T.L.'Nbase' /
Where:
USDA
SOM^ 10JW 1V 1 R.C.W.T.L.'Nbase'
„ NRCS 
‘ R.C.W.T.L
= Total cropland according to USDA estimates,
= Absolute soil organic matter per acre based on EPIC in region
R, for crop C, water technology W, land type L and basic 
fertilization,
= Relative share of tillage system T, water technology T, in 
region R, for crop C, on land type L, and
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SOM 3110 = Total soil carbon in U.S. cropland based on EPIC estimates
and aggregated using 1997 NRCS observed tillage mix.
As a second step, target levels of total SOM changes under each tillage system 
were developed. These levels represent maximum changes in total SOM after a 
complete adoption of a particular tillage system. Lai has estimated the total potential 
from using zero tillage to be around one billion metric tons of carbon. Thus, this 
estimate was used as target level for zero tillage. Conservation tillage leads to slightly 
lower gains than zero tillage. Based on EPIC results, the total carbon sequestration 
potential of conservation tillage was assumed to be 80 percent of the potential from zero 
tillage (Equation 38). The expected total SOM change from applying conventional 
tillage on all fields (Equation 40) was deducted using the total potential of conservation 
and zero tillage, the proportions of current tillage system usage, and an additional 
assumption shown in Equation 39. In particular, it is assumed that maintaining the 
current proportions of tillage system use will not change the SOM levels. The 
proportionate deviation of EPIC estimates of the potential to sequester carbon from 
target levels was captured through an adjustment factor k^0M (Equation 41).
Equation 38 Specification of Maximum SOM Change Under Complete Switch to 
Conservative Tillage
ASOM-c'ons- =80%xASOM .^ro.
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Equation 39 Zero SOM Change for Base Scenario
ASOM .^. = £ ( s f csxASOM ^)=0
T
Equation 40 Calculation of SOM Change at 100 Percent Conventional Tillage 
System Adoption
ASOM^„- = X ( - s? '“ * AS0 Mt')A -v"?
T={"Zero'."Cons") /
Equation 41 SOM Change Identity
ASOM^“ = k f M xA SO M flc
Where:
ASOMy' = Change in total soil carbon at 100% adoption of tillage system
T (based on literature estimates). 
s f cs = Fraction of tillage system T used in 1997 according to NRCS
estimates,
ASOMpp,c = Change in total soil carbon for 100% adoption of tillage
system T (based on EPIC), and 
k“ M = Scaling factor to adjust EPIC values.
For SOM changes in ASMGHG to be consistent with NRCS survey based 
estimates, Equation 42 needed to be satisfied. Substituting Equation 37 in Equation 41 
yields Equation 43. Combining Equation 42 and Equation 43 in turn leads to Equation
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44. This equality can be solved explicitly ASMGHG SOM level changes as a function 
of EPIC-based SOM estimates (Equation 45).
*SOM coefficient adjustments are summarized in Table 4-6.
Equation 42 Augmented SOM Change Identity
ASOMy' = lusda x  £  f f £ s ^ L f)xASOM “ !“ “ _,
R.C.W.L T
Nbase*
Equation 43 Identity After Substituting Equation 37 Into Equation 41
ASOM^[ = k f M x Lusda x £
R.C.W.L
\  \  
xSOM ^ 10R.C.W,T.L.'Nbasey  MRCS Zrf R.C.W.T.L
V f
_ Y ( n r c s  x S O M 1* 10 )
Z A  R.C.W.T.L R.C.W.T.L.'Nbajc- /
Equation 44 Identity After Substituting Equation 42 Into Equation 43
.NRCS
’ R.C.W.L.T
x ASOMasmghg = k SUM Xa . a o v j l v l  R.C.W.T.L.'Nbase *SOM
xSO M ^10A O W 1V1 R,c.W.T.L.'Nbase-Y  N^RCS Z  R.C.W.T.L f
_  Y  (sNRCS xSOMep,c )Z '  R.C.W.T.L R.C.W.T.L.'Nbase' I
Equation 45 SOM Difference Between New Management Equilibrium and 
Average Current SOM Level
l .  NRCS
r ASMGHG _  r 'TASOM =R.C.W.T.L.-Nbase-
Y<;NRCS
Z  S R.C.W.L.f
V s NRCS xSOMEPlcZ  R.C.W.T.L R.C.W.T.L.'Nbase"
f )
- Y ( s NRCS x SOM0,10 )Z V  R.C.W.T.L R.C.W.T.L.'Nbasc* '
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Table 4-6 Calibration of Soil Carbon Net Emission Coefficients
Tillage System
Cutei ion
1997 Mix Conventional Conservation Zero
National system 
adoption in 1997 1 0 0  % 72.2 % 18.7 % 9.2 %
Assumed total organic 
matter change in million 
metric tons of carbon at 
1 0 0 % system adoption
0 Endogenous 600 1 , 0 0 0
Calculated final soil 
organic matter level in 
million metric tons of 
carbon at 1 0 0 % system 
adoption (EPIC)
2.205 2,184 2,242 2.303
Calculated total soil 
organic matter change in 
million metric tons of 
carbon at 1 0 0 % system 
adoption (EPIC)
0 - 2 1 37 98
Calculated total soil 
organic matter change in 
million metric tons of 
carbon at 1 0 0 % system 
adoption (ASMGHG)
0 -282 600 1 , 0 0 0
Adjustment factor 
( k f M) N/A 13.5 16.3 1 0 . 2
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Where:
ASOMj^c = Change in SOM equilibrium of tillage system T relative to
tillage mix weighted average in region R, for crop C. water 
technology W, land type L, and fertilization alternative F.
The change in SOM as computed through Equation 45 represents the maximum 
gain or loss of carbon from a particular strategy relative to the average current SOM 
level for that region, crop, and soil type. The average annual net emission coefficient 
then equals the maximum SOM change divided by the number of years it takes to reach 
the new equilibrium (Equation 46). For this study we assumed that it would take 30 
years for the soil organic matter to adjust to a different tillage system and that the soil 
carbon changes linearly within this 30-year period.
Equation 46 Annual Soil Carbon Emission Coefficients in ASMGHG
ASOMasmchgSoil _  a  J ^ iV iR.C.W.T.L.F
e R.C.W .T.L.F ~  jEquA dj
Where:
eRLc.w.T.L.F = Annual net emissions through changes in soil organic matter
from production of one acre of crop C. in region R, using 
water technology W, tillage system T. and fertilization 
alternative F on land type L, and 
TEq'lAd| = Time span necessary to reach new soil carbon equilibrium
after a change in management strategies.
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4.3.S.2.2 Production of Fossil Fuel Substitutes
Biofuel and ethanol are agriculturally produced commodities, which can offset 
carbon emissions from fossil fuel based power plants, or fossil fuel based gasoline. 
Contrary to soil carbon sequestration through tillage reduction, these carbon emission 
mitigation options compete with the production of traditionai agricultural commodities.
To implement biofuel generation in ASMGHG. production budgets for switch 
grass, hybrid poplar, and willow were obtained from the Oakridge National Laboratory 
(Walsh et al., see Table 4-7). While production of traditional agricultural crops is 
constrained to fall in a convex combination of historically observed crop mixes, no such 
constraint was enforced on biofuel crops. Mitigation policies are likely to directly or 
indirectly encourage growing these crops beyond historically observed limits.
Net emission reductions from cultivating and processing biofuel crops were 
calculated as shown in Equation 47. Data were available on production of energy units 
per mass unit of biofuel crop (Table 4-7) and on the average GHGE coefficients of 
electrical power plants per unit of energy (U.S. DOE, see Table 4-8). All power plant 
emission parameters refer to average annual emission coefficients obtained through a life 
cycle assessment (Mann and Spath).
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Table 4-7 Regional Assumptions on Biomass Productivity and Resulting Net 
Emission Values
Yield Net Emissions
Biomass Crop Region (Dry Tons per (KG CE per Acre)
Acre) C02 CH4 N20
Willow North East 4.21 -2.003 - 8 6 3.4
Switch grass North East 3.21 -1,342 -58 2.3
Switch grass Lake States 3.64 -1.522 - 6 6 2 . 6
Switch grass Com Belt 3.64 -1.522 - 6 6 2 . 6
Switch grass South East 5.16 -2.157 -93 3.6
Switch grass Delta States 4.36 -1.823 -79 3.1
Hybrid poplar Lake States 3.11 -1.480 -64 2.5
Hybrid poplar Com Belt 3.11 -1.480 -64 2.5
Hybrid poplar South East 3.22 -1.532 - 6 6 2 . 6
Hybrid poplar Delta States 2.57 -1.223 -53 2 . 1
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Table 4-8 Data and Assumptions for Calculating Emission Offsets From 
Biomass Power Plants
Parameter of 100 MW Power Plant Feedstock
Biomass Coal
Carbon dioxide emissions (g/KWH) 4.95 E+l 1.02 E+3
Methane emissions (g/KWH) 5.07 E-3 2 . 0 0
Nitrous oxide emissions (g/KWH) 9.54 E-3 4.30 E-3
Average heat rate (BTU/KWH) 9,179 10,318
Average net plant efficiency10 (%) 37.2 33.1
Biomass Feedstock
Switch Gras Willow Hybrid Poplar
Annual feedstock input (1000 tons) 482.76 424.24 424.24
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Equation 47 Net GHG Emission Coefficients of Biomass Production in ASMGHG
,B ioF
'R.BF.L.G J R.BF.L
DM DryTon
Acre
x en BTUBF
MBTU BF
DryTon
x eff BioPP
MBTU GRID
MBTU BF
Where:
1000
3.4147
KWH GRID
MBTU, (E
BioPP c CoaiPP\ 
G G j
KG
KWH,
kB»F
'R.BF.L.G = Net emission of greenhouse gas G from using one acre in
DM 
J  R.BF.L
en„
region R to produce biomass crop BF on land type L,
= Dry mass yield of one acre of biomass crop BF in region R on 
land type L.
= Average energy yield for biomass crop BF,
eff BioPP = Net plant efficiency of biomass fueled power plants.
: BioPP
-CoalPP
= Net emission of greenhouse gas G from using a biomass 
fueled power plant, and 
= Net emission of greenhouse gas G from using a coal fired
power plant.
Emission coefficients of ethanol production were obtained (Equation 48) in a 
similar fashion. Since ethanol can be used as gasoline, the carbon emission reduction 
corresponds to the amount of carbon otherwise released when combusting fossil fuel
based gasoline.
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Equation 48 Carbon Emission Coefficients From Ethanol Production
— v ^  x CEgl x v  x
e p.R .C CT.W.T.L.F y P.CCT ^  y R .C ^ .W .T .L .F  *
( L*
I  —
100
Where:
c’T  CT = Carbon emission reduction from production of ethanol through
P.R.C .W.T.L.F
process P using crop C ^  produced on one acre in region R 
with water technology W. tillage system T, fertilization 
alternative F on land type L,
= Ethanol yield of process P using commodity C61",
CECL = Average carbon emission of fossil fuel based gasoline,
y R c CT w  t  l . f  = Yield of one acre of ethanol crop C ^  produced with water
technology W, tillage system T, fertilization alternative F on 
land type L, and
L^ ,. = Relative loss factor which accounts for carbon emissions from
producing and processing ethanol.
4.3.5.2.3 Conversion of Agricultural Land Into Forestry
Planting trees on agricultural land is perhaps the most referred carbon sink on 
agricultural lands. Stavins estimated the national potential to sequester carbon from 
planting pines on agricultural lands as a function of carbon subsidies. His results are 
listed in Table 4-9 and were used in ASMGHG.
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Table 4-9 Data on Potential, Costs, and Carbon Sequestration From Planting 
Trees on Agricultural Lands (after Stavins)
Scenario Land Planted With 
Pines in 1000 Acres
Average Cost in $ 
per TCE
Carbon Sequestered 
Annually in 1000 
Metric Tons
1 0 0 0
2 4653 57.32 7045
3 6579 105.63 9961
4 7484 129.15 11332
5 7897 142.25 11957
6 8212 155.98 12434
7 8470 169.22 12825
8 8689 182.74 13156
9 8874 195.72 13437
1 0 9038 208.21 13685
1 1 9178 219.53 13897
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Each estimation point from Stavins was used to approximate the underlying 
marginal cost function for planting trees on agricultural land in a stepwise linear fashion. 
Total emission reductions and associated total costs as calculated in ASMGHG are 
shown in Equation 49 and Equation 50. Emission reductions were included in the sink
account (Equation 55), while costs were made part of the objective function. Land used
for planting trees was included in the land balance equation of ASMGHG. Equation 5 1 
restricts the step variables to sum up to unity. This forces a convex combination.
Equation 49 National Annual Emission Reduction From Afforestation of 
Cropland
p o  ASMGHG _  V  / y  y  p n S tav in s \
■ T rcc '.'C E " ~  L i \ ^ i  *  C r V T re e '. 'C E " .i /t
Equation 50 Total Costs of Afforestation
CASM GHG =  y ( z  g j^S tav in s  ^  ^S tav tns \
"T re e ' \  i "T rc c '. 'C E " .i "T ree* .!/i
Equation 51 Convexity Constraint for Afforestation Variable in ASMGHG
I z ,  = l
i
Where:
E R -^ vce- = Total annual emission reduction in ASMGHG from planting
trees on agricultural lands,
ER-rn*vcE-.i = Annual emission reduction in ASMGHG from planting trees
on agricultural lands by step,
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Casmghg _ Yotaj annual costs incurred from planting trees,
= Average annual cost of planting trees per ton of carbon
sequestered, and 
Zj = Step variable.
4.3.6 Nitrous Oxide Emissions
Nitrous oxide constitutes perhaps the least understood greenhouse gas among all 
agriculturally relevant gases. However, a few measures correlate the amount of nitrous 
oxide emitted from agricultural soils or livestock to specific management practices. In 
particular, fertilizer management strategies impact the amount of nitrogen that is 
denitrified (Granli and Beckman) Denitrified nitrogen, then, enters the atmosphere either 
as atmospheric nitrogen (N2 ) or as nitrous oxide (NiO). The ratio of nitrous oxide 
emissions to total nitrogen emissions from denitrification varies depending on 
environmental conditions (Changsheng, Narayanan, and Harriss). Depending on the 
annual average temperature, precipitation, and nitrogen content in rainfall, between 19 
and 33 percent of the total denitrified nitrogen are estimated to be NiO-nitrogen. Thus, 
with respect to soils, estimates of denitrification rates and nitrogen air volatilization may 
provide proxies of N2O emissions.
Management strategies to decrease N2O emissions aim at decreasing the 
denitrification rate. Included in the analysis was substitution of anhydrous ammonia 
fertilizer, use of nitrification inhibitors, and reduced nitrogen fertilizer application.
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Again EPIC was used to simulate the effects of changed fertilization management on 
yields and variable costs.
Equation 52 Calculation of Nitrous Oxide Emission Coefficients From Crop 
Production
„ N , 0  _  / J n EPIC , EPIC ) y
e R.C.W .T.L.F -  (  R.C.W.T.L. F +  d v R,C.W.T.L.F j  *
(  j.N : 0 /N ;  '\
. , _N -0 /Nv 1 t r - j
Where:
eR.cw.T.L.F = Nitrous oxide emission coefficient from producing one acre of
crop C in region R using water technology W, tillage system 
T, fertilization alternative F on land type L, 
dn^cw T.L.F = Denitrification rate from producing one acre of crop C in
region R using water technology W. tillage system T, 
fertilization alternative F on land type L (EPIC parameter), 
rN:°'N: = Ratio of nitrous oxide to atmospheric nitrogen from
denitrification, and
avRcw.T.LF = volatilization rate from producing one acre of crop C in
region R using water technology W, tillage system T, 
fertilization alternative F on land type L (EPIC parameter).
To minimize the bias of nitrous oxide emission coefficients, all EPIC values were 
adjusted in absolute magnitude; however, relative differences between different 
management were preserved. The validation process was based on the assumption that
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nitrous oxide emission under full fertilization amount to about one percent of the amount 
of nitrogen fertilizer applied (Equation 53). Results of emission coefficient validation 
are listed in Table 4-10.
Equation 53 Calibration of Nitrous Oxide Emission Coefficients
0.01 X ^  ( ^ R .C .W .T .U -N B a s e ' X  ^ R .C .W .T .L . f )
— N .O  _  N .O  R .C .W .T .L .F __________________________________________
e R .C .W .r.L .F  “  R .C .W .T.L.F X V (eN:° V ABasc )L i \  R .C .W .T .L .'N B a se"  *  R .C .W .T .L .F /
R .C .W .T .L .F
Where:
^ .cw.t.cf = Adjusted nitrous oxide emission coefficient.
fR.c.w.T.L.-vBASE- = Amount of nitrogen fertilizer applied to crop C. in region R.
when using water technology W, tillage system T. land type L, 
and basic fertilization, and 
A r.c.w.t l f = Total acreage allocated to crop C in region R using water
technology W, tillage system T, and fertilization alternative F 
on land type L.
4.3.7 Emissions Accounting in ASMGHG
4.3.7.1 Individual Emission Sources and Sinks
Emission accounting in ASMGHG takes place on the national level. Source 
emissions are summed over emissions from crop and livestock production, land transfer, 
and from processing (Equation 54).
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Table 4-10 Assumptions for Nitrous Oxide Emission Coefficient Calculation and 
Validation
Parameter Value
Total nitrogen fertilizer application in 1995 (USDA), in MMT 11.7
Total nitrogen fertilizer application of ASMGHG base solution 
(in MMT)
9.6
ASMGHG basic nitrous oxide emissions assuming emissions 
equal 1 percent of nitrogen fertilizer (in thousand metric tons)
96.0
Assumed denitrification water threshold level for all EPIC runs 99%
Assumed N20/(N20+N2) ratio of denitrification for calculating 
nitrous oxide emission coefficients from denitrification rates
0 . 2 2
ASMGHG basic nitrous oxide emissions using EPIC coefficients 
(in thousand metric tons)
20,495
Adjustment multiplier for original EPIC coefficients 4.68 E-3
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Crop emission coefficients vary by crop, water technology, tillage system, soil type, 
fertilizer management, and region. Livestock emission coefficients are specific by 
region, animal, and methane reduction technology.
Equation 54 All Emission Sources Accounting Constraint in ASMGHG
~  X  ( e R .C .W .T.L.F .G  X ^ R  C .W T X .f ) L '  T L , G >0 
R.C .W .T.L.F 1
+ I  ( t e c  +  e ^ A .G .B l x  N r .A.b )
R.A.B
Pasture y  r Pasture-> Crop \
\  R .L.G *  L R .L  }
R.L
X  (ep°oP x BPPftl"p)+
P
Where:
e R.rPw.T.L.F.G = Emissions of greenhouse gas G from production of one acre of
crop C in region R using water technology W, tillage system 
T, fertilization alternative F. on land type L, and 
e ^ c = Emissions of greenhouse gas G from production of one animal
unit A in region R.
A second block of equations calculates greenhouse gas sinks (Equation 55). 
Currently, there are three sinks included for carbon dioxide emission reduction and one 
sink for methane emission reduction. Note that sink here refers to all management 
options, which lead to a decrease in net emissions relative to the base scenario.
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Equation 55 All Emission Sinks Accounting Constraint in ASMGHG 
S0 = I (e ," S , xBPPR-') [
p 'CPC
+ £  ( e “ ‘ x E P p * ')
p
+ y  fc.n“ x x )M  \  t I /
i
V  / Pasture v  r Cropland- > Pasture \
L i \  R.L X L R.L )
R.L
+ X  f e  *  M „ . . J
R.A.i
-  Y  (eSo,lc x A  )\ c R.C .W .r.L.F A R.C.W.T.L.F/
R .C .W .T.L.F
son. . / i
cft.C.W.T.L.F<u
Where:
Cf'ne = Amount of carbon sequestered nationally at carbon equivalent
value i,
A®'°bff l = Acreage allocated to production of biofuel crop BF in region R
on land type L. and
A ^  R cCT w T L F = Acreage allocated to crop from region R, water technology
W, tillage system T. fertilization alternative F on land type L 
to produce ethanol through process P ^ .
4.3.7.2 Aggregated Emissions
The emission accounting equations described above do not provide emission 
estimates in Kyoto Protocol defined greenhouse gas categories such as methane, nitrous
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oxide, or carbon dioxide. Instead, the variables Eg and Sg contain total emissions from 
individual emission sources such as methane emissions from enteric fermentation or 
total emission reductions from individual sinks such as carbon sequestration from tree 
planting. Kyoto Protocol defined greenhouse gas categories are calculated through 
Equation 56 and Equation 57. The two-dimensional mappings, Emap (KG, G) and Smap 
(KG, G), ensure an appropriate summation of source emissions and sink emission 
reductions into the three relevant greenhouse gas categories.
Equation 56 Summation of Individual Emission Sources
K^G = ^G
Emap( KG.G)
Equation 57 Summation of Individual Emission Sinks
SrG = X ^G
Smapt KG.G)
4.3.8 Mitigation Policies
4.3.8.1 Dual Emission Accounting
Mitigation policies may or may not affect all agricultural greenhouse gas sources 
and sinks. High transaction costs combined with relatively low expected emission 
reductions may induce policy makers to not police each and every emission source or 
sink. Nevertheless, those "ignored" sources and sinks will continue to exist and will 
continue to emit or absorb greenhouse gases. To distinguish between regulated and 
unregulated sources and sinks, a dual emission accounting system of equations was
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introduced in ASMGHG. Contrary to the accounting scheme described in section 
4.3.7.1, the dual equations will only account for selected emission sources and sinks.
The mathematical structure of the dual emission accounting scheme is shown in 
Equation 58 through Equation 63. The dual accounting equations of "active" individual
54 and Equation 55. For "non-active" sources and sinks, the dual accounting values 
equal baseline emissions (Equation 59) and baseline sequestration (Equation 61), 
respectively. The reason for setting ignored emission sources and sinks equal to their 
baseline value will be explained in section 4.3.8.2.
Equation 58 Active Emission Sources Accounting Constraint in ASMGHG
greenhouse gas soun.es (Equation OS) and sinks (Equation 60) arc identical to Equation 
+ U ' , R.A.G T R.A.G.BR.A.B
+ i t e px B P r )
\ p G<=Ga j "*
Equation 59 Fixation of Ignored Emission Sources at Baseline Level
Dp _ £Base 
G “  G lG«G''an*
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Equation 60 Active Emission Sinks Accounting Constraint in ASMGHG
p ler.G >0
\
+  I ( e pBh,xEPPEthl)
p
, V  ( p P in e  „ i  1
/ s , v iy
1
Y  / Pasture Y r  Cropland->  Pasture ] 
Ld \  R.L X L R.L /
R.L
R.A.i
-  Y fe* 5'10 x A  )L  \ c R.C.W.T.L.F a  R.C.W.T.L.F/ 
V R.C.W.T.L.F
.VHlC ,rt 
^R.C.W TL.F4,0 /
Equation 61 Fixation of Ignored Emission Sinks at Baseline Level
D o  _  ^  Base I
|G<G^
Equation 62 Calculation of Total Emission Sources
DEt 0 = Z C ' E g+'- 'Eo)
Emap(KG.G)
Equation 63 Calculation of Total Emission Sinks
S|CG ~ X(  ^G+ ^g)
Stnap(KG.G)
Where:
G Acave = Active emission source or sink.
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The dual emission accounting system allows analysis of both different policy 
designs and different assumptions about the availability of mitigation strategies in the 
agricultural sector. It is also valuable to multi gas side effects of policies, which do not 
cover all GHGs or mitigation strategies.
4.3.8.2 Policy Equations
4.3.8.2.1 Emission Standards
Emission standards place an upper limit on allowable net emissions of 
greenhouse gas categories as defined by the Kyoto Protocol (Equation 64). Two 
additional non-negative variables - a slack and a surplus variable - capture positive and 
negative deviations from the imposed standard. With a simple standard, net emission 
savings have no value; however, net emissions above the standard are penalized 
(Equation 65).
Equation 64 Implementation of Emission Standards in ASMGHG
( E r g -  SKG+SAVKG- S U R KG= Z KC][fZKc>o
Equation 65 Costs of Excess Emissions Above Specified Standard
c a* = S ( f in e kox s u r ko1|
KG
Where:
CAg = Total penalty paid from the AG-sector for excess emissions,
SAVkg = GHG Emissions below target (saved emissions),
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SURkg = GHGE above target (emissions surplus),
ZKG = GHGE target, and
FENEkg = Penalty on excess emissions of Kyoto Protocol defined GHG.
In ASMGHG, Equation 64 is only enforced if the standard for a particular 
greenhouse gas is strictly positive. Similarly, fines on excess emissions are only 
computed for greenhouse gas categories with a strictly positive standard (Equation 65). 
To analyze the effect of an overall standard on carbon equivalent net emissions, the 
individual methane, nitrous oxide, and carbon dioxide standards are set to zero leaving 
only the carbon equivalent standard active at the appropriate positive level.
4.3.8 .2.2 Emissions Trading
Emissions trading constitutes a mitigation policy, which directly regulates the 
quantity of emissions. However, entities have more flexibility in meeting the standard 
through trade of emission permits with other entities. Emissions trading systems can be 
designed in many ways (Tietenberg, et al.). At this time, no decision has been made as 
to which types of emissions trading will be allowed. Consequently, the setup described 
in this section may have to be modified whenever more information becomes available.
In the simplest setup, the agricultural sector is treated as one entity, which could 
sell emission permits to and buy emission permits from other entities such as the 
electricity sector (Equation 6 6 ). Trading of emission permits is assumed to be perfect 
within the agricultural sector. Trading between the agricultural and other sectors is
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based on a given price. Cost and revenue calculations under this type of emissions 
trading are shown in Equation 67 and Equation 6 8 .
Equation 66 Implementation of Emissions Trading in ASMGHG
DE Kr. —d S kg +  y . B U Y ^  v.r. -  Y s E L L ^  v n  + S A V lfr. - S U R i . ^  =  Z v r .**KG ^ENT.KG ENT. KG
^  ENT ENT lfZKG>0
Equation 67 Total Cost From Emissions Trading to Agricultural Sector in 
ASMGHG
CAS = Z |  HNE^ xSURK0 + S(PHKT,KaXBUYB,TK0)
KG V ^  >zKC>0
Equation 68 Total Benefits From Emissions Trading to Agricultural Sector in 
ASMGHG
^  g ~  ^  ( P  ENT.KG X  B U Y FNt  )
KG ENT
Where:
^  B U Y ^  KG = Total volume of GHG emission credits purchased by entity
ENT
ENT from the agricultural sector,
SELLgj^. KG = Total volume of GHG emission credits sold by entity ENT to
the agricultural sector,
VAg = Total value of marketed emission credits in the agricultural
sector, and
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P en t .kg  = Market price for tradable emission credits.
4.3.8.2.3 Emission Taxes and Sequestration Subsidies
Taxes and subsidies can impact agricultural operations both directly and 
indirectly. A direct emissions tax or sequestration subsidy is shown in Equation 69.
This equation assumes perfect monitoring and enforceability of agricultural emission 
sources and sinks. Given the non-point source nature of these emissions, this 
assumption is rather unrealistic. However, it is a useful theoretical assumption for 
finding the upper boundary of marginal abatement of greenhouse gas emissions. It can 
also be interpreted as least cost estimation of greenhouse gas emission mitigation.
Equation 69 Emission Taxation in ASMGHG
TAX“ = £ ( t KOx ( DEKO- DSKO)J
KG KC
Where:
tKG = Tax rate on Kyoto Protocol defined GHG net emissions, and
TAXag = Total tax payment from the agricultural sector.
4.3.8.2.4 Special Greenhouse Gas Emission Related Tax or Subsidy Policies
The non-point source nature of greenhouse gas emissions suggests emissions 
taxing upstream at the input level rather than downstream. ASMGHG provides manifold 
opportunities to examine upstream tax or subsidy policies. Examples are a carbon 
emission tax imposed on fossil fuel use, a carbon subsidy paid for land use changes, a
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methane emission tax imposed on certain types of livestock management, or various 
combinations of those policies. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine a 
complete list of these policies. However, an example is given in Equation 70 of how to 
implement a tax or subsidy on different forms of tillage management.
Equation 70 Total Tax Value in the Agricultural Sector
4.3.9 Scenario Analysis in ASMGHG
ASMGHG provides four sets of scenario specifications, which can be used to 
examine the effects of GHGE mitigation policies under various assumptions. The first 
scenario set (POLICY) contains all policies to be analyzed. The set includes greenhouse 
gas emission taxes, emission reduction subsidies, emission standards, and others. The 
second scenario set (INTENSITY) contains the levels of intensity for the policies 
activated in scenario set one. Thus, if a policy consists of a tax or subsidy, scenario set
r
T.L V R.C.W.F /
Where:
AR.C.W.T.L.F Acreage in region R, on land type L, allocated to crop C, water
technology W, tillage system T. and fertilization alternative F,
and
T.L Tillage and land type specific tax.
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two contains all desired tax or subsidy levels. If the policy is a standard, scenario set two 
will contain all desired levels of the standard.
The third scenario set (STRATEGY) specifies which mitigation options are 
active in ASMGHG. This set is used to find the assessment bias from not modeling 
mitigation options simultaneously. Finally, scenario set four (SCOPE) in ASMGHG 
allows researchers to specify different assumptions about the economic scope of the 
analysis. For the purpose of this study, only the highest economic scope setting was 
used, where prices, domestic production, and imports from and exports to other countries 
are endogenous. To estimate the impact of specific assumptions one could specify and 
analyze different settings in scenario set four. Alternative settings may include use of 
exogenous prices, exogenous crop acreage allocation, or zero trade restrictions.
Multiple specifications of the four scenario sets can yield substantial combination 
of model runs. To avoid redundant, senseless, or undesired scenario combinations, 
model runs are controlled and by a four-dimensional set. For example, it would be 
senseless to examine a tax policy on nitrous oxide emissions if no nitrous oxide emission 
mitigation option is active.
4.3.10 ASMGHG Tableau
Linear programming models can be efficiently summarized through tableaus, 
which display equations as rows and variables as columns. The base model of 
ASMGHG contains 5,248 equations, 88,057 variables and 557,615 non-zero 
coefficients1 ‘. A simplified version of the ASMGHG tableau is provided in Figure 4-2.
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Structurally similar equations and variables are combined in blocks. For example, the 
equation block "Primary Goods Balance" represents 54 individual equations, one 
equation for each of the 54 primary agricultural commodities contained in ASMGHG. 
The objective function in Figure 4-2 is shown as implicit identity, where the unrestricted 
variable “Consumer plus Producer Surplus denotes the variable to be maximized during 
the optimization algorithm.
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5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM JOINT GHGE MITIGATION ANALYSIS
This section describes quantitative effects of GHGE mitigation efforts in the U.S. 
agricultural sector based on empirical results from joint GHGE mitigation scenarios 
examined with ASMGHG. Mitigation efforts were stimulated through economic 
incentives placed on CE emission reductions and economic disincentives placed on CE 
emissions. Each incentive level corresponds to a particular ASMGHG solution. To 
examine the behavior o f parameters of interest for a certain range of incentives, 
ASMGHG was solved repeatedly each time altering the incentive level. In particular, the 
incentive level was increased in increments of S2 for CE values between SO and S50 per 
TCE, in increments of S20 for CE values between S50 and S500 per TCE, and in 
increments of S200 for CE values between S500 and 55000 per TCE. While CE values 
over S200 per TCE are certainly not practical, they are useful for illustrative purposes, 
i.e. for finding the overall capacity limit of agricultural mitigation activities.
The mitigation policy design used here can be described as perfect emissions tax 
or, equivalently, as perfect emission reduction subsidy. Costs for implementing, 
monitoring, and enforcing this policy were assumed to be zero. In addition, the design 
allowed for unrestricted tradeoffs between different GHG on the basis o f the GWP. For 
example, the reduction of one metric ton of methane has the same objective function 
value as a 2 1  metric ton emission reduction of carbon dioxide.
Taking into account the underlying assumption, the emission reduction values for 
the mitigation incentive design described above should be interpreted as upper bound.
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As such these values provide points of reference for alternative mitigation policies. For 
example, transaction costs for an alternative policy setup can be approximated through 
the cost difference between alternative policies and the policy examined here for 
corresponding levels of emission reduction.
5.1 Overall Contribution of Agriculture to Greenhouse Gas Abatement
The economics of greenhouse gas mitigation can be efficiently summarized 
through abatement curves (Norton). Abatement curves show potential GHGE reduction 
at a given cost or. alternatively, what price has to be paid to achieve a certain level of 
emission reduction. Figure 5-1 through Figure 5-3 show agriculture's potential to 
mitigate greenhouse gases for low, high, and extremely high CE incentive levels. The 
net contribution of each greenhouse gas category to the emission reduction is also 
shown.
Emission reductions were calculated for each incentive level as the difference between 
actual emissions and baseline emissions. The slope of the marginal abatement curves in 
Figure 5-1 through Figure 5-3 indicates how much each greenhouse gas can be reduced 
at a given incentive level. For a S20 per TCE incentive, approximately 50 MMT of 
carbon equivalents can be saved through the agricultural sector. This amount equals 
about three percent of the combined 1990 U.S. emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, 
and nitrous oxide (U.S. EPA). Even under extreme incentives, agriculture's annual 
contribution does not exceed 400 MMT (Figure 5-1).
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The low initial slope of the emission reduction supply curve can be attributed to 
the fact that unregulated externalities involve many production inefficiencies. For 
example, some farmers may be economically indifferent between two management 
options, which yield about the same economic profit but result in different levels of 
emissions. With no incentive in place, these farmers may adopt or continue using the 
high emitting strategy for various non-economic reasons. However, the introduction of a 
small incentive will capture all "easy" reductions.
Between $20 and $60 per TCE, the slope of the abatement curve is visibly higher 
indicating increasing marginal cost of emission reductions. As noted before, marginal 
abatement curves do not incorporate transaction costs of implementing mitigation 
policies. From $60 per TCE onwards, the gap between carbon dioxide emission 
reductions and the other two greenhouse gas emission reductions widens greatly. As 
shown in Figure 5-1 through Figure 5-3, nitrous oxide emission reductions have the least 
effect on overall emission reductions.
5.2 Mitigation Contribution of Individual Strategies
The contribution of individual GHGE mitigation components at each emission 
reduction value is shown in Figure 5-4 through Figure 5-7. Carbon dioxide emission 
reductions arise mainly from increases in soil organic matter and production of biomass 
feedstock for electrical power plants (Figure 5-5). The latter option dominates clearly for 
carbon equivalent taxes of 1 0 0  dollars per metric ton or higher.
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Carbon emissions from direct fossil fuel use and from fertilizer application decrease 
steadily as emission reductions become more valuable (Figure 5-4). However, these 
emission reductions embody only reductions from conventional crop production and do 
not include source reductions from new alternatives such as biomass production.
Agricultural methane emissions are mainly reduced through keeping of fewer 
animals and through improved liquid manure management. Diminished rice cultivation 
has only little impact on overall methane emission reductions. Nitrous oxide emission 
savings from reduced denitrification contribute relatively little to overall emission 
mitigation.
5.3 Welfare Implications of Mitigation to Agricultural Sector Participants
Welfare impacts of mitigation on agricultural sector participants are shown in 
Figure 5-8 and Figure 5-9. These impacts represent intermediate run results, which are 
equilibrium results after adjustment. Thus, producers' welfare does not include 
adjustment costs, which might be incurred in the short run after implementation of a 
mitigation policy. Total welfare in the agricultural sector decreases by about 20 billion 
dollars for every 100 dollars of tax increase on carbon equivalents. In contrast, 
producers’ welfare increases continuously as emission reduction become more valuable. 
This increase in producers' welfare is due to large welfare shifts from consumers. 
Consumers’ welfare decreases because of higher food prices.
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Foreign countries’ welfare decreases as well; however, the reduction is not as 
large as for domestic consumers. While foreign consumers suffer from higher food 
prices due to lower U.S. exports, foreign producers benefit from less U.S. food 
production. Since foreign welfare is aggregated over both foreign consumers and 
producers, the two effects can offset each other somewhat. The policy setup employed in 
this section yields positive governmental revenues as long as net emissions of carbon 
equivalents are positive as well. At tax levels beyond $150 per TCE, net emissions from 
the agricultural sector become negative and so do governmental revenues. Note that the 
above welfare accounting does not include social costs or benefits related to diminished 
or enhanced levels of the greenhouse gas emission externality, and other externalities 
such as erosion and nitrogen pollution.
5.4 Mitigation Impacts on Traditional Agricultural Markets
Mitigation efforts in the agricultural sector impact both production technologies 
and production intensities. New economic incentives and disincentives stimulate 
farmers to abandon emission intensive technologies, increase the use of mitigative 
technologies, and consider production of alternative products such as biofuel crops. 
Below, the mitigation impacts on traditional markets are summarized. Most results are 
provided at the national level to keep the output at reasonable size.
5.4.1 Management Changes
This section summarizes the effects of a mitigation policy on agricultural 
management strategies. On cropland, reducing tillage intensity is one of the considered
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
147
actions to reduce net carbon dioxide emissions. ASMGHG explicitly models three 
different tillage intensities: conventional, conservation, and zero tillage. The national 
response of tillage system adoption for conventional crop production to various levels of 
carbon prices is shown in Figure 5-10 and Figure 5-11. Most changes in the adoption of 
available tillage systems occur between carbon prices of SO and $100 per metric ton.
Zero tillage reaches maximum usage at a carbon price of S80 per ton, but then declines 
as a result of the overall acre reduction for conventional crop production. Conservation 
tillage increases relative to the baseline usage only for low carbon prices around S2 0  per 
metric ton (Figure 5-11). Conventional (intensive) tillage decreases strongly up to $100 
per ton of carbon. Associated emission reductions from increased soil organic matter are 
also shown in Figure 5-10.
Irrigation use leads to carbon dioxide emissions, the magnitude mainly depending 
on fossil fuel requirements for water pumping and the amount of water applied to irrigate 
fields. The relationship between carbon prices, irrigated acreage, and water usage is 
shown in Figure 5-12. For relatively low values of carbon up to S60 per metric ton of 
carbon, irrigation decreases. Higher carbon values, however, produce mixed effects on 
irrigation. A probable explanation is that irrigated crops return higher yields. Starting at 
carbon prices of $60 per metric ton, production of biomass becomes attractive. Since 
biomass production has a high mitigative potential, irrigation can free more cropland for 
biomass production.
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Alternative fertilizer management impacts both carbon dioxide emissions and 
nitrous oxide emissions. In Figure 5-6, changes of nitrogen fertilizer application rates 
are shown in response to increasing carbon prices. At first, the nitrogen fertilization 
intensity for traditional crops decreases a little. However, if the price for carbon savings 
surpasses $80 per TCE, average nitrogen application rates are on the rise again. 
Analyzing Figure 5-6, it becomes clear that nitrous oxide emission reductions occur 
because the total amount of nitrogen fertilizer applied to traditional crops decreases. 
Considering the fact that per acre application rates of nitrogen fertilizer remain relatively 
unchanged, nitrous oxide emission reductions must result from less acreage allocated to 
the traditional crop sector.
In Figure 5-13, the effects of increasing carbon prices on dairy management and 
production are shown. Several responses can be observed. First, mitigation efforts are 
negatively correlated with total dairy cow population and milk production. Higher 
carbon prices lead to less milk production and fewer animals. However, milk production 
decreases at smaller rates than animal population. This can be explained by increasing 
numbers of BST treated animals. The number of cows under improved manure 
management increases as well.
According to EPA estimates, livestock manure management has the highest 
methane emission reduction potential among agricultural mitigation strategies. This 
assertion could be confirmed by ASMGHG results. Emission reductions from methane 
mitigation options for dairy cows are shown in Figure 5-14.
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Liquid manure management appears to be the most cost efficient mitigation 
option for dairy cows. Note that emissions saving manure management technologies are 
constrained by the currently observed usage of manure management systems and the 
currently observed herd size distribution. Subsequently, reducing the number of animals 
leads to fairly constant increases of methane emission reduction in response to increasing 
levels of carbon payments. The effect of BST treatments on emission reduction is 
relatively small.
5.4.2 Market Indicators
This section summarizes agricultural market responses to mitigation policies 
reflected by changes in market prices, production, exports, and imports. In section 3 .1, 
graphical analysis was used to show that mitigation policies are likely to raise land 
values. The results from the graphical analysis are confirmed by the empirical results 
obtained from ASMGHG. Land values of ASMGHG land classes increase considerably 
as greenhouse gas mitigation becomes more valuable (Figure 5-15).
Agricultural product markets respond in various ways to mitigation policies. 
Higher costs of production (emission tax, opportunity costs, land rental costs) for 
conventional crop management strategies and higher incentives for alternatives cause 
farmers to shift more land to mitigative products. Production of conventional crops may 
change both due to altered crop yields and acreage shifts. The impact of carbon prices 
on production of traditional agricultural products is shown in Figure 5-16 and Figure
5-17.
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Declining crop production is mainly due to less acreage allocated to traditional 
food crops. The computed Tomquist index reveals only a small response of crop yields 
to mitigation (Figure 5-16). Initially, yields decline slightly due to less irrigation and less 
fertilization. Subsequently at higher carbon prices, average crop yields go up again. For 
prices above S100 pcrTCE substantial amounts of cropland arc diverted to trees and 
biofuel crops (see section 5.5). In ASMGHG, tree and biomass yields are not sensitive 
to cropland quality; hence the marginal cropland is diverted first increasing average 
yields on the remaining acreage for conventional crops. Less U.S. domestic food 
production coupled with higher prices in U.S. agricultural markets induce foreign 
countries to increase their net exports into the U.S.
Livestock production decreases as a result of higher costs from mitigative 
management. Lower levels of production of traditional agricultural products in turn 
affect the market price of these products (Figure 5-18 and Figure 5-19). In particular, 
prices change considerably if the product is emission intensive, if it has a low elasticity 
of demand, and if the U.S. is a major producer.
5.5 Diversion of Agricultural Land to Different Uses
With mitigation incentives in place, farmers may choose to divert cropland to 
alternative uses. Growing biofuel crops to yield emission offsets or afforestation to 
sequester carbon emissions are among the considered options. The potential acreage 
diversion of traditional agricultural land to other uses is shown in Figure 5-20.
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The acreage afforested with pine trees remains relatively small and reaches only 
about eight million acres at the highest carbon prices, which is still about five million 
acres short of the imposed afforestation limit on cropland. Note that tree carbon 
coefficients do not integrate any specific nonlinear dynamics of tree carbon sequestration 
over time. Biofuel crop acreage increases from zero to more than one third of the 
available cropland as the carbon value increases up to 5500 per TCE (Figure 5-20).
Three different crops were considered for providing biomass as feedstock to 
power plants: switch grass, willow and hybrid poplar. The relative importance of these 
crops is shown in Figure 5-21. Switch grass production accounts for the bulk of 
emission offsets from biomass power plants. It becomes a competitve mitigation 
strategy for carbon prices above S60 per TCE. Willow is used to a smaller extent 
starting from S120 per TCE. Emission offsets from willow increase up to a carbon price 
of $280 per TCE. Hybrid poplar is never brought into production at any incentive level.
While most results presented so far stayed at the national level, ASMGHG output 
can also be used to analyze regional effects. With respect to biomass production, this is 
done so in Figure 5-22. The Lake States offer the most cost efficient biomass 
production. Between $60 and $ 120 per TCE, biomass is produced almost exclusively in 
these states. Subsequently, the North East. Delta State, and South East regions take part. 
The Com Belt region becomes profitable for biomass production only for carbon price 
above $220 per TCE. Possible reasons for such behavior may include high opportunity 
cost in the agriculturally productive Com Belt region.
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5.6 Mitigation Impacts on Other Agricultural Externalities
The complex nature of EPIC results makes it possible to simultaneously analyze the 
effects of agricultural management on greenhouse gas emissions and on other important 
agricultural externalities. In section 3.3, graphical analysis suggested a "win-win" 
situation, where greenhouse gas emission mitigation also leads to a reduction in both soil 
erosion and water pollution. The sign and magnitude of EPIC coefficients do not 
automatically ensure the direction of change for non-greenhouse gas external effects in 
ASMGHG. For example, average EPIC coefficients of soil erosion decrease as tillage 
intensity decreases, but increase as nitrogen fertilization decreases. Empirical results 
from ASMGHG are shown in Figure 5-23 and in Figure 5-24. The average per acre 
values of the other externalities decrease considerably for a carbon equivalent price 
between SO and S100 dollars per metric ton and stays at levels around 65 percent of the 
baseline value for higher prices. Thus, carbon prices beyond S100 per metric ton do not 
result in additional gains with respect to the other externalities.
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6 EXAMINATION OF ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS
In the previous section, ASMGHG was used to estimate the total GHGE 
mitigation potential from agriculture and related effects on management, markets, and 
the environment. Throughout section 5, it was assumed that all mitigation options were 
available simultaneously, emission coefficients were known with certainty, and that 
policy transaction costs were zero. While these assumptions facilitate the analysis, they 
are not always accurate or useful. For example, independent analysis of mitigation 
strategies may be preferred over joint analysis when examining policies, which target 
only a few specific mitigation strategies. Second, many emission coefficients were 
derived from simulation models with little experimental validation. Hence, a sensitivity 
analysis for these coefficients is desirable. Finally, downstream emission pricing 
policies as assumed in section 5 may not be practical for non-point source pollutants 
(Fischer, Kerr, and Toman).
In this section, ASMGHG will be used to relax above-mentioned assumptions 
and to examine the effects of the resulting modifications on GHGE mitigation. The 
objective of this section is to provide insight in the type of assumptions that can be 
modified through a few examples. Given the large number of possible cases, an 
exhaustive analysis of the effects of all assumptions is currently neither feasible nor 
desirable.
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6.1 Joint Versus Independent Analysis of Agricultural Mitigation Options
Independent analysis of individual agricultural mitigation options has been used 
in many previous studies (see section 2 ) because of a single strategy focus and/or the fact 
that tools or resources for a joint analysis were not available. The individual assessment 
of mitigation strategies may be preferred under at least two circumstances. First, 
national or international policy makers may consider only one or a few specific 
agricultural strategies to be acceptable for emission reduction credits. Joint analysis of 
all possible strategies would then overstate agriculture’s potential. Second, comparison 
of joint and individual analysis can reveal the assessment bias from excluding additional 
potential mitigation strategies.
The first point is illustrated in Figure 6-1. Emission reduction supply curves are 
shown for different assumptions about the availability of agricultural mitigation 
strategies. The more strategies are available the higher becomes the total emission 
reduction potential. For example, at a price of S100 per TCE, the achieved reductions in 
GHGE amount to 103 MMT (all AG-mitigation strategies), 50 MMT (biofuel carbon 
offsets), 32 MMT (non-biofuel carbon sinks), 18 MMT (methane strategies only), 8  
MMT (carbon source reductions only), and 2.5 MMT (nitrous oxide strategies only). 
Alternatively, to get a total reduction volume of 20 MMT, carbon equivalent emission 
reductions cost on average S14 per TCE (all AG-mitigation strategies), 540 per TCE 
(non-biofuel carbon sinks), S72 (biofuel carbon offsets), $180 per TCE (methane 
strategies only)12, and more than $500 per TCE (carbon source reductions only).
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Carbon sink strategies yield the highest individual mitigation potentials. Nitrous 
oxide emission mitigation appears little attractive, however, results are based on 
calibrated emission coefficients derived from the EPIC model. The original EPIC 
coefficients were scaled down (see Equation 53 in section 4.3.6) and hence, may be 
conservative estimates. Similarly, methane emission reduction supply curves reflect only 
application of well-documented mitigation options. Intensive research on additional 
methane emission reduction strategies is currently underway (see section 2 .2 . 1 . 1 ) and 
may provide data for more effective mitigation options in the near future.
The assessment bias of individual mitigation appraisals can be quantified for both 
individual and aggregate emission reduction supply curves. The first case is illustrated 
for carbon emission offsets from ethanol production (Figure 6-2).
Pictured in Figure 6-2 are carbon emission abatement curves from ethanol use 
under different assumptions about simultaneous availability of other mitigation 
strategies. The scenario labeled “All Options'” stands for a joint assessment of all 
mitigation options. “No Biomass’” also represents a joint analysis with biomass 
production to fuel electrical power plants being the only mitigation option suppressed.
In scenario “Ethanol + CH4”, only methane mitigation options are enabled in addition to 
ethanol emission offsets. Finally, in scenario “Ethanol Only” all mitigation options are 
eliminated except for ethanol.
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The data graphed in Figure 6-2 verify the theoretical findings from section 3.1. 
Several things can be observed. First, the emission reduction potential from ethanol is 
highest when ethanol is the only mitigation strategy permitted. If more options are 
included in the analysis, ethanol emission reductions are smaller because other strategies 
arc more cost effective. Second, the decline in ethanol emission reductions depends on 
the competitiveness of simultaneously included mitigation strategies. Methane 
mitigation strategies do not interact with ethanol production as much as carbon sink 
strategies. Hence, the left shift of the emission reduction supply curve is higher if all 
carbon sink options are enabled. For carbon values of $70 per TCE and above, the 
biomass for power plant option leads to a strong decline of ethanol production.
The deviation of ethanol abatement curves obtained through individual or semi 
joint assessment from the joint abatement curve is a measure of the assessment bias. In 
Table 6-1, the percentage overstatement is listed from excluding other mitigation 
strategies when assessing ethanol emission offsets.
Non-joint assessment of GHGE mitigation strategies also lead to biased 
predictions of the total emission reduction potential in the agricultural sector (Figure
6-3). In particular, the sum of emission reductions from individually examined strategies 
is between 1 0  and 2 2  percent higher than the emission reduction obtained through a joint 
analysis of the same mitigation strategies. This result again confirms the existence of 
substantial interdependencies between agricultural mitigation strategies.
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Table 6-1 Percentage Overstatement of Ethanol Mitigation From not Including 
All Other Mitigation Options
CE Value Implementation Assumption of Other Mitigation Strategies
(Dollars per TCE) No Biomass Ethanol + CH4 Ethanol Only
4 0 . 0 112.3 310.7
8 0 . 0 2 1 . 8 128.3
1 2 0 . 0 22.3 209.4
16 0 . 0 28.2 181.0
2 0 0 . 0 97.0 282.5
24 0 . 0 117.1 265.5
28 0 . 0 101.9 235.6
32 0 . 0 125.4 2 0 0 . 6
36 0 . 0 108.2 190.6
40 0 . 0 114.9 180.5
44 0 . 0 1 0 2 . 8 162.8
48 0 . 0 63.6 82.7
52 0 . 0 54.6 70.2
56 0 . 0 58.4 67.2
60 0 . 0 53.0 58.2
64 0 . 0 54.3 64.7
6 8 0 . 0 55.4 74.0
72 0 . 0 58.7 75.2
76 38.3 1 1 2 . 0 148.1
80 50.0 126.1 2 1 1 . 6
84 130.0 255.3 389.9
8 8 250.5 434.8 664.2
92 267.5 468.5 754.8
96 268.4 491.8 760.5
1 0 0 514.9 902.8 1347.2
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Limited availability of farmland was discussed to be the main reason for above 
described interdependencies (see section 3.1). Land use intensive mitigation strategies 
such as soil carbon sequestration, afforestation, and biofuel production lead to a 
competition for farmland that builds up as the value of carbon credits increases. The 
higher the aggregate demand for farmland, the higher will be the equilibrium prices. 
Empirical data on changes of land values are shown in Figure 6-4. The graphical display 
illustrates both the effects of the level of carbon prices and different assumptions about 
the simultaneous availability of mitigation strategies. Inclusion of carbon related 
mitigation strategies appear to increase of land values. Starting at S60 per TCE, the 
biomass power plant option raises land rental rates the most. In contrast, methane 
mitigation strategies tend to decrease land values. Methane emission reduction 
incentives lead to less extensive livestock production, hence, demand for pasture and 
feed crops decreases. Nitrous oxide mitigation appears to have only little effect on land 
rental rates.
6.2 Trade Between Greenhouse Gases
Global warming and associated environmental threats result from the combined 
presence of GHG in the atmosphere. Moreover, the value of CE emission reductions is 
the same regardless of which GHG has been reduced. In its current version, the Kyoto 
Protocol poses separate targets on emission reductions for each individual gas. While 
this policy design may be justifiable by reasons such as accountability and verifiability 
(see section 2.3.5), it may be criticized for imposing scientifically redundant restrictions.
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A proposed alternative is to only limit CE emissions. Such a system would permit free 
exchange of emission reduction credits among different GHGs. In this section, the 
magnitude of dead weight losses from not allowing trade between CO;, N;0, and C H 4 
emission reduction credits is examined.
Empirical data from individual versus joint GHGE reductions are displayed in 
Figure 6-5. The curve representing joint emission reductions was obtained by allowing 
for free trade of GHGE reductions. Trade is based on the global warming potential of 
each gas. Individual GHG abatement curves were computed by imposing carbon 
equivalent emission reduction incentives on individual gases only. The GWP-weighted 
sum of the individual GHGE reductions is also shown in Figure 6-5. Since individual 
abatement is more restrictive, the total mitigation potential at a given price is always 
lower. The difference between the no-trade and joint reduction abatement curves 
represents the dead weight loss from the trade ban between greenhouse gases (Figure 
6- 6) .
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The empirical results in section 5 are in part based on uncertain assumptions and 
preliminary data. Some emission coefficients derived from simulation models had to be 
scaled considerably to match ASMGHG baseline emission predictions with baseline 
predictions from EPA or other institutions. Given doubtful coefficients, it is desirable to 
examine how sensitive main results are with respect to these coefficients.
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In the following two sections, a sensitivity analysis is performed on the impact of both 
soil organic matter and nitrous oxide emission coefficients on overall mitigation results.
6.3.1 Soil Organic Matter Coefficients
Soil organic matter coefficients (SOMC) were varied over a range from 10 to 
1000 percent relative to the values used in ASMGHG. The effects of these 
modifications are shown in Figure 6-7 and Figure 6 -8 . Two characteristics are 
worthwhile noting. First, different absolute magnitudes of SOMC alter the general shape 
of emission reduction supply curves only for low carbon incentives below S20 per TCE. 
At higher carbon prices, the emission reduction supply curve moves fairly parallel to the 
right or to the left depending on the direction of SOMC adjustments (Figure 6-7).
The relatively parallel shifts above S20 per TCE indicate the low-cost nature of 
SOM related emission reductions. Under all SOMC scenarios, net emission reductions 
from SOM changes reach a peak at carbon values between S60 and S 100 per TCE. The 
most dramatic carbon net emission reductions occur for carbon incentives below $ 2 0  per 
TCE (Figure 6 -8 ) regardless of how much SOMC are scaled. Above $20 per TCE. 
emission reductions from SOM changes increase only little. Second, the magnitude of 
the supply curve shift depends on the direction of SOMC adjustments. Smaller values of 
SOMC result in fairly small shifts of the aggregate emission reduction supply curve. If 
SOM emission savings are smaller, other mitigation strategies will be used more 
intensely. These other strategies compensate for smaller SOM emission reductions and 
therefore buffer the effect on total emission reductions.
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However, if SOMC are proportionally increased, then shifts of the aggregate supply 
function can be large (Figure 6-7). As SOM emission savings increase, soil carbon 
sequestration will eventually become the most competitive mitigation option. Thus, the 
level of SOMC adjustments relates more directly to the level of emission reductions.
6.3.2 Nitrous Oxide Emission Coefficients
Nitrous oxide emission coefficients from denitrification involve large 
uncertainties. For this study, all denitrification values were derived from EPIC 
simulations (see section 4.3.6). Unfortunately, absolute levels of EPIC coefficients on 
denitrification did not correspond to assumptions used in previous analyses. To be 
consistent with those analyses and to be conservative, all EPIC denitrification 
coefficients were adjusted proportionally and only relative differences were preserved 
(see section 4.3.6). The impacts of such adjustment on GHGE mitigation are shown in 
Figure 6-9 and in Figure 6-10.
Comparison between emission reduction supply curves from using ASMGHG 
coefficients versus using original EPIC coefficients reveals large differences (Figure 
6-9). When applying ASMGHG coefficients, nitrous oxide emission reductions 
contribute only little to total agricultural GHGE reductions. However, when using the 
original EPIC values, nitrous oxide emission reductions exceed by far reductions from 
all other agricultural mitigation options.
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While the emission reduction supply curves from reduced denitrification appear 
more elastic for higher coefficient values (Figure 6-10), most reductions occur for carbon 
values between SO and S20. The high sensitivity of total CE emission reductions to the 
magnitude of nitrous oxide emission coefficients is in part caused by the high GWP of 
310 relative to carbon dioxide.
6.4 Efficiency Losses and Transaction Costs From Upstream Policies
Direct measurement and regulation of emissions from agricultural management is 
often impractical. In section 2.3, it was argued that emission policies implemented 
upstream might provide a feasible alternative to expensive downstream approaches. 
ASMGHG can be used to estimate efficiency losses, and hence, partial transaction costs 
of upstream emission regulations. This will be demonstrated here for two alternative 
types of a soil carbon sequestration policy. The first policy is a downstream emission 
based policy as used in section 5. Soil carbon emission incentives are linked to true 
emission reductions. All transaction costs are ignored.
The second policy corresponds to an upstream mitigation policy. Soil carbon 
sequestration is encouraged through incentives placed on low tillage intensity. For each 
of the three different tillage systems, farmers will receive or pay a system specific 
amount of money. To keep efficiency losses at a low level, incentives for each tillage 
system were calculated proportional to the sequestration potential of each system. In 
section 4.3.5.2.1, soil carbon was assumed to increase by 1,000 MMT of carbon 
equivalents for zero tillage, by 600 MMT for conservation tillage, and to decrease by 282
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MMT for conventional tillage. Thus, each incentive dollar for zero tillage was joined by 
a 60-cent per acre incentive on conservation tillage, and a 28.2-cent per acre disincentive 
on conventional tillage (Table 6-2).
Observed differences between upstream and downstream implementations of soil 
carbon policies are summarized in Figure 6-11. The efficiency loss at each level of 
emission reduction equals the horizontal distance between the two curves. Given 
program costs of, for example, two million dollars, the upstream policy achieves only 
about 85 percent of the emission reduction realized by a downstream policy. The 
vertical distance at each level of emission reduction represents the cost of upstream 
inefficiencies. In addition to costs of monitoring and enforcement, this inefficiency cost 
item pertains to transaction costs of an upstream soil carbon policy. In the policy 
example used here, these partial transaction costs amount to about 50 percent of the 
program costs13 incurred by the downstream policy.
6.5 External Effects of Specific Mitigation Policies on Unregulated Emission 
Sources
Agricultural mitigation policies can become expensive if many detailed 
management decisions of agricultural enterprises have to be reported, monitored, and 
enforced. However, cost savings may be possible because several mitigation strategies 
appear to be linked. If, for example, a fossil fuel tax creates considerable incentives for 
farmers to switch from intensive tillage to conservation or zero tillage, then costs of 
implementing a tillage subsidy may be redundant.
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Table 6-2 Tillage System Specific Tax Levels of Hypothetical Soil Carbon 
Policy in Dollars per Acre
Policy Level Conventional Tillage Conservation Tillage Zero Tillage
4 0.56 - 1 . 2 0 -2 . 0 0
8 1.13 -2.40 -4.00
1 2 1.69 -3.60 -6 . 0 0
16 2.26 -4.80 -8 . 0 0
2 0 2.82 -6 . 0 0 - 1 0 . 0 0
24 3.38 -7.20 - 1 2 . 0 0
28 3.95 -8.40 -14.00
32 4.51 -9.60 -16.00
36 5.08 -10.80 -18.00
40 5.64 - 1 2 . 0 0 -2 0 . 0 0
44 6 . 2 0 -13.20 -2 2 . 0 0
48 6.77 -14.40 -24.00
52 7.33 -15.60 -26.00
56 7.90 -16.80 -28.00
60 8.46 -18.00 -30.00
64 9.02 -19.20 -32.00
6 8 9.59 -20.40 -34.00
72 10.15 -21.60 -36.00
76 10.72 -22.80 -38.00
80 11.28 -24.00 -40.00
84 11.84 -25.20 -42.00
8 8 12.41 -26.40 -44.00
92 12.97 -27.60 -46.00
96 13.54 -28.80 -48.00
1 0 0 14.10 -30.00 -50.00
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The dual emissions accounting in ASMGHG (see section 4.3.8.1) makes it 
possible to examine external effects of specific mitigation policies on unregulated 
emission sources and sinks. To demonstrate this aspect, the hypothetical soil carbon 
policy described in section 6.4 (upstream emission tax) was used again. For 25 different
I «■>* 'n l  p  /■» C* T1 \u t  i i i c ^ i i k i v w b  ( l w i u  uiisj. u U i io w i  v a t i U t i  u . u a £ w y  a iiu .  u i a u t c c u u  * c S  \ w w u v  c i i U O u c U
tillage), emission reductions were recorded from all GHGE sources and sinks, which are 
contained in ASMGHG.
In Figure 6-12, the recorded net GHGE reductions are graphed for four different 
degrees of emission aggregation at each policy level. SOM carbon reductions represent 
intentional or gross emission savings due to changes in the soil organic matter content. 
Unintentional emission changes from the applied soil carbon policy were aggregated into 
two categories, non-SOM carbon reductions and non-carbon reductions. The first 
category relates to the combined emission savings from all carbon emission sources and 
sinks except for the soil carbon sink. Similarly, non-carbon reductions denote the sum of 
all changes from methane and nitrous oxide emission sources and sinks contained in 
ASMGHG. Net GHGE reductions correspond to the total effects on agricultural 
emissions and were computed by adding together above three emission components.
Inspection of Figure 6-12 reveals that policy induced SOM carbon savings 
contribute most to overall GHGE reductions. However, other emission and sink 
accounts change as well. Substantial complimentary emission reductions up to 19 
percent of SOM carbon changes result from untargeted, non-SOM carbon sources and 
sinks (Table 6-3). Nitrous oxide and methane emission accounts vary relatively little.
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Table 6-3 Relative Contribution of Unregulated Emission Sources and Sinks to 
GHGE Reduction Under Hypothetical Soil Carbon Policy
Policy Net Emission Reductions in MMTCE (in Percent of SOM Carbon Savings)
Level SOM Carbon Non-SOM Carbon Non-Carbon Net GHGE
4 11.25 0.44 (3.9) -0.09 (-0 .8 ) 1 1 . 6 6 (103.6)
8 18.30 1.04 (5.7) -0.03 (-0 .2 ) 19.34 (105.7)
1 2 2 1 . 1 2 2.03 (9.6) 0.04 (0 .2 ) 23.22 (109.9)
16 22.75 2.35 (10.3) 0.09 (0.4) 25.21 ( 1 1 0 .8 )
2 0 23.37 2.51 (10.7) 0.09 (0.4) 25.97 ( 1 1 1 .1 )
24 23.60 2.92 (12.4) 0.15 (0 .6 ) 26.63 ( 1 1 2 .8 )
28 24.13 2.96 (12.3) 0 .1 S (0 .8 ) 27.24 (112.9)
32 24.99 3.01 ( 1 2 .0 ) 0 . 2 2 (0.9) 28.17 (112.7)
36 24.96 3.30 (13.2) 0.29 ( 1 -2 ) 28.45 (114.0)
40 25.01 3.56 (14.2) 0.39 ( 1 .6 ) 28.78 (115.1)
44 25.03 3.79 (15.1) 0.48 (1.9) 29.07 (116.1)
48 25.20 3.75 (14.9) 0.49 (1.9) 29.21 (115.9)
52 25.51 3.83 (15.0) 0.53 (2 . 1 ) 29.60 (116.1)
56 25.53 4.12 (16.1) 0 . 6 8 (2.7) 29.97 (117.4)
60 25.56 4.41 (17.3) 0.76 (3.0) 30.33 (118.7)
64 25.57 4.45 (17.4) 0.75 (2.9) 30.38 (118.8)
6 8 25.64 4.55 (17.8) 0.77 (3.0) 30.57 (119.2)
72 25.61 4.79 (18.7) 0 . 8 8 (3-4) 30.81 (120.3)
76 25.61 4.89 (19.1) 0.89 (3-5) 30.93 ( 1 2 0 .8 )
80 25.63 4.78 (18.6) 0.80 (3.1) 30.83 (120.3)
84 25.62 4.73 (18.5) 0.82 (3-2) 30.78 ( 1 2 0 .2 )
8 8 25.64 4.80 (18.7) 0.90 (3-5) 30.93 ( 1 2 0 .6 )
92 25.66 4.80 (18.7) 0.89 (3-5) 30.96 (120.7)
96 25.67 4.71 (18.4) 0.78 (3.0) 30.88 (120.3)
1 0 0 25.67 4.74 (18.4) 0.79 (3.1) 30.91 (120.4)
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7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation analyzes the economic potential of agriculture to participate in 
greenhouse gas emission mitigation efforts. Special focus is placed on the assessment 
methodology. While previous studies often ignore interactions among simultaneously 
available mitigation strategies and between mitigation strategies and conventional 
agricultural practices, this study tries to more fully capture likely interdependencies. The 
study required development of a model (ASMGHG), which simultaneous included 
available agricultural mitigation strategies.
Empirical results confirm the existence of substantial interactions, which are 
manifest by price and production responses to mitigation incentives throughout the 
traditional agricultural sector. Results also indicate that agriculture's contribution to 
greenhouse gas emission reduction may be substantial, but not sufficient to fulfill the 
requirements of the Kyoto Protocol. Even under extreme economic incentives, the 
annual emission reduction potential does not exceed 300 MMT of carbon equivalents if 
considering carbon dioxide emissions only, or 400 MMT if emission reductions were 
summed across all greenhouse gases. Under the current version of the Kyoto Protocol, 
carbon dioxide emissions alone would require a reduction volume of approximately 700 
MMT by the year 2010 (U.S. EPA).
The joint presence of mitigation strategies in ASMGHG made it possible to 
identify preferred emission reduction strategies at each incentive level. For carbon prices 
above $80 dollars per TCE, biofuel production via switch grass and willow becomes the
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dominating strategy. The annual emission reduction contribution for incentives between 
S80 and S400 per TCE ranges from 50 to 200 MMT of carbon equivalents, respectively. 
However, for carbon prices below S60 per TCE, the ASMGHG equilibrium yields no 
biofuel production at all. This observation confirms the currently unimportant 
commercial production of woody crops or switch grass for electrical power generation. 
Biofuel production saves about 1.5 metric tons of carbon equivalent per acre and year. 
Thus, a S60 per TCE incentive corresponds to a price subsidy for biomass crops between 
50 and 100 percent of the current market price.
Low carbon prices between SO and S60 per TCE lead to a more complex mixture 
of actively used mitigation strategies. For example, an incentive level of S25 per TCE 
leads to less fertilization, tillage, and irrigation intensity, increased afforestation, and 
improved liquid manure management, and reduces overall emissions by about 50 MMT 
of carbon equivalents. Soil organic matter buildup contributes about one third or 17 
MMT. Note that at S25 per TCE the average costs of emission reductions only amount 
to about 55 per TCE.
The above cost summary does not incorporate all costs and benefits associated 
with agricultural participation in greenhouse gas mitigation. Not monetarized in this 
analysis were transaction costs of mitigation policies, costs or benefits from reduced 
levels of other agricultural externalities, and costs or benefits of changed income 
distribution in the agricultural sector. Monitoring and enforcement may not be cheap 
given the non-point source nature of agricultural greenhouse gas emissions. However, 
policies targeting emission reductions at the upstream level may reduce transaction costs.
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Efficiency losses from upstream regulations were shown for soil carbon sequestration 
policies.
Agricultural externalities examined besides greenhouse gas emissions included 
soil erosion, nitrogen and phosphorous pollution. At an incentive level of S50 per TCE,
all fUfAet o j i t i r tp  m Uir O s frrs 4 0  f  n  o r  «-* rs f* **<•■> 1 o n 4  D  'f>n41 1  uiiww wAkwiiiauiivo iwuulwu O j  iU “tU pwiwwui Jwi uwiw Oi ciUpiUiiu. Dc^UnU
incentive levels of S50 per TCE, changes in external effects were limited. Thus, when 
making an overall decision about the worthiness of agricultural mitigation options, 
policy makers should also account for, or at least be aware of, these additional effects.
Many agriculturists oppose the Kyoto Protocol and related efforts to introduce 
new environmental policies, arguing that farmers would be subjected to substantial 
economic losses. The findings in this dissertation do not justify this perspective. On the 
contrary, farmers are likely to experience higher earnings specifically in the intermediate 
run after adoption of mitigation technologies and market adjustment.
Throughout the 20th century, U.S. agricultural food production has increased 
faster than demand for agricultural products. With inelastic demand encountered for 
many agricultural products, this disproportionate growth led to a decline in agricultural 
prices and farmers' net income. The empirical results o f this dissertation suggest that this 
negative trend from farmers' point of view could be alleviated through mitigation efforts. 
Positive net income effects result from both higher food prices and additional revenue 
opportunities in the mitigation arena.
The findings in this dissertation provide support for a new breed of combined 
environmental and farm policies. Traditionally, a large amount o f governmental money
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was allocated to reduce soil erosion (CRP program) and stabilize agricultural prices at 
"fair" levels (farm program). The expenses incurred through those individual programs 
may be dispensable through a new combined policy. For example, a "smart" mitigation 
program could encourage farmers to grow switch grass or woody crops on cropland. If 
the economic incentives of such a program would be higher for land with higher 
erodibility, then cropping on highly erodible land would be reduced, GHGE would be 
offset, and farmers’ net income would increase due to market effects described above.
In interpreting the empirical results of this study, a few words need to be said 
about existing limitations. Sources of errors relate to data inaccuracies, model structural 
assumptions, and aggregation approximation errors.
A warning has to be given with respect to the data of included mitigation options. 
As outlined in section 4, many data were obtained from simulation models, in particular 
from EPIC. These data reflect the evolving nature of those models. Absolute levels of 
simulated parameters did not always concur with literature estimates when aggregated. 
Adjustments were made, which generally preserved the relative difference between 
different management options but scaled the absolute level of data.
A particular objective was to include all major agricultural mitigation options. 
Difficulties arose for mitigation options which were known qualitatively, but for which 
no quantitative data were available. The decision to include a particular mitigation 
option depended on the justifiability of assumptions that were needed to overcome 
missing data.
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Another shortcoming of the presented analysis is the lack of temporal dynamics. 
All included mitigation strategies were assumed to have constant mitigative effects over 
time. While this assumption may be justifiable for methane, nitrous oxide, and carbon 
dioxide source emission reduction strategies, and for carbon sink strategies in tL’
»n  »♦ C* /■* n «  r*’ r» Tn tU n  1 r»
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run, i.e. 50 to 200 years, tree and soil carbon sequestration will cease. Thus, further 
analysis is needed.
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NOTES
1 This chapter is drawn from a publication authored by McCarl and Schneider (2000). 
The article is entitled "U.S. Agriculture's Role in a Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Mitigation World: An Economic Perspective" and is published in Volume 22, 
Number 1 of the Spring/Summer 2000 issue of the Review o f Agricultural 
Economics. For the copyright statement, see Appendix A.
2 Enteric fermentation relates to methane emissions through microbial fermentation in 
digestive systems of ruminant animals.
3 NjO emissions in 1990: 0.4 million metric tons, current emissions: 0.5 million 
metric tons (U.S. EPA).
4 Note that the U.S. agricultural sector is currently experiencing a reduction in 
commodity programs and environmental incentive programs. Under the 1996 Farm 
Act, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) will spend twenty-two percent less 
than CRP historically and as of yet it will expire in 2002.
5 A weighted U.S. average of 210 pounds CO2 per million BTU generated is used 
based on the CO2 content of coal (U.S. DOE, 1998a) and biomass is assumed to 
displace 95 percent o f that level of emissions.
6 Note that the tax levels examined in all studies reviewed here are substantially 
greater than any anticipated carbon tax. Current policy discussions seem to indicate 
a carbon tax much more in the neighborhood of S1 0  per ton carbon.
Annex B countries comprise the developed countries including countries which are 
undergoing the transition to a market economy. The countries listed in Annex B are 
almost identical to the countries listed in Annex I to the UNFCCC with the 
exception of Croatia, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and Slovenia (included only in Annex 
B), and Turkey (included only in Annex I). The listing in Annex B to the Kyoto 
Protocol imposes specific emission reduction quantities on each contained country 
while the listing in Annex I or II of the convention only indicates the general 
agreement of contained countries to various emission control measures as qualified 
in the convention.
s Agriculture is assumed to face an elastic demand curve for GHGE reductions. This 
assumption is used for convenience only. A downward-sloped demand curve for 
emission reductions does not alter the qualitative results of the analysis.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
200
9 This procedure is done automatically through a program.
10 The power plant efficiency is defined in the traditional sense as the energy delivered 
to the grid (3414.7 BTU per kWh) divided by the energy in the power plant 
feedstock. For coal fired power plants, an estimate for the efficiency was obtained 
from the Electric Power Annual for 1998. Maim and Spath provided an estimate for 
the efficiency of biomass power plants.
11 Note that these values were computed for a setup with three fertilization 
alternatives. Increasing the number of alternative management options, i.e., allowing 
for more alternative fertilization options will also increase the ASMGHG model 
size, in particular the number of contained variables.
12 The emission reduction supply curves in Figure 6-1 do not show mitigation 
potentials beyond S100 per TCE. However, results were recorded for carbon prices 
up to S500 per TCE.
13 Program costs include only governmental costs. They should not be confused with 
the total economic costs incurred by producers, consumers, and the government.
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NOMENCLATURE
GHG(s) Greenhouse Gas(es)
GHGE(s) Greenhouse Gas Emission(s)
MMT Million Metric Tons
CE Carbon Equivalent
TCE Tons of Carbon Equivalent
MMTCE Million Metric Tons of Carbon Equivalent
CH4  Methane
N2O Nitrous Oxide
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
GWP Global Warming Potential
SOM Soil Organic Matter
SOMC Soil Organic Matter Coefficients
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Management2 Y-Adjb
'S'< l |
£
C-Adjd DN* Wa-Er‘ Wi-Er2 N-Exh P-Ex'
DN1 L V 1.042 1.04 -1,663 1,689 81.4 65.5 135.8 1.23
DN1 L c 1.039 1.03 1,955 1,668 50.9 43.5 136.0 0.38
D N l L z 1.039 1.02 3,670 1,628 28.1 31.2 135.2 0.54
DN1 M V 1.106 1.08 -2,518 1,410 225.5 71.0 147.2 1.02
D N l M c 1.015 1.01 2.959 1.413 136.7 47.1 154.9 0.41
D N l M z 1.016 1.01 5,556 1,392 77.6 34.0 152.7 0.57
D N l S V 0.739 0.77 -2,232 703 984.2 81.8 210.0 10.70
D N1 S c 0.861 0.90 1,987 710 617.5 53.8 211.2 3.75
D N l S z 0.860 0.91 5,691 705 357.7 37.9 208.5 4.40
D N l w V 1.084 1.10 -951 2,086 12.9 46.4 132.1 0.32
D Nl w c 0.987 1.00 855 1,993 10.7 30.8 101.3 0.19
D Nl w z 0.987 1.00 2,415 1,958 6.0 21.6 101.0 0.37
DN2 L V 0.904 0.77 -1,663 1,048 82.6 58.3 84.7 0.54
D N2 L c 0.910 0.79 1,955 1,036 51.7 38.7 84.7 0.28
DN2 L z 0.910 0.79 3,670 1,011 28.5 27.8 84.1 0.36
D N2 M V 0.974 0.87 -2,518 820 230.0 64.8 84.1 0.39
DN2 M c 0.886 0.80 2,959 822 139.4 43.0 88.6 0.33
DN2 M z 0.887 0.79 5,556 810 79.1 31.0 87.1 0.41
DN2 S V 0.638 0.58 -2,232 400 1,004.6 73.8 115.0 9.81
DN2 S c 0.744 0.67 1,987 405 630.3 48.5 114.8 3.56
DN2 S z 0.742 0.67 5,691 402 365.1 34.2 113.3 3.98
DN2 W V 0.960 0.90 -951 1,391 12.8 41.2 92.5 0.11
DN2 w c 0.874 0.82 855 1,329 10.7 27.4 70.7 0.10
DN2 w z 0.874 0.81 2,415 1,305 6.0 19.2 70.4 0.17
DN3 L V 0.707 0.53 -1,663 849 98.2 63.5 71.6 0.39
DN3 L c 0.710 0.55 1,955 839 61.4 42.2 71.7 0.23
DN3 L z 0.710 0.55 3,670 818 33.9 30.3 71.2 0.25
DN3 M V 0.754 0.63 -2,518 626 287.6 72.1 65.6 0.30
DN3 M c 0.685 0.58 2,959 627 174.3 47.9 69.3 0.27
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Management1 Y-Adjb N-Adjc C-Adjd DN* Wa-Er‘ Wi-Er8 N-Exh P-Ex1
DN3 M Z 0.685 0.57 5,556 618 98.9 34.5 68.1 0.29
DN3 S V 0.504 0.39 -2,232 294 1,250.0 83.4 82.7 7.90
DN3 S c 0.578 0.47 1,987 297 784.3 54.8 82.8 3.19
DN3 S z 0.578 0.47 5,691 295 454.2 38.6 81.6 3.46
DN3 W V 0.759 0.64 -951 1,168 14.7 44.0 83.0 0.09
DN3 VV c 0.690 0.59 855 1,116 12.2 29.2 63.2 0.08
DN3 W z 0.691 0.58 2,415 1,096 6.8 20.4 62.9 0.10
IN I L V 1.035 1.02 -1,597 2,141 75.7 62.3 170.8 0.80
IN I L c 1.013 0.99 1,878 2,115 47.3 41.4 173.1 0.40
IN I L z 1.013 0.99 3,525 2,064 26.2 29.7 172.3 0.57
IN I M V 1.032 1.03 -2.438 1,890 217.7 67.4 189.3 0.85
IN I M c 1.010 1.02 2,865 1,894 131.9 44.7 199.3 0.43
IN I M z 1.010 1.02 5,380 1,866 74.9 32.2 196.5 0.60
IN I S V 0.872 0.92 -2,193 880 849.1 74.6 265.9 8.44
IN I S c 0.970 1.02 1,952 889 532.7 49.0 267.2 3.36
IN I S z 0.969 1.02 5,591 882 308.6 34.5 263.6 4.02
IN I VV V 0.884 0.94 -899 2,776 12.7 47.3 173.2 0.40
IN I VV c 0.866 0.92 809 2,652 10.6 31.4 133.0 0.24
IN I VV z 0.866 0.92 2,284 2,605 5.9 22.0 132.7 0.42
I N2 L V 0.896 0.78 -1,597 1,329 76.9 55.5 106.9 0.33
I N2 L c 0.877 0.76 1,878 1,313 48.0 36.8 108.1 0.30
I N2 L z 0.877 0.76 3,525 1,281 26.5 26.4 107.3 0.36
IN2 M V 0.895 0.84 -2,438 1,100 222.0 61.5 108.1 0.37
IN2 M c 0.875 0.82 2,865 1,102 134.6 40.8 113.8 0.35
I N2 M z 0.875 0.81 5,380 1,086 76.3 29.4 112.0 0.41
IN2 S V 0.770 0.74 -2,193 501 866.7 67.3 145.6 5.19
IN2 S c 0.847 0.80 1,952 506 543.8 44.3 145.6 3.05
IN2 S z 0.846 0.80 5,591 503 314.9 31.2 143.5 3.45
IN2 W V 0.761 0.71 -899 1,851 12.6 42.0 121.3 0.15
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Management1 Y-Adjb N-Adjc C-Adjd DNf Wa-Erf Wi-Er® N-Exh P-Ex1
I N2 W c 0.744 0.70 809 1,768 10.5 27.9 92.8 0.13
IN2 W z 0.745 0.69 2,284 1,737 5.9 19.5 92.4 0.19
IN3 L V 0.673 0.49 -1,597 1,076 91.3 60.4 90.6 0.27
I N3 L c 0.658 0.47 1,878 1,063 57.1 40.1 91.5 0.25
I N3 L z 0.658 0.47 3,525 1,037 31.6 28.8 90.9 0.27
I N3 M V 0.675 0.56 -2,438 839 277.6 68.5 84.2 0.31
I N3 M c 0.660 0.55 2,865 841 168.2 45.5 88.8 0.28
I N3 M z 0.660 0.55 5,380 828 95.5 32.8 87.2 0.31
I N3 S V 0.606 0.52 -2,193 367 1,078.4 76.0 105.1 4.57
I N3 S c 0.647 0.54 1,952 371 676.6 50.0 105.2 2.66
I N3 s z 0.647 0.54 5.591 369 391.9 35.2 103.6 2.81
IN3 w V 0.553 0.43 -899 1,554 14.4 44.8 108.6 0.11
I N3 w c 0.542 0.42 809 1,485 12.0 29.7 82.7 0.09
I N3 w z 0.542 0.42 2,284 1,459 6.7 20.8 82.3 0.11
J I-irrigation, D-dry land, Nl/N2/N3-5%/15%/30% nitrogen stress, L-low erodible land,
M-medium erodible land, S-severe erodible land, W-W3-8 land, V-conventional
tillage, C-conservation tillage, Z-zero tillage.
b Relative yield adjustment factor.
c Relative nitrogen fertilizer adjustment factor.
d Soil carbon change from average current level to new tillage equilibrium in Kg 
CE/acre.
e Denitrification rate in kg nitrogen/acre.
1 Water erosion in kg soil/acre.
s Wind erosion in kg soil/acre.
h Nitrogen losses through erosion, leaching, surface, and subsurface flow in Kg 
nitrogen per acre
' Phosphorous losses through erosion, leaching, surface, and subsurface flow in Kg 
phosphorous per acre
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